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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Staff Working Document is the eleventh in a series of annual progress reports prepared 
by the European Commission since 2003 (previously referred to as ‘Monterrey reports’) under 
its  mandate  from  the  Council  to  monitor  progress  and  report  annually  on  the  European 
Union’s collective commitments, initially focusing on official development assistance (ODA) 
commitments agreed to at the 2002 Monterrey  International Conference on Financing for 
Development.  The  Council  subsequently  extended  the  original  mandate  to  other  areas  of 
Financing for Development, including domestic resource mobilisation, aid effectiveness, aid 
for trade and ‘fast-start’ climate finance. The table below summarises progress by the EU and 
its Member States in the implementation of 40 commitments in all areas of Financing for 
Development. 
Overall, the 2013 EU Accountability Report found:  
  substantial  progress  on  EU  commitments  concerning  private  investment,  trade, 
finance  relating  to  climate  change  adaptation  and  mitigation,  STI  and  innovative 
financing sources and instruments; 
  moderate progress on EU commitments concerning domestic resource mobilisation, 
debt  sustainability,  remittances,  biodiversity  protection  and  development 
effectiveness; and  
  limited or no progress on EU commitments concerning volumes of ODA. 
All commitments analysed in this report have emerged over the past decade, as new 
challenges have become clearer and the EU has recognised the need to strengthen its 
leadership role in finding solutions to global problems.  
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
1. Domestic Resource 
Mobilisation       
Support on tax policy, 
administration and reform  No date specified 
 
Member States (MS) are providing 
support, but this is still rather limited.  
Support for established 
regional tax administration 
frameworks (e.g. CIAT, 
ATAF) 
No date specified 
 
 
The EU and six MS support the 
ATAF; four MS are members of the 
CIAT. 
Exploring country-by-
country reporting by MNCs, 
exchange of tax information, 
transfer pricing and asset 
recovery 
No date specified 
 
 
26 MS and the Commission are 
members of the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes.  
Five MS participated in the OECD’s 
informal Task Force on Tax and 
Development, which includes a work 
stream on transfer pricing. 
Six MS support the StAR Initiative. 
Encourage the participation 
of developing countries in 
international tax cooperation 
No date specified 
 
 
17 MS and the Commission support 
at least one forum or dialogue 
platform, including the OECD 
Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters; the 
                                                           
1  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
International Tax Dialogue and the 
International Tax Compact. 
Ratify and implement the 
UN Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) and 
the OECD Convention on 
Combatting Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business 
Transactions 
As soon as possible, 
preferably before 2010, 
for UNCAC; no date 
specified for OECD 
Convention 
 
Germany and the Czech Republic 
have not ratified UNCAC. 22 MS are 
party to the OECD Convention but, 
according to Transparency 
International, only four actively, and 
seven moderately, enforce it. 
Support transparency and 
accountability through EITI 
and similar initiatives, 
possibly also in other sectors  
No date specified 
 
 
Ten MS and the Commission 
supported the EITI in 2012, e.g. 
through direct support to the 
Secretariat, bilateral support at 
country level or through the MDTF; 
five MS provided support to other 
initiatives (e.g. the Construction 
Sector Transparency Initiative and the 
Kimberley Process). 
2. Debt Sustainability       
Support existing debt relief 
initiatives, in particular the 
HIPC Initiative and the 
MDRI 
No date specified 
 
 
Three countries reached HIPC 
completion point in 2012. Several MS 
initiatives support MDRI and similar 
programmes. 
Support discussions, if 
relevant, on enhanced 
sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanisms, on the basis of 
existing frameworks and 
principles 
No date specified 
 
 
Limited support (only the EU and 11 
Member States see a need for reform, 
not necessarily structural). 
Participate in international 
initiatives such as the 
WB/IMF Debt 
Sustainability Framework 
(DSF) and promote 
responsible lending practices 
No date specified 
 
 
A recent IMF assessment found broad 
compliance with the DSF
2. 
Promote the participation of 
non-Paris Club members in 
debt-workout settlements 
No date specified 
 
 
No bilateral action, only support for 
dialogue through one annual meeting 
with non-members, not attended by 
China and India
3. 
Take action to restrict 
litigation against developing 
countries by distressed debt 
funds 
No date specified 
 
 
No action to restrict litigation 
mentioned by MS, only legal support 
to developing countries for litigation 
through multi-donor trust funds (e.g. 
DMF, ALSF). 
3. Private Investment for 
Development 
     
Support the development of 
the private sector, including 
small and medium-sized 
No date specified 
   
The EU and MS have provided 
substantial funding for private sector 
development (in 2004-10, the 
                                                           
2  IMF, Review of the policy on debt limits in fund-supported programs, 2013. 
3  Press release on the Paris Club meeting with representatives of non-Paris Club bilateral creditors and the private 
sector, 11 September 2012.  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
enterprises, through 
measures to enhance the 
overall investment climate 
for their activity, inter alia 
by promoting inclusive 
finance and through relevant 
EU investment facilities and 
trust funds 
Commission alone provided EUR 2.4 
billion in direct support in the form of 
grant funding). Since 2007, the EU, 
together with some MS, has set up 
eight regional blending facilities, 
covering all regions of EU external 
cooperation. Several MS’
4 national 
development finance institutions also 
support blending activities (EU 
facilities and others). 
MS reported over 100 ODA activities 
for private sector development in 
2012. 
Strengthen the EIB’s 
capacity to support EU 
development objectives and 
promote the efficient 
blending of grants and loans 
in third countries, including 
in cooperation with MS’ 
finance institutions or 
through development 
financing facilities 
No date specified 
   
Half of the Commission-funded 
private sector development support 
mentioned above was channelled 
through the EIB. 
Support for blending facilities as 
described above. 
Enhance efforts to promote 
the adoption by European 
companies of 
internationally-agreed CSR 
principles and standards, the 
UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 
and the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises 
No date specified 
   
Exploratory research was undertaken 
by the Commission in June 2012. 
Commitments by large EU enterprises 
are expected by 2014
5. 
Respond to the 
Commission’s invitation to 
develop or update MS’ plans 
or lists of priority actions in 
support of CSR 
No date specified 
   
On-going discussion with MS on 
plans and peer review mechanism
6. 
Several MS intend to complete their 
plans in 2013. 
4. Trade and Development       
Increase collective TRA to 
EUR 2 billion a year by 
2010 (EUR 1 billion from 
MS; EUR 1 billion from 
Commission). Around 50% 
of the increase to be 
available to ACP countries. 
2010 
   
Collective EU TRA commitments 
reached EUR 2.8 billion in 2011; EU 
collective wider AfT amounted to 
EUR 9.5 billion. 
TRA to Africa increased by 50% in 
2011 as compared with 2010. 
Sustain EU and MS efforts, 
giving increased attention to 
LDCs and joint AfT 
response strategies and 
delivery 
No date specified 
   
Active participation in the EIF, a 
multi-donor programme to help LDCs 
become more active in the global 
trading system. The proportion of EU 
collective AfT going to LDCs 
increased from 16% in 2010 to 19% 
in 2011. However, these shares are 
much lower than those of non-EU 
DAC donors. 
Reach agreement on 
regional AfT packages in 
No date specified 
   
In terms of total volume, regional 
AfT is growing faster than overall 
                                                           
4  AT, BE, DE, FR, SE, UK. 
5  See implementation table in the Commission Communication on CSR, 2011.  
6  Ibid.  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
support of ACP regional 
integration, under the 
leadership of the ACP 
regional integration 
organisations and their 
Member States, and 
involving other donors 
AfT. In 2011, the EU and MS 
committed EUR 726 million to ACP 
regional programmes and projects 
(8% of collective EU AfT, as 
compared with 4% in 2008). EUR 
642 million were committed to Sub-
Saharan Africa alone. 
Challenges were encountered with 
respect to the absorption capacity and 
performance of some regional 
organisations and their capacity to 
effectively coordinate donors. 
Continuously review the 
EU’s AfT strategies and 
programmes, taking into 
account lessons learnt and 
focusing on results 
No date specified 
   
The EU is active in the International 
Policy Dialogue on Aid for Trade in 
the OECD (latest meeting in January 
2013) and WTO (next Global Aid for 
Trade Review in July 2013). 
Regular discussions are held with MS 
and an EU monitoring report on AfT 
is published annually as part of this 
Accountability Report. 
Enhance the 
complementarity and 
coherence between trade and 
development instruments, 
focusing on LDCs and 
developing countries most in 
need, and increasing private 
sector involvement 
No date specified 
   
The Trade, Growth and Development 
Policy adopted in 2012 enhances 
complementarity and coherence and 
takes a differentiated approach to 
LDCs and other developing countries 
most in need. 
The new GSP adopted by the EU in 
2012 focuses on countries most in 
need, strengthens the GSP+ as an 
incentive to good governance and 
sustainable development and makes 
the scheme more transparent, stable 
and predictable.  
Better coordinate EU AfT, 
and align it behind the 
development strategies of 
partner countries 
No date specified 
   
38% of the respondents to a survey 
carried out in 2013 among EU 
Delegations and EU MS field offices 
in developing countries (see AfT 
report in Annex) believe that there 
have been moderate improvements in 
coordination (including through joint 
needs assessments, implementation 
and monitoring/evaluation). 
5. Remittances and 
Development 
     
Enhance the development 
impact of remittances 
No date specified 
   
The EU and several MS have 
launched initiatives to train migrants 
and foster migrants’ savings and 
diaspora investments in their 
countries of origin. 
Reduce the average cost of 
transferring remittances 
from 10% to 5% by 2014 
2014 
   
The average cost of sending 
remittances from the EU is estimated 
at 10.6% of the amount sent – higher 
than the global average of 9.1% and 
only marginally lower than the EU 
average of 11.71% in Q3 2008, when 
monitoring of remittance costs 
started. 
6. Official Development        
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
Assistance 
The EU and MS agreed to 
achieve a collective ODA 
level of 0.7% of GNI by 
2015 
2015 
 
The EU ODA/GNI ratio is projected 
to reach 0.43% by 2015. 
Take realistic, verifiable 
action to meet individual 
ODA targets by 2015 and 
share information about this 
action 
No date specified 
 
 
22 MS provided information on 2013 
financial year allocation, but limited 
information was provided on 
realistic/verifiable action. 
Increase collective ODA to 
Sub-Saharan Africa  No date specified 
 
 
2012 EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa 
increased as compared with 2004. 
Provide 50% of the 
collective ODA increase to 
Africa as a whole 
No date specified 
 
 
Only 7% of total EU ODA growth 
between 2004 and 2012 went to 
Africa. 
Provide between 0.15% and 
0.20% of collective ODA/ 
GNI to LDCs by 2010 
2010 
 
 
EU ODA/GNI to LDCs was 0.14% in 
2010, 0.13% in 2011, and 0.12% in 
2012. 
7. Funding for Tackling 
Climate Change 
     
Contribute EUR 2.4 billion 
annually in 2010-12 to ‘fast 
start’ climate funding 
End 2012 
 
The EU and MS contributed EUR7.3 
billion in 2010-12 to ‘fast start’ 
climate funding. 
Work towards pathways for 
scaling up climate finance 
from 2013 to 2020 from a 
wide variety of sources to 
reach the international long-
term joint goal of mobilising 
US$ 100 billion a year by 
2020 
2013-20 
 
Not applicable yet. Work has started. 
8. Funding for Protection 
of Biodiversity 
     
Hyderabad commitment to 
double total biodiversity-
related international 
financial resource flows to 
developing countries (in 
particular LDCs, SIDs and 
countries with economies in 
transition), as compared 
with 2006-10, by 2015 and 
at least maintain this level 
until 2020 
2015 and 2020 
 
Not applicable yet.  
9. Science, Technology and 
Innovation 
     
Improve mechanisms for 
international STI 
cooperation and for the 
development of ICT on 
major sustainable 
development challenges 
No date specified 
   
The  EU  Research  Framework 
Programme  and  EU  ODA 
increasingly support cooperation with 
partner countries in a range of sectors. 
Several  EU-funded  research  projects 
have specifically targeted the use of  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
ICT  to  share  experience  and 
knowledge across countries
7.  
Promote clean and 
environmentally sound 
technologies as a means to 
facilitate a transition to a 
green economy for all 
countries, regardless of their 
development status 
2014-20 
   
The EU and 15 MS support STI and 
technology transfer activities relating 
to the green economy. 
Support STI research 
cooperation and capacity 
building to enhance 
sustainable development in 
developing countries, 
including through the new 
Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme’’ 
2014-20 
   
’Horizon 2020 will put increased 
emphasis on STI partnerships with 
developing countries, in particular 
through bi-regional partnerships. 
Several MS implement programmes 
in this field. 
10. Innovative Financing 
Sources and Instruments 
     
Consider proposals for 
innovative financing 
mechanisms with significant 
revenue generation 
potential, with a view to 
ensuring predictable 
financing for sustainable 
development, especially for 
the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries 
No date specified 
 
 
Several MS are using innovative 
sources of development funding, 
although they accounted for only 2% 
of ODA in 2010-12. It is unclear 
whether revenue generation for 
development from existing and new 
taxes (e.g. FTT) will be significant. 
Promote new financial tools, 
including blending grants 
and loans and other risk-
sharing instruments 
No date specified 
 
 
Several blending instruments have 
been introduced and further 
developed over 2012, now covering 
all regions of EU external 
cooperation. The EU Platform for 
Blending in External Cooperation was 
established in December 2012. 
Use innovative financing 
mechanisms taking into 
account debt sustainability 
and accountability and 
avoiding market 
disturbances and budgetary 
risks. 
No date specified 
 
 
MS and Commission funds for 
innovative financial instruments 
increased from EUR 600 million a 
year in 2010-11 to over EUR 2 billion 
in 2012. 
11. Development 
Effectiveness 
     
Implement the European 
Transparency Guarantee and 
commitments relating to the 
common open standard for 
the publication of 
information on development 
resources, e.g. by publishing 
implementation schedules 
December 2012 
(schedules) and 
December 2015 
(implementation) 
 
By December 2012, the Commission 
and 20 MS, including all nine that are 
signatories to IATI, had published 
schedules to implement the common 
standard. 
In their schedules, the Commission 
and 13 MS set out plans for 
implementation by 2015. 
                                                           
7  Examples include the development of e-infrastructures and collaboration on ICTs between Europe and developing 
countries for research in different areas, e.g. the EU-Med GRID project, the EU-China GRID project and the EU-
India GRID project, aimed at supporting the interoperability of grid infrastructures in the EU and third countries to 
strengthen e-Science and promote new scientific collaboration.  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
1  Comments 
by December 2012, with the 
aim of full implementation 
by December 2015 
A majority of the schedules (11 out of 
21) were rated ‘unambitious’ by 
Publish What You Fund (PWYF). 19 
MS had a rating of ‘poor’ in PWYF’s 
2012 Transparency Index, four MS 
and the Commission were rated as 
‘fair’ and four MS as ‘moderate’.  
Promote joint programming 
and increase coordination in 
order to develop a EU joint 
analysis of, and response to, 
partner countries’ national 
development strategies 
No date specified 
 
 
Joint programming was taken forward 
in six partner countries in 2012 and is 
expected to be in place at the start of 
the next programming period (2014) 
in at least eight. The opportunities for 
joint programming were assessed on 
the ground in a total of 55 countries 
and preparations for joint 
programming will go ahead in almost 
all of these. Nine MS have issued 
guidelines on joint multi-annual 
programming.  
Implement the results and 
mutual accountability 
agenda 
No date specified 
 
 
Currently, the EU and 24 MS 
participate in mutual accountability 
arrangements in over 10% of their 
priority countries, and 13 MS and the 
EU do so in 50% or more. 
The EU and 21 MS participate in 
country-level results frameworks and 
platforms in over 10% of their 
priority countries, and 12 MS and the 
EU do so in 50% or more.  
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  INTRODUCTION 
This Accountability Report is the eleventh in a series of annual progress reports prepared by 
the  European  Commission  since  2003  (previously  referred  to  as  ‘Monterrey  reports’). 
Building on previous reports, it assesses where the EU and its Member States stand in relation 
to  40  common  commitments  on  Financing  for  Development.  This  report  focuses  on  the 
evolution in key areas since the 2012 report, and thus only summarises issues discussed at 
length last year. 
The Report responds  to the Council’s invitation  to  the European Commission  to  monitor 
progress  and  report  annually  on  common  EU  commitments,  initially  focusing  on  ODA 
commitments made at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey. The Council later expanded the original monitoring mandate to cover other areas 
of Financing for Development, including domestic revenue mobilisation, aid effectiveness, 
aid for trade, and fast-start climate finance. 
For  the  third  time,  the  Commission  presents  a  single,  comprehensive  report  covering  all 
topical issues of the international Financing for Development agenda. This year, the report 
also covers Science, Technology and Innovation, to reflect new commitments made as part of 
the Rio+20 process, and domestic resource management in addition to resource mobilisation, 
in  line  with  the  new  EU  Budget  Support  Guidelines.  Building  on  this  comprehensive 
approach,  the  report  is  also  intended  to  contribute  to  discussions  on  the  post-2015 
international development framework, including the UN Special Event to review progress 
towards achieving the MDGs. Financing and other Means of Implementation issues are an 
integral part of the discussions on the Rio+20 follow-up on sustainable development and the 
post-2015 overarching framework. 
The report is based on input provided by the 28 EU Member States, including Croatia, and the 
Commission through (i) the 2013 EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development, 
which covers key EU commitments related to the international Financing for Development 
agenda, and (ii) public sources and online databases on development cooperation. 
The Council also called on the Commission to make the annual progress report a model of 
transparency and accountability. As in 2011 and 2012, all Member States have agreed to the 
online publication of their replies to the annual questionnaire on Financing for Development. 
The Commission complements this exercise through Donor Profiles that give an overview of 
the overall development strategy of each Member State. All these documents are available on 
the EuropeAid webpage
8. 
Annex 1 lists the bibliography for all chapters. Annex 2 presents the methodology applied for 
analysing  ODA  and  climate  finance.  Annex  3  is  the  Statistical  Annex  on  ODA  trends 
(including individual graphs for all EU Member States showing the gaps to reaching 2015 
targets). Annex 4 consists of the Aid for Trade Report 2013. 
                                                           
8 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/financing_for_development/index_en.htm.  
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1.  BEYOND MDGS AND BEYOND AID 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the funding commitments of the Monterrey 
Conference were made more than a decade ago. Over this period, the global political and 
economic landscape has significantly changed. Growth in emerging economies has become 
the key driver of the global economy. Disparities among and within developing countries 
have increased and the GNI per capita of a few upper middle-income countries has outscored 
that  of  some  European  Member  States.  Likewise,  new  actors  have  emerged  in  the 
development  arena,  including  from  the  private  sector.  The  understanding  of  what 
development  means  is  also  changing,  with  a  greater  focus  on  sustainability  in  all  its 
dimensions, and broader issues relating to governance, human rights and peace and security. 
1.1.  Towards an Integrated Approach to All Financing Processes 
EU Commitments 
  Council  Conclusions  of  25  October  2012  on  Rio+20,  §33:  Underlines  the  need  for 
coherence, coordination and non-duplication of efforts with regard to the Financing for 
Development process; expresses its support for an integrated approach to the various 
MoI  aspects  of  the  Rio+20,  the  post-2015  development  agenda  and  other  relevant 
processes, given that the potential financing sources are the same, and highlights the 
importance  of  addressing  in  a  comprehensive  manner  the  various  strands  relating  to 
finance  and  technology  transfer  including  those  undertaken  in  the  context  of  climate 
change, biodiversity and desertification. 
  Council Conclusions of 25 June 2013 on the Overarching Post-2015 Agenda, §17c: 
There is a need for a common and comprehensive approach to financing for development 
beyond 2015. It will be important to address, in a coherent and comprehensive manner, 
relevant international processes relating to finance, role of ODA, innovative sources of 
financing, financial regulation and illicit financial flows, technology transfer, capacity 
building,  trade  and  those  processes  undertaken  in  the  context  of  climate  change, 
biodiversity and desertification. It will also be important to bear in mind the outcome 
from  Rio+20 on a process  proposing options for  a financing strategy for  sustainable 
development. 
As emphasised throughout the EU public consultation on ‘Towards a post-2015 development 
framework’
9 and underlined in the European Report on Development 2013
10, the values and 
principles of the Millennium Declaration remain relevant today, but achieving them ‘requires 
agreement on a broader set of goals than the MDGs, (…) a wider range of instruments than 
ODA, the main tool of the MDG effort, and an approach that moves beyond the historical 
donor-recipient relationship.’ 
The goal of EU Development Policy, as stated in the European Consensus on Development
11 
and in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union
12 and Article 208 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union
13,  remains  ‘poverty  elimination  in  the  context  of 
sustainable development’
14. The ‘Agenda for Change’
15 further underlines the importance of 
                                                           
9  European Commission/IBF, ‘Report on the public consultation on a post-2015 development framework’, 2012.  
10  European Report on Development, Post-2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future, Overseas 
Development  Institute (ODI),  German  Development  Institute/Deutsches Institut  für  Entwicklungspolitik  (DIE), 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Brussels, 2013. p. xxvii. 
11  European Consensus on Development, 2005. 
12  ‘Foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary 
aim of eradicating poverty.’ (para 2.d). 
13  ‘The reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.’ (para 1). 
14  European Consensus on Development. 
15  COM (2011) 637 final.  
16 
promoting  ‘inclusive  and  sustainable  growth  for  human  development’,  stressing  that 
‘development  is  not  sustainable  if  it  damages  the  environment,  biodiversity  and  natural 
resources and increases the exposure/vulnerability to natural disasters.’ 
The recent UN Task Team Report on the Post-2015 Development Agenda on ‘A renewed 
global partnership for Development’ stated clearly that the commitments made at Monterrey 
will remain an important cornerstone of this renewed global partnership for development
16. 
However, while the framework agreed at Monterrey remains useful, it should be extended to 
accommodate recent developments. Some of these developments have been incorporated into 
the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, agreed to at the Busan High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. 
In February 2013, the Commission adopted a Communication on ‘A Decent Life for All: 
Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’
17. The Communication proposes a 
common approach to the follow-up of Rio+20, and in particular the definition of Sustainable 
Development Goals, and to the review of the Millennium Development Goals. It suggests 
working towards an overarching framework to address these issues. In June 2013, the Council 
endorsed this general approach.
18 
International processes have multiplied, and there is now a momentum for consolidating 
these. The UN High Level Panel on post-2015 has published its report, the UN Open Working 
Group on Sustainable Development Goals has started its work and the UN Expert Committee 
for proposing options on a sustainable development financing strategy is being established. 
Various other processes also ponder what the post-2015 agenda should look like and how this 
could be implemented. Recent reports from the UN Secretary General, ECOSOC and UN 
General Assembly resolutions
19 all seem to favour merging the Financing for Development 
and Rio+20 Means of Implementation follow-up strands. 
In May 2013, the High -Level Panel of Eminent Persons on th e Post‐2015  Development 
Agenda published its final report
20, in which it also recognised the need to promote a single 
and coherent post-2015 development agenda that integrates economic growth, social inclusion 
and environmental sustainability. All post -2015 intergovernmental processes, including the 
Rio+20 follow-up, should be coherent and brought together into one comprehensive vision 
and approach. 
The  European  Union  can  lead  these  processes  as  it  did  for  the  Monterrey  and  Doha 
Conferences on Financing for Develo pment, and this is the time to flesh out the Union’s 
vision for a post-2015 overarching framework. 
At the time of drafting this report, financing issues had been actively discussed neither in the 
post-2015  development  agenda  nor  the  Rio+20  follow-up  process
21.  However,  an 
intergovernmental expert group is being established in the framework of the Rio+20 follow -
up to propose options for a sustainable development financing strategy by 2014; and the UN 
will decide in 2013 on the appropriateness of holding a new  Financing for Development 
Review Conference. 
                                                           
16  UN Task Team on the post-2015 Development Agenda, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, 2013.  
17  COM(2013) 92 final. 
18  Council Conclusions on the Overarching Post-2015 Agenda, 25 June 2013. 
19  See  for  example  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/67GA_SGR_FfD_AUV_290812.pdf  and 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/67GA_SGR_FfdModalities_AUV.pdf.  
20  UN High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and 
Transform Economies through Sustainable Development, May 2013 
21  See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/followupbyunsystem.html.  
17 
As  stated  in  the  Global  Partnership  Roadmap  for  2013
22,  ‘bridging  the  Financing  for 
Development  and  post-2015  discussions  is  the  nascent  intergovernmental  process  on 
sustainable development finance. The UN intergovernmental expert group is expected to be 
composed of 30 experts from different regions, and will hold four meetings in 2013 and two 
meetings  in  2014.  The  process  will  assess  financing  needs,  consider  the  effectiveness, 
consistency and synergies of existing instruments and frameworks and evaluate additional 
initiatives.  A  report  should  be  presented  to  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  2014  and  this 
sustainable development finance process may eventually be integrated with the existing FfD 
process’. 
As  potential  sources  of  finance  are  identical  and  limited,  the  means  to  achieve  poverty 
eradication and sustainable development should not be considered or measured separately. In 
its Conclusions on Rio+20
23, of October 2012, the Council of Ministers expressed ‘its support 
for an integrated approach to the various Means of Implementation aspects of the Rio+20, the 
post-2015 development agenda and other relevant processes, given that the potential financing 
sources are the same’. 
Every euro allocated to serve global policy objectives can only be spent once, but may, at the 
same time, serve several objectives. As underlined in the EU’s contribution to the Rio+20 
Outcome  Document
24,  ‘a  joint  approach  by  traditional  donors,  emerging  economies, 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and the private sector is needed, addressing the ‘silo’ 
approach to channelling funds and ensuring a more effective identification and use of existing 
resources, as well as mobilisation of available and innovative sources of finance’. As shown 
Table  1.1.1  below,  the  Financing  for  Development  process  encompasses  all  Means  of 
Implementation. The process started at Rio+20 has the potential to have essentially the same 
scope.  Other  financing  initiatives  do  not  necessarily  address  some  of  the  issues  (e.g. 
remittances, trade, debt or systemic issues). The present report provides an overview of all the 
different means, including, for the first time, Science, Technology and Innovation. 
Table 1.1.1 – Elements of Means of Implementation Covered under existing UN Processes  
Means of 
implementation for: 
Process 
Financing for 
Development 
Rio+20  Climate Change   Biodiversity  
Domestic resources  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Private flows, FDI, 
innovative mechanisms 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other private 
flows/CSR/Remittances 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Trade  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
ODA  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Effectiveness  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Capacity building  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Innovative sources  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Debt  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Systemic 
issues/international 
architecture 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
                                                           
22  Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Draft roadmap for 2013.  
23  Council Conclusions on Rio+20: outcome and follow-up to the UNCSD 2012 Summit, 25 October 2012. 
24  Contribution by the European Union and its Member States to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(1 November 2011).   
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Policy Coherence for 
Development and other 
policy challenges 
Yes  In part  No  In part 
Science, Technology and 
Innovation 
In part  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
1.2.  Towards a Comprehensive Approach to All Financing Sources 
EU Commitments 
  Council Conclusions of 25 October 2012 on Rio+20, §34: Underlines that resources for 
the implementation of sustainable development policies have to be mobilised by all types 
of stakeholders and come from all sources, national and international, public and private 
as well as financial and non-financial actions. 
  Council Conclusions of 25 June 2013 on the Overarching Post-2015 Agenda, §17d: The 
mobilisation of all resources, public and private, domestic and international and their 
effective  and  innovative  use  will  be  vital  for  the  successful  development  and 
implementation of the [post-2015] framework. 
Recent  studies
25  show that most developing  countries have the financial means to  end 
poverty
26 by 2030. While the cost is negligible for Upper MICs, it is estimated at around 5.5% 
of GDP in 2008 for Lower MICs (an amou nt that could be easily covered for example by 
better tax collection), where almost 80% of the global poor live (bearing in mind that every 
individual country situation is by definition unique). MICs also have stronger national buffers 
to deal with exogenous shocks. Progress depends primarily on the design and implementation 
of appropriate national policies to ensure the inclusiveness of development and pro -poor 
growth. In contrast, the investment needs of LICs for ending poverty were estimated at 25.4% 
of their GDP
27 in 2008, and they are projected to remain significant in 2020 (14.9%), and 
2030 (9.7%). LICs have much lower levels of national resource mobilisation and greater 
vulnerability to global shocks due to low buffers. The progress in LICs will contin ue to 
require external financing to support national efforts in ending poverty by 2030. 
At an aggregate level, as shown in Table 1.2.1 below, most resources to end poverty by 2030 
can be mobilised by the public sector domestically and by the private sector both domestically 
and internationally, while public international finance is very small in comparison. Data are 
readily available only for ODA, while they need to be assembled from a variety of sources for 
all  other  means  of  implementation.  The  methodology  used  in  assembling  such  data  is 
described in Annex 2. 
Public finance fulfils the same function whether coming from domestic or external sources. 
Domestic public finance is directly available for implementing government plans from the 
moment of collection. International public finance should complement domestic resources and 
help  to  implement  nationally  owned  development  strategies,  using  development  finance 
effectively. 
For middle-income countries, domestic revenues constitute the main financial source, while 
ODA  has  only  a  marginal  role  (0.4%  of  GDP).  The  domestic  revenues  of  low-income 
                                                           
25  Institute of Development Studies, Andrew Sumner, ‘From Deprivation to Distribution: Is Global Poverty Becoming 
A Matter of National Inequality?’, IDS Working Paper Volume 2012 No 394, 2012. 
26  Poverty is defined here as people living on less than $2 per day. 
27  Institute of Development Studies, Andrew Sumner, ‘From Deprivation to Distribution: Is Global Poverty Becoming 
A Matter of National Inequality?’ Op. Cit.  
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countries  are  relatively  lower,  and  ODA  remains  a  significant  source  (12%  of  GDP) 
representing the most important external financial flow. 
The aggregate data above hide many national-level differences. While the specific situation of 
each country requires an individual approach, the above analysis shows massive differences 
of vulnerabilities and abilities between MICs and LICs. Yet, it is clear that all countries need 
to do more to mobilise resources and use them in a targeted way in order to reach the global 
development goals. 
Private sector finance accounts for about one quarter of all flows in both low-income and 
middle-income countries. It can serve as means of implementing the fight against climate 
change  and  the  protection  of  biodiversity,  or  be  leveraged  through  innovative  financial 
instruments like blending, presented in Chapter 5. This illustrates the extent to which private 
finance has become pivotal in many developing countries and confirms the need to work more 
closely with private sector actors and include them into the post-2015 dialogue. 
 
While all resources fluctuate somewhat, domestic sources tend to be more stable and exceed 
by far external finances. Experience shows that, with the right policies, more resources can be 
mobilised. With regard to private finance and private sector actors, it is important to work 
towards streamlining their contribution towards global goals, including through the use of 
policy incentives.  
20 
Table 1.2.1 – Total Resources Available to Developing Countries by Income Group 
(EUR billion, 2010) 
Flow 
LIC  MIC 
Unallocated 
by income 
Total 
Amount 
share of 
GDP  amount 
share of 
GDP 
Public Domestic Finance   42  13.1%  3,275  22.0%    3,317 
Tax revenue  41  13.0%  3,211  21.6%    3,252 
Public or Publicly Guaranteed 
External Debt 
0  0.0%  64  0.4%    65 
             
Memo item: Total Reserves  41  12.9%  4,033  27.1%    4,074 
             
Public International Finance   39  12.1%  57  0.4%  63  158  
ODA Grants  35  11.2%  28  0.2%  29  92 
(of which EU)  15  4.8%  11  0.1%  13  39 
Concessional Loans  1  0.2%  5  0.0%  2  7 
(of which EU)  0  0.1%  1  0.0%  1  3 
Other official finance  2  0.7%  24  0.2%  28  54 
(of which EU)  -0  -0.1%  -2  -0.0%  -2  -4 
International security operations          5  5 
(of which EU)          2  2 
             
Private Finance – domestic and 
international 
71  22.4%  3,538  23.8%  42  3,652 
Domestic Private Investment  42  13.1%  2,636  17.7%    2,678 
External private finance (debt, FDI, 
portfolio investment, remittances) 
29  9.2%  902  6.1%  42  974 
of which: 
Private non-guaranteed 
External Debt 
1  0.2%  69  0.5%    70 
FDI  11  3.5%  431  2.9%    443 
Foreign Portfolio Investment    0.0%  181  1.2%    181 
Remittances  18  5.5%  221  1.5%    238 
(of which EU)  3    40      43 
Private charity          42  42 
             
Total finance for investments  151  48%  6,870  46%  105  7,126 
             
International Trade (facilitates 
private and public finance 
mobilisation)             
Total volume of developing 
countries’ exports of goods and 
services  78  24.5%  4,304  29.0%    4,382 
 
See Annex 2 for details on the methodology used. Data on EU private finance flows to and EU imports from developing 
countries as a group are not currently provided by Eurostat.  
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1.3.  Strengthening Global Governance 
EU Commitments 
  Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009, §36: Considering that world trade, investment and 
financial  stability  are  essential  for  restoring  global  sustained  growth,  the  Council 
welcomes the G20 agreement on the reform of the mandates, scope and governance of 
[International Financial Institutions]to reflect, inter alia, changes in the world economy 
and the new challenges of globalisation, to ensure greater voice and representation for 
emerging  and  developing  countries,  including  open,  transparent  and  merit-based  top 
management selection processes. 
The European Union promotes effective multilateralism and supports the fundamental role of 
the UN system in global governance. It is indeed a founding principle of the EU, as stated in 
Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty
28. 
Many  development  challenges  of  the  21
st  century,  spanning  from  climate  change  to 
biodiversity protection, from fighting illicit capital flows to increasing developing countries’ 
access to global markets, from financial stability to security, defy borders, call for innovative 
instruments, blur the lines between development cooperation in the context of sustainable 
development and other policy fields, and require solutions that are often not only multilateral, 
but also multipolar involving new or re-emerging sovereign players, and a much more active 
civil  society  without  borders.  The  new  Global  Partnership  for  Effective  Development 
Cooperation  that  has  recently  emerged  calls  for  a  more  inclusive,  efficient  and  effective 
global governance – an important objective of the EU. To this end, there is a need to reform 
the institutional framework, centred on the UN System, while confirming its leading role in 
the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of global policy goals. 
An important step in this direction was made at the Rio+20 Conference, held in June 2012 in 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  which  initiated  a  process  to  strengthen  the  institutional  framework  for 
sustainable development. This includes further integration of sustainable development within 
the work of the General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as a 
key element of the overarching framework of the UN activities and its agenda setting. In this 
context, Rio+20 decided to establish a High Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable 
Development,  replacing  the  Commission  on  Sustainable  Development.  The  HLPF  will, 
among other agreed functions
29, follow-up on the implementation of sustainable development 
commitments, provide political leadership and guidance, enhance integration of the three 
dimensions of sustainable development, improve cooperation and coordination within the UN 
system, and strengthen the science policy interface. The EU and Member States support the 
idea  that  the  HLPF  should  be  ‘directly  linked  with  ECOSOC,  and  working  at  a  higher 
political level (UNGA) at regular intervals’
30. This should contribute to enhance coherence 
with the review of the MDGs and the post 2015 framework.  
A High Level Panel (HLP) of Eminent Persons was also established by the UN Secretary-
General  to  make  proposals  on  the  post-2015  Development  Agenda.  The  HLP  formulated 
recommendations regarding the vision and shape of a ‘Post-2015 development agenda that 
will help respond to the global challenges of the 21
st century, building on the MDGs and with 
a view to ending poverty’ in May 2013. The Panel also advised on how to strengthen the 
                                                           
28  ‘The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or 
global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral 
solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.’ 
29  The main results of the conference are summarised in the Commission Communication on ‘A Decent Life for All – 
Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’, COM(2013) 92 final, 27 February 2013. 
30  Council Conclusions of 25 October 2012 on Rio+20, §17  
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global  partnership  for  development,  improve  accountability  at  all  levels,  build  political 
consensus on the Post-2015 development agenda, and include the private sector.
31 
With regard to International Financial Institutions, IMF members are in t he process of 
ratifying the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform, which is a major achievement in enhancing 
the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund. All EU Member States have fully 
ratified the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform. In January 201 3, the Executive Board 
formulated important building blocks for agreement on a revised quota formula and agreed 
that the review of the quota formula will be taken together with the 15th General Review of 
Quotas by January 2014. An agreement on an integrated package needs to be reached by that 
deadline. It is foreseen that the review will lead to further increases in the quota shares of 
dynamic emerging market economies. 
The World Bank governance reform process is less advanced. Some progress has been made 
on  the  implementation  of  the  2010  reforms  for  enhancing  voice  and  participation  of 
developing countries and meeting new challenges, but more is needed in terms of finding an 
appropriate voting formula by 2015 and ensuring that future selection processes are  truly 
merit based regardless of nationality.  
The World Bank has recently put forward its Common Vision Paper, outlining the proposed 
goals and principles for the future strategy of the World Bank Group, to be endorsed in 2013. 
With the aim of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity and environmental 
sustainability, the World Bank goals and principles mirror very much those of the EU Agenda 
for Change. 
                                                           
31  UN High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and 
Transform Economies through Sustainable Development, May 2013  
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2.  DOMESTIC PUBLIC FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  Domestic Resource Mobilisation 
EU Commitments 
  EU policy on tax and development is set out in the 2010 Communication on ‘Tax and Development 
– Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’
32 and 
the accompanying Staff Working Document. Their main recommendations were endorsed by the 
Council in its Conclusions of 14 June 2010
33 and by the European Parliament in a resolution of 
March 2011. In these Conclusions, the Council encouraged the Commission and Member States 
to: 
1.  support developing countries in tax policy, tax administration and tax reforms, including in the 
fight against tax evasion and other harmful tax practices; 
2.  support, including financially, already established regional tax administration frameworks such 
as  CIAT  (Centro  Inter-Americano  de  Administraciones  Tributarias)  and  ATAF  (African  Tax 
Administration Forum), as well as IMF Regional Technical Centre; 
3.  work  towards  exploring  country-by-country  reporting  as  a  standard  for  multinational 
corporations;  a  global  system  for  exchange  of  tax  information;  reducing  incorrect  transfer 
pricing practices; and promoting asset recovery; 
4.  encourage the participation of developing countries in structures and procedures of international 
tax cooperation should be strongly encouraged, including in the United Nations and the OECD, 
in the International Tax Dialogue and International Tax Compact; and 
5.  enhance their support to the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) and consider 
expanding similar practices to other sectors. 
  The  relevance  of  this  agenda  was  reinforced  through  the  2011  Commission 
Communications on ‘An Agenda for Change‘ and ‘The future approach to EU Budget 
support  to  third  countries’
34.  These  Communications  provide  further  emphasis  on  tax 
policy  and  administration  by  stating  that  ‘the  EU  will  continue  to  promote  fair  and 
transparent  domestic  tax  systems  in  its  country  programmes,  in  line  with  the  EU 
principles  of  good governance in  the tax area, alongside international initiatives  and 
country  by  country  reporting  to  enhance  financial  transparency’
35.  The  main 
recommendations  of  the  Agenda  for  Change  were  endorsed  by  the  Council  in  its 
Conclusions of 14 May 2012. 
  In September 2012, the EU adopted new ‘Budget Support Guidelines’ in line with the 
2011  Communication  which  places  a  stronger  emphasis  on  encouraging  partner 
countries’ efforts to mobilise domestic revenues and to reduce their aid dependency. In 
particular,  the  guidelines  state  that  ‘within  budget  support  contracts,  DRM  will  be 
considered within the macroeconomic (fiscal policy) and public financial management 
(tax administration) eligibility criteria, and it should be given greater attention in policy 
dialogue and capacity development.’ 
  An  updated  synthesis  of  EU  position  on  tax  reform  is  presented  in  the  2012  Commission 
Communication on ‘Improving EU support to developing countries in mobilising Financing for 
Development‘
36. The Commission stressed that ‘it is up to the partner government to enact and 
uphold the appropriate regulatory measures and policies to ensure that the virtuous cycle of tax 
collection-development spending-development progress-increased tax collection materialises. The 
EU and its Member States can facilitate this process by continuing to expand their support to 
                                                           
32  COM(2010) 163 final. 
33  Council  Conclusions  on  Tax  and  Development  –  Cooperating  with  developing  countries  in  promoting  good 
governance in tax matters, 11082/10, 15 June 2010.  
34  COM(2011) 638 final.  
35  COM(2011) 637 final. 
36  Recommendations based on the 2012 EU Accountability Report on Financing for Development. COM(2012) 366.   
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strengthen  the  capacity  of  tax  systems,  and  to  ‘incorporate  tax  administration  and  fair  tax 
collection, including rationalising tax incentives and good governance in tax matters, into policy 
dialogue with partner countries.’ Additional support can be through regulatory means, such as 
combating illicit capital flows and reducing the misuse of transfer pricing as well as strengthening 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and adopting legislation for country by 
country reporting for multinational enterprises. 
  The EU has committed to take action at the international level to fight corruption, tax evasion and 
illegal financial flows. In the Council Conclusions of 11 November 2008 (EU position for Doha 
FfD conference), §18, the EU promised in particular to: 
1.  ratify and implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Merida) as soon as 
possible and best before 2010; 
2.  adhere to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions; 
3.  adopt  and  implement  international  norms  to  prevent  money  laundering,  as  well  as  the 
financing of terrorism and proliferation, support international cooperation repatriation of 
stolen assets, among those the Stolen Assets Recovery initiative (STAR); and 
4.  promote the principles of transparency and accountability over natural resource revenue by 
supporting and implementing the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), as well 
as other specific initiatives aiming at improved governance and transparency in the extractive 
sector. 
  Commission Communication of 6 December 2012 (and ensuing ECOFIN Council Conclusions 
of 14 May 2013 and European Council Conclusions of 22 May 2013) on an Action Plan to 
strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion
37. The Action Plan sets out 34 actions that 
the Commission proposes to take with Member States over the next two years, in order to combat 
tax fraud and evasion, and is accompanied by two Recommendations on measures intended to 
encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, and on 
aggressive tax planning
38. 
2.1.1.  Introduction 
Domestic revenue is the most important source of development finance directly available to 
governments.  As  emphasised  in  the  2012  Communication  on  Improving  EU  support  to 
developing countries in mobilising Financing for Development
39 ‘the primary responsibility 
for  development  lies  with  the  developing  countries  themselves’.  Studies  have  shown  that 
many developing countries need substantial additional revenue
40 and a corresponding increase 
in fiscal space to finance poverty -reduction and adaptation to climate change.   Increasing 
domestic revenue not only supports this type of spending, it also allows a country to assume 
ownership for its policy choices, thus strengthening good governance
41. 
The objective of this section is to present current EU thinking and progress in the area of tax 
and development. The analysis below reveals that the EU policy framework put forward in 
2010 has been mainstreamed by some Member States and associated with an emerging 
consensus amongst practitioners on how best to support tax reforms to enhance effective 
domestic resource mobilisation. The rest of the section presents the evolution of EU and 
Member State’s support during the past year. 
                                                           
37  COM(2012) 722 final. 
38  COM(2012)8805 and COM(2012)8806. 
39  COM(2012) 366.  
40  About 4% of GDP in lower income countries - See IMF (2012) Taxation and Development – Again.  
41  UN Task Team on the post-2015 Development Agenda, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, 2013. 
(para 25).   
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2.1.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on 
domestic resource mobilisation. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
42  Comment 
Support on tax policy, 
administration and reform  No date specified 
 
Member States (MS) are providing 
support, but this is still rather limited.  
Support for established 
regional tax administration 
frameworks (e.g. CIAT, 
ATAF) 
No date specified 
 
 
The EU and six MS support the 
ATAF; four MS are members of the 
CIAT. 
Exploring country-by-
country reporting by MNCs, 
exchange of tax information, 
transfer pricing and asset 
recovery 
No date specified 
 
 
26 MS and the Commission are 
members of the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes.  
Five MS participated in the OECD’s 
informal Task Force on Tax and 
Development, which includes a work 
stream on transfer pricing. 
Six MS support the StAR Initiative. 
Encourage the participation 
of developing countries in 
international tax cooperation 
No date specified 
 
 
17 MS and the Commission support at 
least one forum or dialogue platform, 
including the OECD Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters; the International Tax 
Dialogue and the International Tax 
Compact. 
Ratify and implement the 
UN Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) and 
the OECD Convention on 
Combatting Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business 
Transactions 
As soon as possible, 
preferably before 2010, 
for UNCAC; no date 
specified for OECD 
Convention 
 
Germany and the Czech Republic 
have not ratified UNCAC. 22 MS are 
party to the OECD Convention but, 
according to Transparency 
International, only four actively, and 
seven moderately, enforce it. 
Support transparency and 
accountability through EITI 
and similar initiatives, 
possibly also in other sectors  
No date specified 
 
 
Ten MS and the Commission 
supported the EITI in 2012, e.g. 
through direct support to the 
Secretariat, bilateral support at 
country level or through the MDTF; 
five MS provided support to other 
initiatives (e.g. the Construction 
Sector Transparency Initiative and the 
Kimberley Process). 
2.1.3.  Recent Trends 
Domestic tax revenues  represented a significant share of the overall development finance 
available for both low income and middle income countries in 2010, as shown in Figure 2.1.3. 
                                                           
42  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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Figure 2.1.3 – Domestic Tax Revenues as a Share of Total Resource Flows of Low-
Income (LIC) and Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in 2010 
The relative level of domestic revenue collection is generally a function of per-capita income. 
The ratio between tax revenues and GDP in developing countries varies, but is in general a 
smaller share of GDP than in higher income countries. Overall, government revenues have 
been a stable and increasing source of financing
43 for most developing countries, except for 
LICs  where  ODA  funding  often  exceeds  efforts  in  d omestic  revenue  mobilisation .  On 
average, tax revenues account for 13% of GDP in LICs, 20% of GDP in MICs, and 35% of 
GDP in High Income Countries (HICs)
44. Moreover, the share in LICs has been essentially 
stationary since 1970, while it has grown in both MICs (+9%) and HICs (+4%). This is partly 
for structural reasons, but mostly results from suboptimal tax systems (e.g. narrow tax base) 
and weak tax administration (collection capacity). Fragile countries, in particular, have much 
lower average tax revenue (14%) as a proportion of GDP than non-fragile countries (20%)
45. 
Natural resources are an important source of tax revenues: between the early 1980s and 2005, 
resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa increased their tax–GDP ratios by about seven 
percentage points; non-resource related tax revenue in the region, on the other hand, was 
essentially stagnant
46. 
The most significant additional long-term mobilisation efforts should be undertaken by LICs 
and fragile states, which lag behind in terms of tax ratio, while avoiding distortions that would 
penalise private sector investment. This usually involves institution and state building, but 
does not preclude shorter-term reforms even in the absence of fully effective institutions
47. 
Many developing countries offer tax incentives and exemptions to investors, particularly in 
areas which would otherwise be considered undesirable for investment. For example, in the 
last  decades  many  African  countries  provided  tax  exemptions  in  their  Value  Added  Tax 
(VAT) system and other forms of tax incentives and exemptions. Tax incentives and their 
corresponding tax expenditures have been characterised as ‘substantial’ even if they are not 
easy to quantify on the basis of a consistent methodology and they vary significantly from one 
country  to  the  other
48. Tax incentives are estimated to reduce tax revenues by several 
                                                           
43  IDS News & blogs, ‘Tax is the most stable source of revenue for developing countries’, 2012.  
44  IMF, ‘Tax Composition and Growth: A Broad Cross-Country Perspective’, WP/12/257, 2012. 
45  IMF, ‘Mobilizing Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Norms and Key Determinants’, WP/12/108, 2012.  
46  IMF, ‘Taxation and Development — Again’, WP/12/220, 2012. 
47  Idem.  
48  IDB, ‘Tax Expenditure Budgets: Concepts and Challenges for Implementation’, IDB-WP-131, 2010. The study of 
seven Latin American countries provides a detailed definition and analysis of tax expenditures and, based on early 
2000 data, estimate their cost to range from 1.5 percent of GDP (Brazil, 2001) to 12.7 percent of GDP (Guatemala, 
2002).   
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percentage  points  of  GDP  (e.g.  3%  in  Tanzania  according  to  the  Tanzania  Revenue 
Authority
49) and their efficacy in attracting foreign direct investment is also open to question, 
especially in Africa
50. 
Illicit financial flows
51 are particularly harmful for developing countries, although their size 
is  difficult  to  estimate.  According  to  a  recent  report  by  Global  Financial  Integrity
52, 
developing countries lost EUR 442 billion per year through illicit flows over the decade 2000-
2010. In 2010 alone, illicit outflows from developing countries had grown to EUR 649 billion 
– almost six times the value of net ODA from all donors in the same year. 
2.1.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
2.1.4.1.  Domestic Revenue Mobilisation 
The EU and 19 Member States
53 reported new initiatives to strengthen developing countries’ 
tax  systems.  This  reflects  the  continued  importance  of  taxation  in  support  to  developing 
countries.  The content  of such support varied  from  the very narrow (e.g. study  tours for 
instance in the case of Czech Republic and Romania) to the quite broad and multi-country 
programmes (e.g. UK support to EITI, and France’s support to capacity building in West 
Africa).  New  initiatives  in  the  area  of  domestic  revenue  mobilisation  include  Germany’s 
support to South Sudan and UK’s support to the Palestinian Authority. 
A recent  UK Parliamentary  report
54 has put added emphasis on the importance of tax in 
developing countries, in line with EU commit ments. The critical importance of taxation in 
development and poverty reduction is at the centre of this report. It states that effective tax 
collection involves: (a) with respect to the extractive industries, a heavier focus on taxing 
volumes of extraction or turnover; and (b) improved collection of personal income taxation, 
VAT and local property taxation. Underpinning the latter is an urgent need to provide 
incentives for formalisation of enterprises to join the formal sector. The report underlines the 
global nature of tax collection, where regulatory issues play a major role, and recommends 
enacting laws unilaterally requiring (i) tax authorities to exchange information automatically 
to deter cross-border tax evasion; (ii) corporations to report their fi nancial information on a 
country-by-country basis; and (iii) assess any new primary or secondary UK tax legislation 
against its likely impact on revenue-raising in developing countries – especially to discourage 
the misuse of transfer pricing. 
The 2012 Accountability Report had noted the absence of a joint diagnostic framework for 
assessing  tax  systems.  In  the  course  of  2012,  efforts  have  been  made  by  several  donors 
(including EU MS and the Commission) and the IMF to develop a joint assessment tool. The 
2012 report had also noted that the coordination and complementarity of the Member States’ 
approaches could be enhanced, while country coverage seemed improved based on suitable 
division of labour between Member States. These observations appear to remain valid and 
international coordination platforms (e.g. the International Tax Compact) should be further 
deployed. Finally, there is no information on whether the weakness related to the relatively 
low engagement with  national  parliaments  and  civil  society  organisations  have benefitted 
                                                           
49  Tanzania Revenue Authority, ‘Tax Exemptions and Incentives in Tanzania: Challenges for Tax Policy and Revenue 
Administration’, Presentation at ICTD 2012 Annual Meeting.  
50  ATAF, Presentation of the African Tax Administration Forum at ICTD 2012 Annual Meeting, 2012. 
51  Illicit financial flows involve the cross-border transfer of the proceeds of corruption, trade in contraband goods, 
criminal  activities,  and  tax  evasion.  -  See  UNDP  (2011),  ‘Illicit  Financial  Flows  from  the  Least  Developed 
Countries: 1990–2008’, Discussion paper. 
52  Global Financial Integrity, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001-2010’, 2012.  
53  AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, NL, PT, RO, SL, UK. 
54  UK  Parliament,  ‘Tax  in  Developing  Countries:  Increasing  Resources  for  Development’,  House  of  Commons, 
Fourth Report of Session 2012-13.  
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from any specific support. These organisations are an important part of the good governance 
and  accountability  frameworks  in  developing  countries  and  would  benefit  from  capacity-
building. 
To  improve  support  to  developing  countries,  several  new  studies  provide  guidance  for 
prioritisation  and  sequencing  of  support  and  identify  approaches  that  are  the  likeliest  to 
succeed, as discussed in Box 2.1.4 below. 
Portugal remains the only Member State to report funding tax reform in developing countries 
at a share above 50% of its ODA for public financial management (PFM). Another fourteen 
Member States
55 provide support for tax reform, but at lower shares of their PFM aid, while 
nine Member States
56  do not provide any. These results are in line  with what had been 
reported last year. 
The  EU  and  twelve Member  States
57  report  monitoring  domestic  resource  mobilisation 
through budget support operations. The monitoring takes place in a number of ways, with 
many taking advantage of this task being performed by donor groups and/or through Joint 
Performance Assessment Frameworks – which minimises the reporting burden imposed on 
recipient countries. Other approaches have been pursued by Austria, through its dialogue on 
aid dependency, Germany’s ‘fiduciary risk assessment tool’ which sets a 10% threshold on 
revenue  to  GDP  as  a  trigger  for  budget  support,  and  Denmark,  which  is  issuing  new 
guidelines on budget support to address this area more systematically. 
The EU and the majority of Member States support developing countries’ efforts to assess the 
impact  of  tax incentives. Member States’ support is  largely through technical  assistance, 
provision of experts, twinning, training and studies. Some, such as Germany and Denmark, go 
beyond  the  simple  quantification  of  the  expenditures  and  assess  impact  in  terms  of 
investments, cost benefit and efficiency. Other donors, such as the UK, Germany and Ireland 
also  provide  indirect  support  by  funding  related  work  by  institutions  such  as  the  IMF 
(including its Regional Assistance Centres) and the World Bank, in line with the Council 
Conclusions of June 2010 on Tax and Development. 
 
Box 2.1.4 –Tax and Development: recent findings 
 
A 2013 OECD study
58 shows that taxation should be regarded not only as a means to raise 
revenue but also as an essential component of good governance. In that sense, how revenue is 
collected is as important as how much gets collected. And linkages between taxation and 
governance also involve supporting institutions and organisations outside the revenue system 
(e.g.  the  Judiciary,  Parliament,  civil  society).  Donors  can  support  revenue  collection 
processes, but partner country ownership and leadership are preconditions for success. 
 
Two focused studies conducted in 2012 by the International Centre for Tax and Development, 
with funding from DfID and Norad, update knowledge in selected areas, provide further 
validation of current approaches, and may help EU and Member States to prioritise their 
interventions: 
                                                           
55  AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IE, NL, PL, SE, UK. 
56  CY, EL, IT, LT, LU, LV, RO, SK, SL do not provide support. 
57  AT, DE, DK, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, SE, SK, UK. 
58  OECD, ‘Tax and Development - Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems’, DCD/DAC(2012)34, 2012.   
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  The report on Taxation and Development
59 summarises lessons learnt from 50 years of research. It 
concludes that: (i) encouraging and funding local think tanks has important long -term payoff; (ii) 
better tax policy and administration depend on country circumstances and need to be tailor-made; 
and (iii) support needs be oriented to build capacity within and outside government and sustaining 
such efforts over the long-term. 
  The report on Donors, Aid and Taxation in Developing Countries
60 proposes seven ‘big picture’ 
considerations for the design of donor programmes: (a) supporting local leadership of reform 
efforts;  (b)  incorporating  more  systematic  political  economy  analysis  into  the  design  and 
implementation of reform; (c) designing tax reform that seek to foster broader linkages between 
taxation,  state-building  and  governance;  (d)  paying  careful  attention  to  the  complexity  of  the 
relationship between aid and tax effort; including tax exemptions on aid; (e) better designing tax-
related conditionality, particularly by developing a more nuanced set of performance indicators; 
(f) ensuring the effective coordination of donor interventions; ; in line with the implementation of 
the  Paris  declaration  and  subsequent  commitments  and  (g)  paying  greater  attention  to  the 
international policy context, and particularly the role of tax exemptions for donor projects, tax 
havens and tax evasion by some multinational corporations in undermining developing country tax 
systems. 
There is still no consensus in the EU on foregoing tax exemptions on projects financed 
through external aid. At EU level, some progress has been achieved in this area, for instance 
when financing framework contracts, but there continues to be lack of consensus on the way 
forward. Some Member States, such as France, Romania and Slovenia have mainstreamed 
this  approach  in  their  disbursement  of  foreign  aid.  Others,  such  as  Denmark,  have 
implemented it partially – in the case of VAT on goods and services purchased in partner 
countries. A few Member States are not in favour of the elimination of exemptions on various 
grounds including the concern it will reduce the volume of goods, services and civil works 
that  may  be  purchased.  A  large  majority  of  Member  States  consider  however  that  a 
coordinated approach towards the elimination of tax exemptions would be desirable, arguing 
that such an approach would need to: (a) apply to all donors, not just European ones; (b) 
exclude humanitarian aid; (c) be based on a prior study that determines which exemptions to 
be  maintained  and  provides  a  thorough  analysis  of  implications;  and  (d)  be  linked  to 
harmonisation of taxes within the EU. 
2.1.4.2.  Tax Evasion and Fraud  
Tax  evasion  and  fraud  are  widely  believed  to  be  important  factors  limiting  revenue 
mobilisation  but  also  undermining  good  governance  and  institutional  development.  Tax 
evasion  and  fraud  threaten  governments´  revenues,  both  in  developed  and  developing 
countries, thereby limiting their capacity to carry out their economic policy and to proceed to 
necessary structural  reforms.  Tax evasion  generally  comprises illegal  arrangements  where 
liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays less tax than he is legally obligated 
to by hiding income or information from the tax authorities. Tax fraud is a form of deliberate 
tax evasion which is generally punishable under criminal law. The term includes situations in 
which deliberately false statements are submitted or fake documents are produced
61. 
In recent years, the challenge posed by tax fraud and evasion has increased considerably. The 
globalisation of the economy, technological developments, the internationalisation of fraud, 
and the resulting interdependence of tax authorities reveal the limits of strictly national 
approaches and reinforce the need for joint action. The interaction of many different tax 
                                                           
59  ICTD, ‘Taxation and Development: What Have We Learned from Fifty Years of Research?’, Working Paper 1, 
2012.  
60  ICTD, ‘Donors, Aid and Taxation in Developing Countries: An overview’, Working Paper 6, 2012. 
61  SWD(2012) 403 final.  
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systems in the context of a global economy creates many possibilities for the undermining of 
tax systems
62. The private sector is accused to use the possibilities offered by ‘tax havens’ 
which, generally speaking, are countries that base their attractiveness on opacity and harmful 
tax competition in the direct tax area to relocate their tax bases in their low-tax jurisdictions, 
and to conceal this from their country of residence (through means such as obstacles to the 
identification of beneficial ownership, bank secrecy and conduit companies). 
The  revenue  losses  which  can  arise  from  both  tax  evasion  and  tax  fraud  as  well  as  tax 
avoidance
63 are difficult to estimate. According to some estimates concerning only the United 
States, the revenue cost of profit shifting towards ‘tax havens’ by US multinationals could be 
up to EUR 45 billion, while individual tax evasion could cost up to EUR 38 billion yearly
64. 
Estimates of this kind are not available for the EU, but on the basis of the similar amount of 
FDI stocks in ‘tax havens’ in both USA and the EU, the tax revenue losses can be estimated to 
be of similar magnitude
65. 
The OECD and the G20 have been calling for more determined action to combat tax evasion 
and fraud. There is growing pressure on tax havens to increase the trans parency of their tax 
systems and put an end to unfair competitive practices. The EU and most Member States have 
provided further support for addressing tax evasion, tax fraud and harmful tax competition, 
and promote the principles of good governance in tax matters in their cooperation policy. 
In the area of exchange of information, the EU and twenty-six Member States are supporting 
the  Global  Forum  on  Transparency  and  Exchange  of  Information  for  Tax  Purposes. 
According to OECD data
66, sixteen Member States
67 signed a total of thirty -six new Tax 
Information  Exchange  Agreements  with  twenty -seven  developing  countries  in  2012.  In 
addition, Croatia has signed fifty-five Double Taxation Agreements and is continuing with the 
negotiations in order to spread the network of Double Taxation Agreements as a good tool for 
tackling cross-border tax evasion. 
Furthermore,  several  Member  States,  such  as  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom supported initiatives in 2012 such 
as the International Tax Compact
68 (ITC) and the OECD tax and development programme
69 
aimed at helping developing countries fight tax evasion, improve information exchange and 
limit the misuse of transfer pricing. 
In 2011, the Commission initiated a Tripartite Initiative with the World Bank and the OECD 
to enhance the capacity of developing countries to adopt and implement Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines while providing a secure and stable environment for multinational corporations to 
invest in these countries. This initiative supports training and technical assistance initiatives in 
countries that are politically committed and institutionally ready. 
In March 2012, the European Council called on the Commission to step up action against tax 
fraud and tax evasion. The European Parliament had also adopted a Resolution in April 2012 
                                                           
62  Since the late 1990’s, both the OECD (see the 1998 OECD report ‘Harmful tax competition: an emerging global 
issue’) and the EU (with the 1997 tax package), with the Code of conduct for business taxation, have made efforts 
to counter the erosion of tax bases. 
63  Tax avoidance is here understood as arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs intended to reduce his tax liability and that, 
although it could be legal, is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow (cf. OECD 
Glossary of Tax terms). 
64  J. G. Gravelle (2009): Tax Havens: Tax Avoidance and Evasion. CSR Report for congress. 
65  SWD(2012) 403 final, annex 6. 
66  See http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchangeoftaxinformationagreements.htm for details. 
67  AT, BE, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, HU, IE, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, SE, and UK, based on OECD data. 
68  See www.taxcompact.net.  
69  http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/theoecdinformaltaskforceontaxanddevelopment.htm#.  
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calling  for concrete ways to  combat tax fraud  and tax evasion
70. In response to this, the 
Commission adopted a Communication in June 2012 on ‘Concrete ways to reinforce the fight 
against tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to third countries’
71, setting out key 
challenges  posed  by  tax  fraud  and  evasion,  and  concrete  measures  to  address  them, 
highlighting  the  importance  that  EU  partners  under  international  trade  and  cooperation 
agreements commit to good governance principles in the tax area. 
In December 2012, the Commission adopted an Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax 
fraud  and  tax  evasion
72.  Through  the  description  of  34  specific  actions,  the  Action  Plan 
presents a comprehensive set of measures to help Member States protect their tax bases and 
recapture taxes legitimately due. This action plan is accompanied by two recommendations to 
encourage  Member  States  to  take  immediate  and  coordinated  action  on  aggressive  tax 
planning and so called ‘tax havens’
73. These initiatives constitute an immediate response to 
the identified needs to ensure a coherent policy vis-à-vis third countries, to enhance exchange 
of information and to tackle certain fraud trends. Furthermore, it calls for EU Member States 
to consider offering closer cooperation and technical assistance to third countries, especially 
developing  ones,  which  are  committed  to  complying  with  minimum  standards  of  good 
governance in tax matters in order to assist them in fighting effectively against tax evasion 
(e.g. possible secondment of tax experts to such countries for a limited period of time) which 
could  have  a  positive  impact  on  their  capability  to  raise  revenues  and  institutional 
development. 
2.1.4.3.  Money Laundering, Illicit Flows, and Corruption 
More coordinated international action to prevent money leaving developing countries illicitly 
and taking the necessary policy measures (fiscal transparency and exchange of information, 
country-by-country  reporting,  anti-money  laundering  measures,  efficient  tax  collection 
systems)  to  reduce  illicit  flows  would  bring  a  significant  increase  in  resources  that  are 
available to developing countries’ governments. 
In February 2013, the Commission adopted two proposals to reinforce the EU’s existing rules 
on  anti-money  laundering  and  fund  transfers.  The  proposals  include  a  directive  on  the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing and a regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds to secure ‘due 
traceability’  of  these  transfers.  Both  proposals  fully  take  into  account  the  latest 
Recommendations  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF),  the  world  anti-money 
laundering body, and go further in a number of fields to promote the highest standards for 
anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing. 
Many Member States have in the past provided support to developing countries in combating 
corruption and money laundering, some of which is on-going. The Commission has allocated 
more than EUR 93 million on 69 projects dedicated to the fight against corruption in various 
regions since 2009. Moreover, the Commission is financing a number of Rule of Law and 
sectoral capacity building projects that address corruption indirectly. 
EU Member States are signatories to several conventions aimed at combatting corruption, 
including the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the UN Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC). Twenty-two EU Member States
74 are signatories of the OECD Convention, while 
                                                           
70  European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2012 on the call for concrete ways to combat tax fraud and tax evasion. 
71  COM(2012) 351 final. 
72  COM(2012) 722. 
73  Commonly understood to be jurisdictions which are able to finance their public services with no or nominal income 
taxes and offer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape taxation in their country of residence. 
74  CY, HR, LT, LV, MT, and RO did not sign the OECD convention.   
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all Member States and the EU have signed UNCAC. According to the 2012 Transparency 
International Progress Report on Country Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention
75, only 
four EU Member States
76 (out of the twenty-two analysed in the report) do actively enforce 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, while five do not enforce it at all
77. Germany and the 
Czech Republic are the only EU Member States that have not ratified the UNCAC yet, 
although they signed it, respectively, in 2003 and 2005
78. 
At the Third Conference of States Parties in Doha, in November 2009, it was decided to set up 
a  Mechanism  for  the  Review  of  Implementation  of  the  UNCAC  (UNCAC  Review 
Mechanism). Only the executive summaries of the country review reports are published, 
unless a reviewed country chooses otherwise. Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK have supported financially the review mechanism with EUR 1.3 million 
over the period 2010-2012. 
The Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative was launched in 2007 by th e World Bank and 
UN to support international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds. In 2012, six Member 
States
79 provided support to the StAR Initiative in various forms (including financial support, 
or staff secondment). Spain is providing Albania with training on fighting money laundering 
and financial crimes. 
2.1.4.4.  Extractive Industries 
In 2011, the European Commission proposed amendments to the existing Transparency and 
Accounting Directives regarding transparency requirements for listed and large non-listed EU 
companies, and made proposals on country by country reporting
80. The main thrust of the 
proposal
81 is to provide mandatory disclosure requirements for extractive industry companies 
on a country and project basis. These requirements are in line with the voluntary requirements 
set by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards. 
In  2012,  the  Commission  and  ten  Member  States
82  supported  EITI,  either  politically, 
technically or financially. Financial support was channelled through direct support to the EITI 
Secretariat, bilateral support at country level and/or through the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
(MDTF). Germany for instance is supporting EITI implementation through bilateral and 
regional technical cooperation projects. Other recent financing provided by Member States in 
this area include UK’s contribution of about EUR 30 million to a World Bank project
83 in the 
Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  or  Belgium’s  contribution  of  EUR  one  million  to  the 
Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility. 
There is no consensus among Member States over whether and how the approach of EITI 
should be extended to other sectors. Some would be favourable to such extension to sectors 
such  as  forestry  and/or  on  the  basis  of  country  driven  priorities.  Others  are  in  favour  of 
strengthening the reporting requirements under the existing EITI, as it is currently under way. 
Germany is supporting the Constructive Sector Transparency initiative (CoST). 
                                                           
75  Transparency International, ‘Exporting Corruption? Country enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery Convention 
Progress Report 2012’.  
76  In order of degree of enforcement: DE, UK, IT, DK. The enforcement by the remaining Member States is classified 
as follows: ‘moderate enforcement’ (FR, NL, ES, BE, SE, AT, FI), ‘little enforcement’ HU, LU, PT, SK, SL, BG); 
and ‘no enforcement: IE, PL, CZ, EL, EE. 
77  Ibid. 
78  See for details: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
79  DE, FR, LU, NL, SE, UK. 
80  COM(2011) 683 final.  
81  Under negotiation between the Commission, Council and the European Parliament. 
82  BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IT, NL, SE, UK. 
83  https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/increasing-business-with-the-democratic-republic-of-congo.  
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2.2.  Maintaining Sustainable Debt Levels 
EU Commitments 
  The EU is committed to supporting debt sustainability in developing countries, in line with the 
2001 Doha Declaration. This has been clearly articulated, inter alia, in the Council Conclusions 
of 18 May 2009 (§12), which state that ‘the EU will continue supporting the existing debt relief 
initiatives, in particular the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and values the Evian approach as an appropriate flexible tool to 
ensure debt sustainability’. The EU also confirmed that it ‘supports discussions, if relevant, on 
enhanced forms of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, based on existing frameworks and 
principles,  including  the  Paris  Club,  with  a  broad  creditors’  and  debtors  participation  and 
ensuring comparable burden-sharing among creditors with a central role for the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWI) in the debate’. 
  More  recently,  the  Council  Conclusions  of  15  October  2012  stated  that  (§3)  ‘The  EU  will 
continue to deliver on debt relief commitments to support the sustainability of public finances in 
developing  countries,  participate  in  international  initiatives  such  as  the  WB/IMF  Debt 
sustainability  framework,  and  promote  responsible  lending  practices.  Moreover,  the  EU  will 
promote the participation of non-Paris Club members in debt-workout settlements, and Member 
States that have not yet done so will take action to restrict litigation against developing countries 
by  distressed-debt  funds.  The  EU  will  also  support  developing  countries’  efforts  to  avoid 
unsustainable debt levels.’ 
2.2.1.  Introduction 
Many developing countries built up their foreign debt to unsustainable levels in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s.  Starting from  the mid 1990’s  and  accelerating from the mid  2000’s,  heavily 
indebted developing countries have received debt relief, whereby a large share of past official 
debt  to  bilateral  and  multilateral  official  creditors  was  forgiven  or  repaid  through  grants, 
allowing  these  countries  to  reallocate  resources  from  debt  service  to  development 
expenditure. 
 
As debt relief has also created fiscal space for new borrowing, often from emerging donors, 
there is always a risk that the debt of poorer countries might return to unsustainable levels. 
 
2.2.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on 
debt sustainability. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
84  Comment 
Support existing debt relief 
initiatives, in particular the 
HIPC Initiative and the 
MDRI 
No date specified 
 
 
Three countries reached HIPC 
completion point in 2012. 
Several MS initiatives support 
MDRI and similar programmes. 
Support discussions, if 
relevant, on enhanced 
sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanisms, on the basis of 
existing frameworks and 
principles 
No date specified 
 
 
Limited support (only the EU 
and 11 Member States see a 
need for reform, not necessarily 
structural). 
Participate in international 
initiatives such as the  No date specified 
 
A recent IMF assessment found 
broad compliance with the 
                                                           
84  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
84  Comment 
WB/IMF Debt 
Sustainability Framework 
(DSF) and promote 
responsible lending practices 
  DSF
85. 
Promote the participation of 
non-Paris Club members in 
debt-workout settlements 
No date specified 
 
 
No bilateral action, only support 
for dialogue through one annual 
meeting with non-members, not 
attended by China and India
86. 
Take action to restrict 
litigation against developing 
countries by distressed debt 
funds 
No date specified 
 
 
No action to restrict litigation 
mentioned by MS, only legal 
support to developing countries 
for litigation through multi-
donor trust funds (e.g. DMF, 
ALSF). 
2.2.3.  Recent Trends 
Net external private and public debt flows to developing countries represented a marginal 
share of the overall development finance available for both low income and middle income 
countries, as shown in Figure 2.2.3. 
Figure 2.2.3 – Net External Public and Private Debt Flows as a Share of Total Resource 
Flows of Low-Income (LIC) and Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in 2010 
Borrowing  by  developing  countries  is  an  important  source  of  finance  that  dissociates 
government spending from revenue inflow fluctuations, and allows frontloading development 
investments.  As  such,  borrowing  can  be  a  stable  source  of  finance.  In  this  context,  it  is 
important to note the stabilising role international official lending has played in the financial 
crisis  during  the  first  year  of  the  crisis,  replacing  private  sector  lending  that  contracted 
significantly in 2009. 
Overall, the total external debt outstanding as a percentage of GNI declined from 37.9% in 
2000 to 21.5% in 2011, and debt service to export ratio of developing countries has declined 
                                                           
85  IMF, ‘Review of the policy on debt limits in fund-supported programs’, 2013. 
86  Press release on the Paris Club meeting with representatives of non-Paris Club bilateral creditors and the private 
sector, 11 September 2012.  
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from 20.4% in 2000 to 8.8% in 2011. The improvement in debt indicators was widespread 
across regions. Low income countries also improved their external debt to GNI ratio from 
68.7% in 2000 to 28.7% in 2011, and their debt service to export ratio from 11.2 to 4.6% over 
the same period
87. 
 
In 2011, net debt inflows from official creditors declined by 14%, while net debt inflows from 
private creditors remained steady. In 2010 and 2011, private lending proved more resilient 
and remained close to its 2007 pe ak in both years, with volumes 6 to 14 times higher than 
public and publicly guaranteed lending. This growing importance of private lending, even 
though within a framework of improving debt indicators, poses a risk to overall economic 
stability as systemic unsustainable private debt tends to become public debt. A study of 90 
defaults and renegotiations on debt owed to private creditors by 73 countries found that debt 
renegotiations have an average length of over seven years, produce average creditor losses  of 
40% and lead to limited debt relief
88. 
2.2.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
Substantial  debt  relief  was  provided  in  2012  by  EU  Member  States,  either  bilaterally  or 
through multilateral initiatives such as the HIPC and MDRI. Over the period 2000-2011, debt 
relief provided collectively by the EU Member States and the Commission amounted to EUR 
58 billion at 2010 prices, equivalent to 71% of global debt relief. 
Active participation in the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative  - aiming at 
providing debt relief to Low Income Countries - continued in 2012. Full relief was granted to 
the three countries that reached HIPC completion point in 2012: Ivory Coast, Guinea and 
Comoros. The Paris Club reached debt  restructuring agreements  for Guinea, St  Kitts  and 
Nevis, Côte D’Ivoire and Myanmar. 
 
UNCTAD prepared  a set  of principles on sovereign lending  and borrowing in  2011, and 
launched the endorsement process at the Doha Conference in December 2012. The principles 
aim to reduce the frequency and severity of debt crises by developing a set of voluntary 
guidelines that promote and reinforce responsible sovereign lending and borrowing practices. 
Lack of globally agreed rules and regulations guiding sovereign financing have contributed to 
irresponsible  sovereign  borrowing  and  lending  to  sovereign  countries.  The  principles  are 
meant to fill this gap. 
Several  debt  swap  programmes  have  been  launched  by  Member  States  in  developing 
countries. EU Member States and the Commission also contributed to the Debt Relief Trust 
Fund (DRTF) that allows the participation of the African Development Bank in the HIPC 
Initiative. Some Member States also assisted countries that are not eligible for HIPC. The 
United Kingdom, for example, provides bilateral assistance to poor countries that are not 
eligible  for  debt  relief  under  the  HIPC  initiative.  Under  the  UK  Multilateral  Debt  Relief 
Initiative (UK MDRI), the UK reimburses ten per cent of qualifying countries’ debt service 
payments to the World Bank and African Development Bank. The UK provided over EUR 18 
million via the UK MDRI in 2012 and is scheduled to provide up to EUR 3.3 million in 2013. 
The EU is focusing on supporting stronger debt management capacities and better public 
finance  management.  Several  EU  donors  and  the  Commission  support  UNCTAD’s  Debt 
Management and Financial Analysis Software (DMFAS) Programme, and the World Bank’s 
Debt Management Facility (DMF), to strengthen debt management capacity in Low Income 
Countries  through  the  provision  of  software  and  technical  assistance.  DMF  support  in 
                                                           
87  World Bank International Debt Statistics, 2013. 
88  See Mark Wright, ‘Restructuring sovereign debts with private sector creditors: theory and practice’ in Sovereign 
Debt  and  the  Financial  Crisis:  Will  This  Time  Be  Different?’,  Carlos  Braga  and  Gallina  Vincelette,  eds. 
(Washington, D.C., World Bank), 2010.  
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particular focuses on diagnosing weaknesses in the management of debt and in the set-up of 
medium term reform strategies, as well as legal support against vulture funds. Several EU 
Member States address the problem of vulture funds also through the African Legal Support 
Facility (ALSF), administered by the African Development Bank. 
Existing debt workout mechanisms for Low Income Countries (e.g. HIPC, Paris Club) need to 
be adjusted to reflect a changing reality: only four potentially eligible countries remaining for 
HIPC,  increased  importance  of  emerging  donors,  and  shift  of  debt  portfolios  to  private 
commercial lending. There is also increasing demand within the UN System for reopening the 
international discussion on a structured approach to solving sovereign debt crises
89 with a 
series of meetings organised by the Economic and Social Council to consider options. 
According to some Member States, the promotion and further development of collective 
action  clauses  (CAC)  in  bond  contracts  are  pr eferable  to  the  alternative  of  large -scale 
structural changes to the current mechanisms available to LICs. Sovereign debt restructuring 
has long been complicated by a free rider problem, as any restructuring had to be negotiated 
with each bondholder indivi dually. CACs allow borrowers to restructure their debt if a 
qualified majority of bondholders agrees to the proposed terms. 
                                                           
89  See  for  example the  2012  Report  of  the  Secretary-General  on  ‘External  debt  sustainability  and  development’ 
(A/67/174).  
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3.  PRIVATE FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
3.1.  Private Investment for Development 
EU Commitments 
Private Sector Development 
  Council Conclusions of 15 June 2010 on the Millennium Development Goals, §25: The EU and its 
Member States will continue to encourage and to support the development of the private sector, 
including small and medium enterprises through measures enhancing the overall investment climate for 
their activity, inter alia through promoting inclusive finance and through relevant EU Investment 
Facilities and Trust Funds. § 27. In the framework of the review of the European Investment Bank’s 
(EIB) external mandate, the EU and its Member States should strengthen the capacity of the EIB to 
support EU development objectives and to promote efficient blending of grants and loans in third 
countries including in cooperation with Member States finance institutions or through facilities for 
development financing. 
  Council Conclusions of 9 March 2012 on Rio+20, §30: Underscores the importance of the private 
sector and of partnerships between the private and the public sector in promoting investment, trade and 
innovation, including in delivering a global GESDPE. 
  Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012 ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda 
for  Change’:  The private  sector  and  trade  development  are  important drivers  for  development.  An 
enabling business environment and more effective ways of leveraging private sector participation and 
resources in partner countries as well as increased regional integration, aid for trade and research and 
innovation will be key to the development of a competitive private sector. This has to go along with 
promoting labour rights, decent work and corporate social responsibility. 
 
Corporate Social responsibility 
  Council Conclusions of 11 November 2008 (EU position for Doha FfD conference), §25: [the EU] 
will further enhance efforts to promote the adoption, by European companies, of internationally agreed 
principles and standards on Corporate Social Responsibility. 
  Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009 (Support to developing countries in coping with the crisis), §9: 
The EU underlines the importance of the concept of corporate social and environmental responsibility. 
  Council Conclusions of 15 June 2010 on the Millennium Development Goals, §26: In addition the EU 
and its Member States commit to increasing their efforts to mobilise the private sector and engage with 
business to help accelerate progress towards the MDGs including by promoting the UN Global Compact 
and the Corporate Social Responsibility principles. Innovative public-private partnerships with the 
business and NGO community, combining and reinforcing each other’s knowledge and capabilities, can 
enhance the effectiveness of our aid. 
  Competitiveness Council Conclusions of 5 December 2011, §7: Welcomes the Communication from the 
Commission A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility as well as of the 
Social Business Initiative; emphasises market advantages of responsible business conduct; encourages 
the Member States to respond to the Commission’s invitation to develop or update their plans or lists of 
priority actions in support of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
  Council Conclusions of 9 March 2012 on Rio+20, §30: reaffirms the need to implement worldwide 
sound corporate governance as well as international principles and standards on corporate social 
responsibility.  
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3.1.1.  Introduction 
The  private sector is  a critical  stakeholder and  partner for development.  It  plays  a key  role in 
supporting inclusive growth, notably by creating jobs (local small-scale businesses provide 90% of 
jobs in developing countries)
90, providing essential goods and services (including health, education, 
water, energy and infrastructure), as well as being a major source of tax revenues. 
Engaging the private sector as a development partner has been an approach pursued since the 1980s 
by bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. It has been rallying even more support in recent 
years, as illustrated by the official recognition of the importance of the private sector as actor in 
development at the Busan 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, and at the R io+20 
Summit in 2012. 
Against this background, and as stated in the ‘Agenda for Change’, the EU is thus striving to work 
more closely with the private sector for achieving the objective of inclusive and sustainable growth 
and poverty eradication. 
When considering the role and contribution of the private sector to development outcomes, it is 
important to acknowledge that the private sector is not a homogeneous entity. It should indeed be 
captured  in  its  multiplicity,  ranging  from  micro,  small  and  medium  enterprises  (MSMEs)  - 
operating in the informal or formal sector - through to large multinational corporations (MNCs). 
Development partnerships with the private sector must therefore be tailored to the type of private 
actors that  are being considered, including by  distinguishing between  foreign and local  private 
companies, and between large firms and MSMEs. 
Such partnerships with the private sector can take many forms. For instance, at the level of policy 
reform, business and professional associations, trade unions and private sector organisations, as 
well as large operators can play an important role in policy dialogue around reforms to improve the 
business environment. 
At  the  level  of  private  companies’  business  operations,  development  partnerships  should  be 
promoted in areas that advance both development and business outcomes so that they are mutually 
reinforcing  (e.g.  inclusive  business  models  and  responsible  business  practices,  public-private 
partnerships  for  the  delivery  of  basic  public  goods  and  infrastructure  services,  and/or  business 
linkages through a ‘growth poles’ approach etc.). 
At the level of development financing, innovative financial mechanisms can be used to leverage 
additional private finance for delivering public goods. The main EU instruments to engage with the 
private sector at the level of development financing are the Regional Investment Facilities, which 
combine EU grants with loans in view of unlocking additional financing for important investments 
in EU partner countries. The use of so-called blending mechanisms
91 to catalyse private investment 
has increased in 2012. Support to the private sector – mainly SMEs – was in 2012 twice the amount 
of  2011  and  represented  13%  of  the  total  grants  blended  that  year.  A  new  ‘EU  Platform  for 
Blending  in  External  Cooperation’
92  was  established  in  December  2012  with  the  European 
Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) to further increase this catalysing role. 
Domestic and foreign private investments are a key source of employment, wealth creation and 
innovation,  and  as  such,  can  contribute  to  sustainable  development  and  poverty  reduction  in 
developing countries
93. The ‘Agenda for Change’ also stresses that private domestic and foreign 
                                                           
90  International Finance Corporation, ‘International Finance Institutions and Development through the Private Sector’, 2010.  
91  These blending mechanisms are described in Chapter 5 of this report. 
92  See Chapter 5 for more details.  
93  G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development, 2012.  
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investment  and  improving  infrastructure  are  critical  success  factors  for  igniting  and  sustaining 
private sector growth. 
In June 2012, at the G20 Summit in Mexico, the Working Group on Private Investment and Job 
Creation presented its report on ‘Promoting responsible investment for sustainable development and 
job  creation’
94.  Eleven  key  policy  recommendations  were  made  to  developing  countries  and 
development  partners  for  creating  a  supportive  environment  for  domestic  and  foreign  private 
investment. These recommendations are grouped into the following four distinct policy stages: 
  Improving  the  business  climate  and  the  regulatory  framework  for  foreign  and  domestic 
investment; 
  Assisting  developing  countries  to  attract  the  most  value  adding  investment  to  their 
economies; 
  Promoting responsible investment in value chains; and 
  Stimulating investment in local enterprise development. 
3.1.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on 
private sector development. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
 
EU Commitment  Target date  Status
95  Comment 
Support the development of the 
private sector, including small and 
medium-sized enterprises, through 
measures to enhance the overall 
investment climate for their 
activity, inter alia by promoting 
inclusive finance and through 
relevant EU investment facilities 
and trust funds 
No date specified 
   
The EU and MS have provided 
substantial funding for private 
sector development (in 2004-10, 
the Commission alone provided 
EUR 2.4 billion in direct support 
in the form of grant funding). 
Since 2007, the EU, together 
with some MS, has set up eight 
regional blending facilities, 
covering all regions of EU 
external cooperation. Several 
MS’
96 national development 
finance institutions also support 
blending activities (EU facilities 
and others). 
MS reported over 100 ODA 
activities for private sector 
development in 2012. 
Strengthen the EIB’s capacity to 
support EU development 
objectives and promote the 
efficient blending of grants and 
loans in third countries, including 
in cooperation with MS’ finance 
institutions or through 
development financing facilities 
No date specified 
   
Half of the Commission-funded 
private sector development 
support mentioned above was 
channelled through the EIB. 
Support for blending facilities as 
described above. 
Enhance efforts to promote the 
adoption by European companies 
of internationally-agreed CSR 
principles and standards, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business 
No date specified 
   
Exploratory research was 
undertaken by the Commission 
in June 2012. Commitments by 
large EU enterprises are 
expected by 2014
97. 
                                                           
94  Report  of  the  Inter-Agency  Working  Group  on  the  Private  Investment  and  Job  Creation  Pillar  to  the  High-Level 
Development Working Group, ‘Promoting responsible investment for sustainable development and job creation’, 2012. 
95  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track. 
96  AT, BE, DE, FR, SE, UK. 
97  See implementation table in the Commission Communication on CSR, 2011.   
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EU Commitment  Target date  Status
95  Comment 
and Human Rights and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 
Respond to the Commission’s 
invitation to develop or update 
MS’ plans or lists of priority 
actions in support of CSR 
No date specified 
   
On-going discussion with MS on 
plans and peer review 
mechanism
98. Several MS intend 
to complete their plans in 2013. 
3.1.3.  Recent Trends 
Domestic and foreign private investment in developing countries represented a substantial share of 
the overall development finance available for both low income and middle income countries, as 
shown in Figure 3.1.2. 
Figure 3.1.3 – Domestic and Foreign Private Investment Flows as a Share of Total Resource 
Flows of Low-Income (LIC) and Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in 2010 
FDI can stimulate domestic investment, increase local market competition, enlarge international 
market  access  for  local  products  and  generate  externalities  and  knowledge  ‘spillovers’.  FDI 
attraction has become a priority of development agendas. It is worth noting however that the impact 
of domestic and foreign private investment on development depends on the type and strategy of 
investors, as well as host country conditions, policies and institutions. 
The global financial and economic crisis had a major impact on FDI flows. According to the latest 
data from UNCTAD
99, global FDI flows fell by 18% to an estimated EUR 1.0 trillion in 2012, 
down from a revised EUR 1.2 trillion in 2011. 
 
The 2012 figure is close to that of 2009, when FDI flows reached their lowest level of just slightly 
over EUR 0.9 trillion. This decline is mainly due to macroeconomic fragility and policy uncertainty 
faced by investors.  For example, the EU-27’s FDI inflows and outflows dropped from a peak in 
2007 to a low point in 2010; provisional figures for 2011 indicate an upturn in both directions. 
 
For the first time ever in 2012, FDI flows to developing countries exceeded those to developed 
countries by EUR 101 million, reaching EUR 529 billion, the second highest level ever recorded. 
FDI flows to developing economies remained resilient, declining only by 3%. 
                                                           
98  Ibid. 
99  UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies’, 2012.  
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Rising FDI to developing countries was driven by a 10% increase in Asia and a 16% increase in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Africa and the least developed countries (LDCs) saw a 
third year of declining FDI inflows, although prospects for Africa are brightening. The 2011 decline 
in flows to the continent was due largely to divestments from North Africa. In contrast, FDI inflows 
to sub-Saharan Africa recovered from EUR 22 billion in 2010 to EUR 27 billion in 2011, a level 
comparable with the peak of 2008. 
Emerging  economies,  mainly in  Asia and South America have clearly  become more important 
destinations for EU FDI. This trend had started well in advance of the economic crisis of 2008/2009 
but the European recession intensified it. 
While developed countries remain the leading source of outward FDI, developing and transition 
economies have emerged as important sources of outward FDI since the 1990s. Many multinational 
corporations from developing and transition economies are increasingly undertaking cross-border 
investment activities through FDI. Between 1980 and 2011, their share of world outward FDI rose 
from 6.2% to 26.9%, peaking at 31.8% in 2010. 
3.1.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
Policies and programmes of the EU and its Member States focus essentially on two fronts: the first 
concerns  the  creation  of  an  enabling  environment  for  private  sector  development  in  partner 
countries, while the second involves seeking new forms of engagement with the private sector to 
achieve development goals. The type of engagement with the private sector generally takes one of 
the following forms: co-financing projects or providing blending facilities and other financial tools 
to crowd in investment from private sector to support growth and job creation in partner countries; 
fostering public-private dialogue, supporting development partnership with private  sector (DPP) 
aiming to achieve business and development goals, promoting Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for 
the  delivery  of  public  goods  and  services  (notably,  infrastructure,  health,  etc.),  testing  and 
disseminating innovative business models (IBM). 
3.1.4.1.  Private Sector Development 
In  line  with  the  ‘Agenda  for  Change’,  EU  support  is  being  notably  targeted  towards  the 
development of competitive local private sectors as a means to promote inclusive and sustainable 
growth. Even if private sector development is not a focal sector in all partner countries, the EU 
seeks to mainstream it in its cooperation programmes (at national and regional level) with most 
partner countries (e.g. in agriculture, energy, governance). 
To date, EU support to private sector development has mainly focused on creating an enabling 
environment for local businesses. A recent study on the ‘Evaluation of EU support to Private Sector 
Development’
100  indicates  that  over  the  period  2004-2010,  the  EU  provided  substantial  grant 
funding for private sector development, spanning a wide range of activities, including  capacity 
building, regulatory reform, and technology transfer. This made the EU an important player in 
private  sector  development  both  financially  and  in  terms  of  scope  covered,  and  private  sector 
development an important area of its aid delivery. The report further indicates that the European 
Commission provided EUR 2.4 billion of direct support to private sector development. There are 
also several well-recognised private sector development donors among Member States, such as 
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, or the UK. 
                                                           
100  European  Commission/ADE,  ‘Evaluation  of  European  Community  Support  to  Private  Sector  Development  in  Third 
Countries’, 2013.  
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Roughly half of EU total support to private sector development (considering both grants and loans) 
is channelled through the EIB
101. The EIB manages several EU instruments to support private sector 
development in partner countries. Two of them specifically target the private sector: 
  The ‘Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership’ (FEMIP) supports growth 
and job creation in two priority areas: private sector development (notably SMEs and the 
industrial  sector)  and  the  creation  of  an  investment-friendly  environment  in  the 
Mediterranean  region.  Since  2002,  EUR  13  billion  have  been  invested  through  FEMIP, 
mobilising roughly EUR 35 billion of additional capital together with international financing 
institutions, bilateral agencies and the private sector in order to advance the integration of 
the region. The European Commission provides an annual envelope of EUR 32 million to 
the EIB to carry out risk capital operations. 
  The ‘ACP Investment Facility’ is an instrument financed from the EDF and managed by the 
EIB. It is geared specifically to fostering private sector investment in the ACP countries 
(through risk capital and loans to the private sector). Between 2004 and 2010, EUR 3.5 
billion have been contracted via the ACP Investment Facility. 
Several  EU  Member  States  have  also  undertaken  initiatives  aimed  at  improving  the  business 
environment and investment climate in partner countries. This support is driven in part by indicators 
to measure the business environment of countries; the so-called ‘Doing Business Indicators’
102, and 
its related publication, the Doing Business Report
103. Despite some shortcomings
104, including bias 
in favour of large firms
105  and concerns over labour protection
106, these indicators have been 
effective in drawing attention to the importance of reducing the burdens of business regulation and 
improving the investment climate. 
For example, Austria and France have provided financial support (E UR two million and EUR one 
million  respectively)  to  the  ‘Facility  for  Investment  Climate  Advisory  Services’  (FIAS)
107. 
Implemented by the World Bank Group, the FIAS offers client governments a range of advisory 
services to assist them in improving the investment climate for domestic and foreign investors. 
Other  important  aspects  of  private  sector  development  supported  by  Member  States  include 
initiatives  aimed  at  facilitating  access  to  financial  services  by  MSMEs,  such  as  micro-finance 
activities supported by Austria, Belgium and Latvia. Furthermore, France, Germany and Lithuania 
are also supporting capacity building programmes in partner countries. 
Alongside promoting the development of the private sector in partner countries, EU donors are also 
striving to engage with private enterprises through different instruments in view of maximising 
development impact. Examples of activities and programmes of Member States include: 
–  Swedish Sida’s ‘Business for Development’ (B4D) Programme, which presents a framework for, 
and an approach to, collaboration with private sector actors. The main instruments are challenge 
funds, Public-Private Partnerships and drivers of change. The objective is to stimulate private 
sector development and entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
                                                           
101  Following  a  review  in  2010,  the  Bank’s  external  mandate  (2007-2013)  benefiting  from  EU  Budget  Guarantee  was 
increased  by  EUR  3.7  billion  (including  EUR  2  billion  for  climate  change  operations  and  EUR  1  billion  for  the 
Mediterranean region). 
102  http://www.doingbusiness.org.  
103  World Bank/IFC, ‘Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises’, 2013.  
104 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTDOIBUS/0,,contentMDK:21645387~pagePK:64829573~
piPK:64829550~theSitePK:4663967,00.html. 
105  CAFOD, ‘What kind of review do we need of the Doing Business rankings?’, 2012.  
106  ITUC, ‘ITUC’s reaction to the World Bank’s report on jobs’, 2012.  
107  https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/.   
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–  Danida’s  Business  Partnerships,  aimed  at  facilitating  the  establishment  of  commercial 
partnerships that have a significant impact on development in poor communities. The aim is to 
create value both for partners and the local society. 
–  Finland has provided a grant amount of EUR 15 million to Finnfund (Finnish Fund for Industrial 
Cooperation),  a  development  financing  company  which  offers  long-term  risk  funding  for 
commercially profitable investments in developing and transition countries. The funded projects 
have development objectives, specifically for the increase in the production capacity. 
Six  Member  States
108  are  members  of  the  ‘Private  Infrastructure  Development  Group’  (PIDG) 
which aims at mobilising private investment in infrastructure, in order to increase service provision 
for the poor, boost economic growth and reduce poverty in the world’s poorest countries. 
As  part  of  the  new  programming  cycle  for  2014-2020,  the  EU  is  considering  new  initiatives 
regarding private sector engagement for development, including possible support to the up-scaling 
of inclusive business models and other forms of private sector engagement in development through 
core business operations. This includes a preliminary analysis on a new set of Guiding Principles 
for engaging with the private sector. 
3.1.4.2.  Blending
109 
As mentioned in the ‘Agenda for Change’, the use of innovative financial instruments which blend 
EU grants with additional non-grant funds, such as loans and equity from financing institutions, is 
seen as  powerful  tool  to leverage private sector support. Blending has the potential to  address 
several factors that currently hold back private investment into projects with a strong developmental 
impact. 
Since  2007,  the  EU,  together  with  several  Member  States,  has  set  up  eight  regional  blending 
facilities. Currently, the Facilities mainly support public investment projects. The main bulk of all 
grants contributions approved since 2007 went to investments promoted by a public entity, although 
in recent years, the EU regional blending facilities have also increasingly supported local businesses 
through risk capital, loan guarantees and technical assistance to leverage private investment and 
commercial finance (representing 11% of grants committed to date). 
The European Commission is currently working to extend the use of innovative financial tools such 
as  risk  capital  and  guarantees  with  a  view  of  unlocking  additional  private  investments  and 
commercial finance for developmental projects, including in other sectors, such as transport and 
energy. 
3.1.4.3.  Corporate Social Responsibility
110 
Although it is difficult to assess and monitor the extent to which Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) impacts sustainable development outcomes in developing countries, the EU has underlined 
the relevance of CSR in the context of the EU’s external relations, including trade policy. 
As a matter of fact, corporate social responsibility is increasingly present in trade agreements that 
the EU concludes. In as much as trade flows interface with investment in development, the fact that 
trade agreements contain CSR clauses will enhance a development cooperation potential that is 
sustainable. 
                                                           
108  AT, DE, IE, NL, SE, UK. 
109  The topic of blending and the recently established EU Blending Platform are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of the 
report (Innovative Finance Mechanisms). 
110  The  Commission  defines  corporate  social  responsibility  as  ‘the  responsibility  of  enterprises  for  their  impacts  on 
society’. To  fully  meet  their  social  responsibility,  enterprises  ‘should  have  in  place  a  process  to  integrate  social, 
environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close 
collaboration with their stakeholders’.  
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The  2012  Communication  on  ‘Social  Protection  in  EU  Development  Cooperation’
111  states  for 
instance that ‘the EU’s initiative on Corporate Social Responsibility can support the private sector 
in developing countries to implement relevant international guidelines in order to achieve more 
inclusive and sustainable growth and further development’. 
The EU and fourteen Member States
112 have supported (and/or are planning to undertake) initiatives 
aimed at promoting CSR principles. Such initiatives include: 
  the development of national plans on CSR and business and human rights (as requested by 
the European Commission in its 2011 CSR Communication
113); 
  the participation in international initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD 
Guidelines  for  Multinational  Enterprises,  ILO  Tripartite  Declaration  on  Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and 
the Kimberley process; 
  policies linked to the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights, and to CSR in 
trade and development; and 
  support to capacity building and knowledge exchange programmes (e.g. on uptake of ISO 
26000 guidelines). 
A peer review of Member States’ policies on CSR and their participation in related initiatives was 
initiated by the European Commission in 2012. The peer reviews aim at: 1) spurring the production 
by Member States of national action plans on CSR and national action plans on business and human 
rights,  and  2)  facilitating  the  production  of  an  updated  compendium  of  Member  States’  CSR 
policies and activities. 
A central aspect of the EU Strategy on CSR is improving EU companies’ disclosure of social and 
environmental information. Following up on the 2011 Communication and on the Single Market 
Act 1
114, the Commission has recently put forward a legislative proposal amending the existing 
rules in the Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives in orde r to enhance the transparency and 
usefulness of the non-financial information disclosed by large companies and groups with more 
than 500 employees. The need to improve the quality of CSR disclosure via regulatory measures 
has also been recently highlighted by two resolutions from the European Parliament
115. Moreover, 
the EU Strategy on CSR makes a commitment to monitor the pledges made by European enterprises 
with more than 1000 employees to take account of internationally recognised CSR principles and 
guidelines. 
Human rights are an increasingly important aspect of corporate social responsibility, but until now 
there  has  been  no  practical  guidance  specifically  for  smaller  enterprises.  The  ‘UN  Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’
116 define what companies and governments should do to 
avoid  and  address  possible  negative  human  rights  impacts  by  businesses,  but  many  challenges 
remain when it comes to the implementation of the Guiding Principles. In December 2012, the first 
UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, in which several EU Member States participated, was a 
                                                           
111  COM(2012) 446 final. 
112  AT, BE, DK, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IT, LT, LV, NL, PT, UK. 
113  COM(2011) 681 final. 
114  COM(2012) 573 final. 
115  European Parliament  resolution of  6  February  2013  on:  ‘Corporate social  responsibility:  accountable,  transparent  and 
responsible  business  behaviour  and  sustainable  growth’  (2012/2098(INI));  and  European  Parliament  resolution  of  6 
February 2013 on ‘Corporate social responsibility: promoting society’s interests and a route to sustainable and inclusive 
recovery’ (2012/2097(INI). 
116  Endorsed in 2011 by the Council on Human Rights, the ‘Guiding Principles’ are recognised as the authoritative global 
standard  for  preventing  and  addressing  adverse  impacts  on  human  rights  arising  from  business-related  activity, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx.  
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first attempt at addressing some of the key trends and challenges in implementing the Guiding 
Principles. 
The EU itself encourages and contributes to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles. To 
this end, the European Commission is supporting a process to develop guidance for enterprises on 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, currently focusing on three business sectors 
(i.e. employment and recruitment agencies; ICT/Telecommunications; and oil and gas). The three 
practical  guidance  notes  were  published  in  June  2013
117  and  are  based  on  the UN  Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights
118. 
The EU has also published an introductory guide to human rights for SMEs
119, available in 28 
languages. Launched at the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, this guide seeks to explain 
why human rights are relevant for European SMEs, and how they can address human rights risks. 
3.2.  Trade and Development 
EU Commitments 
The EU has consistently supported developing countries in using trade as a tool for development. 
As the impact of Trade policy on development is covered in a separate report on Policy Coherence 
for Development, it is not covered in detail in the current report, which concentrates on Aid for 
Trade (AfT)
120.  
 
  Council Conclusions of 15 October 2007 laying down a joint ‘EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: 
Enhancing EU support for trade-related needs in developing countries’, focused on increasing 
volumes of Aid for Trade, especially to the poorest countries, and enhancing the impact of this 
support. One of the commitments was to collectively spend EUR two billion annually on Trade-
Related Assistance by 2010 (EUR one billion from MS and the Commission respectively). In the 
range of 50% of the increase should be made available to ACP countries. 
  Council  conclusions  of  15  June  2010,  §24:  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  have  already 
reached their collective target to spend EUR 2 billion annually on Trade Related Assistance, 
and their total Aid for Trade has reached record high levels of EUR 10.4 billion. The Council 
calls upon them to sustain their efforts, and in particular to give increased attention to LDCs 
and to joint AfT response strategies and delivery. (…) In particular, the Council calls on the EU 
and its Member States to reach agreement on regional Aid for Trade packages in support of 
ACP regional integration, under the leadership of the ACP regional integration organisations 
and their Member States, and involving other donors. 
  Council Conclusions of 16 March 2012, §28: Confirming that the EU and its Member States 
should continue to lead global efforts to respond to the Aid for Trade demands, and calling on 
the Commission and Member states to continuously review the EU’s Aid for Trade strategies 
and programmes, taking into account lessons learned and focusing on results; §29: Recognising 
the need for better targeted, result-oriented and coordinated Aid for Trade as part of the aid 
and  development  effectiveness  agenda,  as  agreed  in  Busan,  by  encouraging  developing 
countries to integrate trade as a strong component in their development strategies, enhancing 
the complementarity and coherence between trade and development instruments, focusing on 
LDCs and developing countries most in need and increasing the engagement of the private 
sector; §30: Calling on the Commission and Member States to better coordinate their aid for 
trade, and to align it behind the development strategies of partner countries, supporting efforts 
                                                           
117  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/human-rights/  
118  The documentation of consultations on the draft guidelines held between December 2012 and February 2013 can be found 
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119  European Commission, ‘My business and human rights: A guide to human rights for small and medium-sized enterprises’, 
2012. 
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to integrate the inclusive and sustainable growth dimension in these strategies, keeping in mind 
the importance of capacity building. 
  Council Conclusions of 15 October 2012, §4: The EU will continue work to deliver  more 
focused, targeted and coordinated Aid for Trade in line with the EU’s Agenda for Change and 
with robust monitoring and evaluation framework. 
3.2.1.  Introduction 
Trade is an essential engine of growth and one of the principal sources of revenue for developing 
countries. Although trade revenues are not a source of development finance per se, trade can help 
boost  development  and  reduce  poverty  by  generating  growth  through  increased  commercial 
opportunities  and investment,  as  well as  broadening the productive base through private sector 
development. Between 2000 and 2008, GDP per capita increased from EUR 353 to over EUR 433 
in LDCs. Much of this can be attributed to an increase in trade and foreign investment
121. 
While many developing partners have furthered their integration into the world economy and global 
trade order and have increased their competitiveness, others, in particular LDCs, continue to lag 
behind and risk further marginalisation. 
The new EU policy framework for trade, growth and development, adopted in 2012, aims precisely 
at focusing efforts on LDCs and other developing countries most in need. It acknowledges the need 
for more differentiation among developing countries in order to better reflect their differences in 
needs, potentials and objectives. 
In line with the EU PCD commitments, the EU has also strived to improve the coherence and 
complementarity between the EU’s trade and development policies. The forthcoming EU Report on 
PCD will take stock of progress in that area. 
3.2.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on Trade 
and Development. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target date  Status
122  Comment 
Increase collective TRA to 
EUR 2 billion a year by 2010 
(EUR 1 billion from MS; 
EUR 1 billion from Commission). 
Around 50% of the increase to be 
available to ACP countries. 
2010 
   
Collective EU TRA 
commitments reached EUR 2.8 
billion in 2011; EU collective 
wider AfT amounted to EUR 9.5 
billion. 
TRA to Africa increased by 50% 
in 2011 as compared with 2010. 
Sustain EU and MS efforts, giving 
increased attention to LDCs and 
joint AfT response strategies and 
delivery 
No date specified 
   
Active participation in the EIF, a 
multi-donor programme to help 
LDCs become more active in the 
global trading system. The 
proportion of EU collective AfT 
going to LDCs increased from 
16% in 2010 to 19% in 2011. 
However, these shares are much 
lower than those of non-EU 
DAC donors. 
Reach agreement on regional AfT 
packages in support of ACP 
regional integration, under the 
leadership of the ACP regional 
integration organisations and their 
No date specified 
   
In terms of total volume, 
regional AfT is growing faster 
than overall AfT. In 2011, the 
EU and MS committed EUR 726 
million to ACP regional 
                                                           
121  European Commission, ‘Ten Benefits of Trade for Developing Countries’, 2012.  
122  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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EU Commitment  Target date  Status
122  Comment 
Member States, and involving 
other donors 
programmes and projects (8% of 
collective EU AfT, as compared 
with 4% in 2008). EUR 642 
million were committed to Sub-
Saharan Africa alone. 
Challenges were encountered 
with respect to the absorption 
capacity and performance of 
some regional organisations and 
their capacity to effectively 
coordinate donors. 
Continuously review the EU’s 
AfT strategies and programmes, 
taking into account lessons learnt 
and focusing on results 
No date specified 
   
The EU is active in the 
International Policy Dialogue on 
Aid for Trade in the OECD 
(latest meeting in January 2013) 
and WTO (next Global Aid for 
Trade Review in July 2013). 
Regular discussions are held 
with MS and an EU monitoring 
report on AfT is published 
annually as part of this 
Accountability Report. 
Enhance the complementarity and 
coherence between trade and 
development instruments, 
focusing on LDCs and developing 
countries most in need, and 
increasing private sector 
involvement 
No date specified 
   
The Trade, Growth and 
Development Policy adopted in 
2012 enhances complementarity 
and coherence and takes a 
differentiated approach to LDCs 
and other developing countries 
most in need. 
The new GSP adopted by the EU 
in 2012 focuses on countries 
most in need, strengthens the 
GSP+ as an incentive to good 
governance and sustainable 
development and makes the 
scheme more transparent, stable 
and predictable.  
Better coordinate EU AfT, and 
align it behind the development 
strategies of partner countries 
No date specified 
   
38% of the respondents to a 
survey carried out in 2013 
among EU Delegations and EU 
MS field offices in developing 
countries (see AfT report in 
Annex) believe that there have 
been moderate improvements in 
coordination (including through 
joint needs assessments, 
implementation and 
monitoring/evaluation). 
3.2.3.  Recent Trends 
Over the period 2005-2011, the volume of world merchandise trade grew by an average of 3.7% 
annually – despite a sharp downturn in 2009. Growth rates over this period have been much higher 
for  many  developing  countries  and  for  LDCs  in  particular  with  an  average  of  4.6%  annual 
increase
123. 
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Total volumes of developing countries’ exports of goods and services revenues are only marginally 
smaller than finance for development flows, and larger for middle income than for low income 
countries. 
Developing countries, in particular LDCs, have made measurable progress in their participation in 
the global trading system. However, for many LDCs this participation still remains too narrowly 
focused  on  a  limited  range  of  exports  (often primary  commodities). In  addition,  prospects  for 
further integration into the global economy continue to be hampered by a range of supply-side and 
trade-related infrastructure constraints. 
LDCs still remain on the margin of global trade: they only account for 1.12% of global exports 
(despite a 23.9% increase of the value of their exports in 2011 compared to 2010)
124, attract little 
Foreign or Domestic direct investment, and are locked into supplying a narrow range of goods and 
services. 
3.2.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
3.2.4.1.  Trade Policies 
The EU is the largest trading partner of developing countries and the market most open to them. It 
accounts for 15.5% of their total trade. According to Eurostat, EU imports of goods and services 
from ACP countries amounted to over EUR 113 billion in 2011. 
The main EU trade preference programme for developing countries is the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP), which provides reduced tariffs for their goods when entering the EU market. 
The GSP covers three separate regimes: 
 
  The ‘standard’ GSP, which currently provides 176 developing countries and territories with 
preferential access to the EU; 
  The  special  incentive  arrangement  known  as  ‘GSP+’,  which  offers  additional  tariff 
reductions to support vulnerable developing countries in the implementation of international 
conventions in the areas of human rights, labour rights, environment and good governance. 
  The  ‘Everything  but  Arms’  arrangement  (EBA),  under  which  all  products  from  LDCs, 
except arms and ammunitions, can enter the EU market at zero tariffs and without quotas. 
In  2011,  imports  that  received  GSP  preferences  were  worth  EUR  87  billion,  which  represents 
around 5% of total EU imports and 11% of the total EU imports from developing countries. 
On 31 October 2012, the EU has adopted a new GSP which will come into effect in 2014. The 
scheme was reformed in order to better pursue the main goal of supporting economic growth in 
developing countries according to their development, trade and financial needs. As a result, the new 
GSP is focused on countries which are most in need of it, i.e. on poorer beneficiaries (89 countries: 
49 LDCs in the EBA scheme, and 40 other low and lower-middle income partners), via the deferral 
of preferences for countries which are already competitive or have a better access to the EU market 
thanks  to  bilateral  agreements.  At  the  same  time,  thanks  to  the  new  GSP+  arrangement,  more 
support  and  incentives  are  provided  to  countries  effectively  implementing  international  human 
rights, labour rights and environment and good governance conventions. The scheme, that will last 
ten years instead of the customary three years, is also more transparent, stable and predictable. 
In January 2013, the European Commission issued a comparative analysis
125 of EU and US trade 
preferences for the LDCs and the AGOA
126 beneficiaries, presenting product and country coverage 
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of the preferences and a detailed analysis of the structure of EU and US imports from the two 
groups of beneficiaries. The analysis shows that: (i) a larger share of EU imports benefits from 
duty-free tariffs compared to the US, (ii) the EU’s EBA initiative offers duty-free and quota-free 
entry  to  all  products  from  the  LDCs  (except  arms  and  ammunition),  while  the  US  extends 
preferences to three quarters of all imports (with figures on par for the AGOA beneficiaries), (iii) 
EU preference schemes are better utilised, and (iv) the EU imports more goods duty free than does 
the US. 
3.2.4.2.  EU Aid for Trade 
An estimated EUR 151 billion
127 have been mobilised globally since the launch of the Aid for Trade 
(AfT) initiative in 2005. AfT resources have grown by more than 80% and reached ap proximately 
EUR 34 billion in 2010, with a third of that share going to LDCs. This figure would increase further 
if the trade-related assistance and wider aid for trade offered by South-South partners was included. 
Progress has been made not just in terms of the amounts of money committed, but also in terms of 
results. For example, it has been estimated that a 10% increase in Aid for Trade spending on 
infrastructure has led to a 6.5% increase in goods exports
128. 
The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  collectively  the  major  contributor  to  AfT  programmes 
worldwide, accounting for  around a third of total worldwide Aid for Trade in 2011. The EU 
collective wider AfT commitment amounted to EUR 9.5 billion in 2011. With a decrease of -11% in 
2011 (after an increase of 17% in 2010), this growth rate is far below the average annual growth 
rate recorded by the EU and its Member States since 2002 (+10%) but less than the global decline 
of -16% in 2011. The decline in EU collective AfT in 2011 was not an isolated phenomenon. In  
fact, the reduction remained far below those of the USA (-41%) and Japan (-20%). 
AfT remains concentrated in some EU Member States (Germany, France, UK, Spain and the 
Netherlands) and EU institutions. The two most important donors, accounting for almost 6 0% of 
EU collective AfT in 2011, were Germany (EUR 2.7 billion) and the Commission (EUR 2.7 
billion). The EU has met the 2010 G20 Seoul commitment
129 to (at least) maintain AfT levels at the 
average of 2006-2008. 
Although Africa saw the largest decrease in A fT observed in 2011, it remains the most important 
recipient of collective EU AfT programmes, accounting for almost 36% of EU AfT flows. There 
has also been a clear downward trend of the share of AfT commitments dedicated to LDCs and 
ACP since 2000. For instance, the share of EU collective AfT to LDCs has declined after having 
remained stable in the period 2006 -2009. Commitments to LDCs accounted for 24% of EU 
collective AfT in 2008 (EUR 2.3 billion) and they now represent only 19% of the total (EUR 1.7 
billion). ACP States have also been affected by this negative trend, from 44% of the total in 2005 to 
less than 35% in 2011. There is however an exceptional and substantial increase in the share of 
programmes dedicated to these countries in 2011 (with respectively 34% of AfT dedicated to ACPs 
and 19% dedicated to LDCs). 
Over 90% of EU collective AfT commitments are focused on two broad categories: trade related 
infrastructure (43% of the total since 2001), and building productive capacity (49% of the total 
since 2001). There are strong similarities in the structure of AfT by broad category between the EU 
and its Member States, albeit covering different sectors. The EU is more specialised on agriculture, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
126  US African Growth and Opportunity Act. 
127  http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl262_e.htm.  
128  Speech  13/18,  K.  De  Gucht,  European  Commissioner  for  Trade,  16  January  2013,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-18_en.htm.  
129  The Seoul G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development in 2010 included a commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, 
aid-for-trade levels that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008) and (…) monitor these commitments and 
evaluate their impact on LICs’ capacity to trade.  
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transport and storage and trade policy, while EU Member States are more involved in  energy, 
banking and financial services, business and other services. 
The  EU  and  its  Member  States  participate  in  several  donor  coordination  fora  such  as  the 
‘International Policy Dialogue on Aid for Trade’ in the OECD and the WTO Global Aid for Trade 
Reviews.  The  EU and its  Member States  have  also  set  up an experts  group in  order to  better 
coordinate EU AfT and align it behind partner countries’ priorities. 38% of the respondents to a 
survey carried out in 2013 among EU Delegations and EU MS field offices in developing countries 
(see AfT report in Annex) believe that there have been moderate improvements in coordination (in 
terms of joint needs assessments, joint implementation, and joint monitoring/evaluation). 
 
The  EU  is  also  a  strong  supporter  of,  and  active  participant  to,  the  ‘Enhanced  Integrated 
Framework’ (EIF), a multi-donor programme housed in the WTO Secretariat supporting LDCs to 
be more active players in the global trading system by helping them tackle supply-side constraints 
to trade. The programme is currently helping 47 LDCs worldwide, supported by a multi-donor trust 
fund, the EIF Trust Fund, with contributions from 23 donors including the EU and several EU 
Member States
130. The European Commission has pledged EUR 10 mil lion to the EIF Trust Fund 
and provides support on the ground by taking the role of a ‘facilitator’ in several LDCs. 
3.3.  Remittances for Development 
EU Commitments 
  The Council has repeatedly committed to reduce the cost and improve the safety of transfers and to 
further work to enhance the impact of remittances on development (e.g. Council Conclusions of 18 May 
2009, §11). It has committed to ‘adopt General principles for International Remittances Services agreed 
by  the  Committee  on  Payments  and  Settlements  Systems  (CPSS)  and  operational  definitions  and 
recommendations  allowing  the  improvement  of  data  on  remittances’  (Council  conclusion  of  11 
November 2008, §27). The Council also committed ‘to ensure that relevant legislation does not contain 
provisions  hampering  the  effective  use  of  legal  remittances  channels’  (Council  conclusions  of  18 
November 2009, §10). 
  Council Conclusions of 29 May 2012, §27: The Council reaffirms the need to ensure faster, easier and 
cheaper  remittance  transfers  and  enhance  the  impact  on  development  of  social  and  financial 
remittances, while ensuring coherence with other development priorities. 
  Council Conclusions of 15 October 2012, §5: Remittances are a key private source of financing for 
developing countries. The EU recalls the G8 and G20 goal of reducing the average cost of transferring 
remittances from  10%  to  5%  by  2014  and  reaffirms  the need to  ensure  faster,  easier and  cheaper 
remittance transfers, in line with the 29 May 2012 Council Conclusions, to maximise the development 
impact of migration and mobility. 
3.3.1.  Introduction 
Remittances are cross-border, person-to-person financial transactions of relatively low value. Even 
if often indistinguishable from any other low-value cross-border transfers, remittances are typically 
recurrent transfers sent by migrants to their families in the country of origin. Remittances are vitally 
important for recipients and their communities, as a source of income (providing disposable funds), 
for developing country governments, as a valuable inflow of funds, as well as for banks in recipient 
countries (by providing foreign currency and access to new potential customers). 
Over the past 15 years, remittances have largely outpaced global development aid to developing 
countries and they proved to be more resilient than foreign direct investment during the crisis. 
However,  persistent  unemployment  in  Europe  and  the  narrowing  of  migration  entry  channels 
present serious downside risks. 
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3.3.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on 
Remittances for Development. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
 
EU Commitment  Target date  Status
131  Comment 
Enhance the development impact 
of remittances 
No date specified 
   
The EU and several MS have 
launched initiatives to train 
migrants and foster migrants’ 
savings and diaspora 
investments in their countries of 
origin. 
Reduce the average cost of 
transferring remittances from 10% 
to 5% by 2014 
2014 
   
The average cost of sending 
remittances from the EU is 
estimated at 10.6% of the 
amount sent – higher than the 
global average of 9.1% and only 
marginally lower than the EU 
average of 11.71% in Q3 2008, 
when monitoring of remittance 
costs started. 
3.3.3.  Recent Trends 
Remittances  to  developing countries  represented a significant  share of the overall development 
finance available for low income countries in 2010, as shown in Figure 3.3.3, while it was more 
marginal for middle income countries. 
Figure 3.3.3 – Remittances to Developing Countries as a Share of Total Resource Flows of 
Low-Income (LIC) and Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in 2010 
Officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries were estimated by the World Bank
132 
to be close to EUR 312 billion in 2012 (an increase of 5.3% compared to 2011).  Remittances to 
developing countries are projected to grow by 8.8% annual rate during 2013  - 2015 to about EUR 
400 billion in 2015.  
Global trends show that remittance flows are predominantly going to low and lower middle income 
countries. Among the top ten countries in terms of value of remittances received, one is low income 
                                                           
131  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track. 
132  World Bank, ‘Migration and Development Brief’, April 2013.   
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(Bangladesh), six are lower middle income (India, Philippines, Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Vietnam), 
and three are upper middle income (China, Mexico, Lebanon). 
The primary body responsible for collecting remittances data at the EU level is Eurostat. While 
World Bank estimates are based on migrant stocks in each country and their income, Eurostat 
obtains and consolidates remittances data from each Member State’s balance of payment statistics. 
However,  the  way  that  data  is  collected  in  individual  countries  varies  considerably  and  some 
Member States do not collect remittances data at all. Moreover, World Bank statistics include both 
remittances (i.e. transfers made by migrants who are residents of the host country) and workers’ 
compensation (i.e. transfers made by non-residents), while Eurostat covers only remittances. The 
two sources therefore differ, with the latter being much more conservative. 
World  Bank  figures  for  EU  remittances  to  developing  countries  in  2011  amount  to  EUR  46.7 
billion. According to Eurostat, remittances from the EU amounted to EUR 39.2 billion in 2011, up 
by 2% compared with 2010. This total includes both intra-EU27 and extra-EU27 flows. Extra-EU27 
flows of workers’ remittances, which represented nearly three quarters of the total, grew by 3% to 
reach EUR 28.5 billion, while intra-EU27 flows remained relatively stable at EUR 10.7 billion. 
Among the Member States for which data are available, the outflow of workers’ remittances in 
2011 was highest from France (EUR 9.7 billion, or 25% of total EU27 remittances), Italy (EUR 7.4 
billion,  or  19%),  Spain  (EUR  7.3  billion,  or  19%),  Germany  (EUR  3  billion,  or  8%)  and  the 
Netherlands (EUR 1.5 billion, or 4%). Among these five Member States, the share of extra-EU27 
remittances in the total ranged from 64% in France to 83% in Italy. 
3.3.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
The EU and its Member States have undertaken a number of remittance related initiatives over 
recent years and some improvements have been made. However, there is still a significant amount 
of work to be done if the commitments made by the EU and its Member States over the last five 
years with respect of remittances are to be met. 
In 2012, the Commission published a report
133 assessing the state of play of the EU commitments 
on remittances. The study addressed a variety of themes, such as data collection, transparency and 
competition, transfer prices, development impact of remittances and policy coherence. 
The report confirms that there has been significant progress towards facilitating remittance transfers 
from Europe. In particular, the regulatory and operational environment for remittance transfers has 
been improved, and the price of transfers has been reduced by a small amount.  The  Payment 
Services Directive (PSD)  –  which  provides  the  legal  basis  of  a  single  European  market  for 
payments  by  promoting  competition  and  strengthening  market  transparency  -  has  considerably 
improved the payment environment, notably by increasing the number of businesses that can offer 
remittances services. 
However, the report also points to the need for Member States to take further measures to improve 
the quality and comparability of remittances data. Several EU Member States are already taking 
measures  to  improve  the  data  collection  of  remittances  as  part  of  their  Balance  of  Payments 
statistics. 
The introduction of the PSD has also resulted in greater reporting requirements for money transfer 
operators  (MTO).  Accurate  data  on  the  volume  of  remittance  flows  helps  to  make  informed 
decision-making and design appropriate development initiatives. However, until now there has been 
                                                           
133  European  Commission/HTSPE,  ‘EU  Remittances  for  Developing  Countries,  Remaining  Barriers,  Challenges  and 
Recommendations’, 2012.  
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no real connection between the PSD and data collection. It is expected that leveraging the reporting 
requirements of the PSD could lead to more accurate data collection. 
In order to improve data collection, a new EU Regulation on Community Statistics concerning 
balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment stipulates that the 
reporting of annual data on remittances with full geographical breakdown will be mandatory as of 
2014. 
Moreover, the report recommends that the Payment Services Directive be broadened to include 
transactions that are sent to countries outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) - the PSD is 
currently only binding for intra-EEA transfers. Some EU Member States have already chosen to 
extend its reach to transactions where one of the parties is located outside the EEA. 
A full review of the PSD was conducted by the Commission in 2012 to evaluate the impact of the 
PSD and identify areas that should be addressed. Results of the review process suggest that the PSD 
may need to be revised; both to adjust some of its provisions to take into account the lessons from 
experience since its entry into force, and to cater for the latest market developments and innovation 
in retail payments. A revision of the PSD therefore features as one of the main levers in the Single 
Market Act II, presented in mid-2013. 
3.3.4.1.  Reducing the Cost of Remittances 
In 2011, the G20 committed to reduce the cost of remittances from a global average of 10% to 5% 
by 2014
134. According to the World Bank
135, the worldwide average remittance cost in the firs t 
quarter of 2013 was 9.05%, while they are averaging 7.5% in the top 20 remittance corridors. It is 
estimated that if the 5% reduction were achieved, up to an additional amount of EUR 12 billion a 
year would become available to citizens in developing countries. 
Much still has to be done within the EU to reduce transfer costs to 5% by 2014. According to the 
above-mentioned report, the average price in 2012 for sending remittances from the EU was 
estimated at 10.6% of the sent amount; higher than the global  average of 9.1% and a little lower 
than the EU average of 11.71% in Q3 2008. Remittance prices vary considerably within the EU 
depending on the countries they are being sent from and to, the method that is used, and the speed 
of the transfer. 
Several EU Member States
136 have indicated that they are taking action towards reducing the cost of 
remittances,  in  line  with  the  G20  commitment.  For  example,  Italy  has  abolished  a  tax  on 
remittances towards extra-EU countries, while the Dutch Minister for Trade and Deve lopment 
Cooperation has promised to take up the subject with the banking sector. 
Five Member States
137 have also set up website portals to facilitate the comparison of transfer costs 
through different operators. Sweden is considering doing likewise. 
The role of recipient countries must not be overlooked. Public authorities in recipient countries can 
also significantly contribute to reducing remittance costs through measures aimed at improving the 
efficiency of their payment system infrastructure as well as ensuring competitive market conditions. 
Receiving countries are also important potential providers of data, notably on informal remittances. 
More attention should therefore be paid to support measures addressing these challenges. 
                                                           
134  Compliance to this commitment will be evaluated in three parts; a sending country is considered on track towards full 
compliance if it: (1) currently has average transfer costs valued at below 10 % for USD200 and USD500 dollar transfer 
amounts OR (2) reduced outgoing transfer costs for remittances OR (3) enacted policy that advances the World Bank 
General Principles for International Remittance Services. 
135  Figures refer to the cost of sending US$200 or the local currency equivalent – see http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/.  
136  DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, SE. 
137  DE, FR, IT, NL, UK.  
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Although they account for approximately 40% of remittances received by developing countries, 
South-South remittance flows have been overlooked. As a matter of fact, remittance flows to Africa 
mainly  originate  elsewhere  in  Africa  rather  than  in  other  continents.  It  is  estimated  that  about 
67%
138 of incoming flows to Africa come from migrants living in other African countries, with the 
majority of these flows being informal. 
Remittance costs can be very high in other regions of the world. This is particularly true for Africa, 
with an average percentage cost of sending money to (or within) Africa close to 12% in January 
2013
139. The World Bank’s database ‘Send Money Africa’
140 shows that the ten most expensive 
corridors globally were all intra-Africa, with the top five originating from South Africa and rates as 
high as 25%. 
3.3.4.2.  Enhancing the Development Impact of Remittances 
As highlighted in a 2011 report by the OECD
141, migration poses a number of challenges that need 
to be addressed. One of them concerns the dependency remittances can crea te for the recipient 
families. It is thus essential to  promote the channelling of remittances flows towards a more 
informed and productive use. 
The EU and several Member States have undertaken initiatives to this end. For example, the 
German GIZ has publis hed  a  ‘Handbook  on  Financial  Literacy  for  Remittances  and  Diaspora 
investment’, collecting different methodologies of financial literacy activities targeting migrants 
and recipient families. The purpose of the handbook is to guide the design of development projects 
that support increased financial inclusion and independence of migrants and their families; link 
remittance flows to other financial products/services (savings, insurance, loans); and foster migrant 
savings and Diaspora investments in their countries of origin. 
Other  Member  States  (Italy,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands)  have  set  up  capacity  building  and 
training programmes to mobilise and support Diasporas in setting up businesses in their countries of 
origin. 
                                                           
138  World Bank, ‘Leveraging Migration for Africa Remittances, Skills, and Investments’, 2011.  
139  http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/.  
140  http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/.  
141  OECD,  ‘Tackling  the  Policy  Challenges  of  Migration:  Regulation,  Integration,  Development’,  Development  Centre 
Studies, 2011.  
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4.  INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
4.1.  Introduction 
International public finance has been a stable and increasing source of finance at the global level 
but volatile at the country level. While the situation varies at country level, it is overall of little 
importance to MICs, accounting for only 0.4% of their GDP and 3% of foreign resource flows. At 
the same time, it remains an important source of finance for LICs, where it accounts for around 
12% of GDP and 60% of foreign resource flows. The potential of significant increases in ODA is 
low, due to the current recession and limited increases in the national budgets of donor countries, 
but existing sources can be better used. 
Figure 4.1.1 – International Public Finance Flows as a Share of Total Resource Flows of Low-
Income (LIC) and Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in 2010 
There are two types of commitments relating to international public finance for development: those 
concerning the quantity and volume of flows and those concerning their quality and effectiveness. 
Quantitative commitments are the subject of this chapter, while qualitative commitments are 
analysed in Chapter 6. As the focus of this chapter is on quantitative targets, EU policies or 
programmes will not be reviewed, unless they have a direct bearing on such quantities. The chapter 
will end with a brief discussion of the current debate on the ODA concept as it has a direct impact 
on the future of existing collective and individual ODA targets. 
Numerous commitments have been made in terms of increasing and distributing the quantity of 
public finance for development and for tackling global challenges and their impact on developing 
countries.  Most  of  them  concern  a  subset,  Official  Development  Assistance  or  ODA,  which 
comprises official loans of concessional character and grants used for development purposes. EU 
Member States and other donors have agreed to global targets for ODA to developing countries, 
expressed as shares of their GNIs, and to a subset of targets concerning aid to specific groups of 
countries (e.g. LDCs, Africa, or Sub-Saharan Africa) or for specific purposes (e.g. aid for trade, 
Fast Start Climate Finance). Other quantitative targets were set for additional public finance for 
global  goals  (e.g.  climate  change  adaptation  and  mitigation  activities),  but  are  not  necessarily 
funded through ODA. 
The concept of ODA itself is under discussion, as many feel the need to broaden its definition 
and/or to monitor the full breadth of public financial flows to developing countries, even at less than 
concessional  terms,  provided  they  have  a  developmental  focus.  The  terms  under  which  public  
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finance is provided are also crucial. Lending has gained prominence in the debate about different 
development financing instruments. According to some studies, grants have a tendency to substitute 
(instead of adding to) domestic revenues, while loans are associated with stronger domestic revenue 
mobilisation
142.  While  the  shift  towards  lending  instruments  helps  to  frontload  development 
spending,  it  also  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  measures  to  e nsure  debt  sustainability  of  the 
borrower. 
4.2.  Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
EU Commitments 
  ODA Levels. In 2002, the EU and its Member States adopted joint commitments on ODA increases. 
These commitments were further developed and broadened, and endorsed by the European Council in 
2005 ahead of the UN World Summit that undertook the first review of progress on the Millennium 
Declaration and the MDGs. Then, the EU and its Member States agreed to achieve a collective ODA 
level of 0.7% of GNI by 2015 and an interim target of 0.56% by 2010, both accompanied by individual 
national targets. The EU Member States agreed to increase their ODA to 0.51% of their national income 
by 2010 while those countries which had already achieved higher levels (0.7% or above) promised to 
maintain these levels. The Member States that acceded to the EU in or after 2004 (EU12) promised to 
strive to spend 0.17% of their GNI on ODA by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015.  
  The commitment to these goals has been repeatedly confirmed by the Council, most recently in the 
Council Conclusions of 15 June 2010 on the Millennium Development Goals, the Conclusions of the 
European Council of 17 June 2010, the Environment Council Conclusions of 9 March 2012 on Rio+20, 
the Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012 (on the Annual Report 2012 to the European Council on EU 
Development  Aid  Targets),  the  Council  Conclusions  of  14  May  2012  (on  Agenda  for  Change),  the 
European Council Conclusions of 8 February 2013 and the Council Conclusions of 29 May 2013 (on 
the Annual Report 2013 to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets). 
  The European Council Conclusions of 8 February 2013 reaffirmed that the 0.7% goal was a key 
priority, adding that ‘the European Union should as part of this commitment therefore aim to ensure 
over the period 2014-2020 that at least 90% of its overall external assistance be counted as official 
development  assistance  according  to  the  present  definition  established  by  the  OECD  Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC).’ 
  Predictability  of  ODA  increases.  The  Council  has  also  stressed  the  importance  of  increasing 
predictability of the ODA increases through national multiannual planning. In 2007, the Council invited 
Member States concerned to introduce such timetables by the end of 2007. In November 2008 and May 
2009 this call was reiterated and the deadline extended to the end of 2010.  
  In  its  Conclusions  of  15  June  2010  (§30)  and  14  May  2012  (on  the  Annual  Report  2012  to  the 
European Council on EU Development Aid Targets) (§5b), the Council asked Member States to take 
realistic, verifiable actions for meeting individual ODA targets by 2015 and to share information about 
these actions and, within the budgetary processes of the Member States, to share information on their 
planned ODA spending for the next budgetary year as well as the intentions for remaining period until 
2015.  
  ODA to Africa. In addition the EU committed in 2005 to: (a) increase ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and 
(b) provide 50% of the ODA increase to Africa as a whole (North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
  ODA to LDCs. In 2008 the EU collectively also committed to provide between 0.15 and 0.20% ODA/ 
GNI to the Least Developed Countries by 2010
143. 
                                                           
142  IMF, ‘Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries’. Box 3, 2011.  
143  European Council, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15075/1/08, Rev. 1.  
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4.2.1.  Introduction 
Although the goal of allocating annually 0.7% of GNI to ODA is accepted by all DAC donors 
except the United States of America, only EU donors and Norway have set a date to achieve it, 
transforming  the  long-standing  UN  0.7%  goal,  considered  by  many  as  aspirational,  into  an 
achievable, time-bound target. The EU decided to move forward and achieve this goal in steps 
within 15 years (2000 – 2015), in line with the set deadline for reaching the MDGs, and based on a 
mix of individual and collective intermediate targets. The first intermediate EU ODA objectives 
were  defined  in  2002  during  the  preparation  for  the  Monterrey  International  Conference  on 
Financing for Development, based on the EU’s ODA levels in 2000. 
4.2.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU ODA commitments. 
Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
144  Comment 
The EU and MS agreed to 
achieve a collective ODA 
level of 0.7% of GNI by 
2015 
2015 
 
The EU ODA/GNI ratio is 
projected to reach 0.43% by 
2015. 
Take realistic, verifiable 
action to meet individual 
ODA targets by 2015 and 
share information about this 
action 
No date specified 
 
 
22 MS provided information on 
2013 financial year allocation, 
but limited information was 
provided on realistic/verifiable 
action. 
Increase collective ODA to 
Sub-Saharan Africa  No date specified 
 
 
2012 EU ODA to Sub-Saharan 
Africa increased as compared 
with 2004. 
Provide 50% of the 
collective ODA increase to 
Africa as a whole 
No date specified 
 
 
Only 7% of total EU ODA 
growth between 2004 and 2012 
went to Africa. 
Provide between 0.15% and 
0.20% of collective ODA/ 
GNI to LDCs by 2010 
2010 
 
 
EU ODA/GNI to LDCs was 
0.14% in 2010, 0.13% in 2011, 
and 0.12% in 2012. 
                                                           
144  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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4.2.3.  Recent Trends 
4.2.3.1.  EU ODA Performance 2005-2012 compared to other donors 
The EU’s combined efforts are already delivering substantially greater amounts of ODA than non 
EU donors, and individual EU countries (with a few exceptions) are still making greater efforts in 
relative terms, although the gap is narrowing. 
 
Figure 4.2.3a –ODA/GNI by Donor (% and EUR million, current prices) 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and European Commission 
Table 4.2.3a – ODA/GNI and ODA per capita of EU Member States and Non-EU DAC Members  
Donor 
ODA per capita (EUR)  ODA/GNI (%)  ODA (EUR Billion) 
2010  2011  2012  2010  2011  2012  2010  2011  2012 
EU  107   105    100   0.44   0.42    0.39   53.5   52.8    50.6  
Non EU DAC Members  79   79    85   0.23   0.23    0.22   44.4   44.6    48.1  
USA  74   71    75   0.21   0.20    0.19   22.9   22.2    23.7  
Japan  65   61    64   0.20   0.18    0.17   8.3   7.8    8.2  
Canada  115   113    126   0.34   0.32    0.32   3.9   3.9    4.4  
Source: OECD/DAC and European Commission   
59 
As shown in Figure 4.2.3a and Table 4.2.3a, both the EU’s per capita ODA and its ODA/GNI 
ratios are greater than those of non-EU DAC Members. Indeed, its ODA/GNI ratio is more than 
double that of Japan and the USA. Collectively, the EU outperforms most other donors by a wide 
margin. The USA, Japan and Switzerland have higher per capita income than the average for EU 
Member States but much lower per capita ODA. The US GNI is close to 90%of the EU27 GNI, but 
US ODA represents less than half of EU ODA. It is clear that most of the gap to achieving the 0.7% 
target lies outside the EU. However, the gap between EU and non EU DAC Members has been 
narrowing  since  2010,  because  the  former  are  reducing  their  ODA  efforts  while  the  latter  are 
keeping theirs essentially stable, as shown in Table 4.2.3. The difference between EU and non EU 
DAC averages for ODA/GNI ratios has fallen from 0.21 in 2010 to 0.17 in 2012. 
4.2.3.2.  Performance on ODA targets (2005-2012)  
ODA figures on 2012 net disbursements are preliminary, based on information provided by EU 
Member States and the European Commission. For those EU Member States that report to the 
OECD/ DAC, final and more comprehensive ODA figures will become available at the end of 2013. 
EU collective ODA spending in 2012 was EUR 55.2 billion (0.43% of the European Union’s 
GNI),  compared  to  EUR  56.3  billion  (0.45%  of  GNI)  in  2011.  A  significant  amount  of  EU 
Institutions’ ODA (EUR 4.5 billion equivalent to 0.04% of EU GNI) is not imputed as ODA to EU 
Member States by the DAC Secretariat. As a consequence, the ODA spending of the twenty-eight 
Member States (i.e. the sum of ODA imputed to them) in 2012 was EUR 50.6 billion, equivalent 
to an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.39%, continuing the previous year’s decline from 0.44% in 2010 to 
0.42% in 2011. The reduction in nominal terms was of EUR 2.2 billion (-4%). 
The downward trend of EU aggregate ODA spending started in 2011, and accelerated in 2012, with 
a rate of decrease in ODA/GNI ratios expanding from 0.02% of GNI between 2010 and 2011, to 
0.03% of GNI between 2011 and 2012. 
Since the EU took its first time-bound ODA commitments in 2002, EU aggregate ODA fluctuated, 
but overall was on an upward trend until 2010. Since then, EU aggregate ODA has been declining 
in both absolute and relative terms, and the speed of this decline accelerated in 2012. In real terms, 
EU aggregate ODA is back to its 2005 levels. However, one third of the reduction between 2011 
and 2012 was due to lower debt relief, which accounted for 26% of EU ODA at its peak in 2005 
and only for 2% in 2012. 
–  Since 2008, EU Member States have been hardly hit by the financial crisis, triggering the 
deepest  global  economic  recession  in  decades.  State-financed  rescue  packages  for  the 
affected banking sector, higher social protection costs and lower budget revenues have 
dramatically  changed  the  fiscal  situation  in  many  Member  States.  Low  or  negative 
economic growth rates in the EU as a consequence of the crisis, and the related austerity 
measures that Member States introduced, led to pressures on ODA. 
–  Through the first three years of the crisis, the EU’s aggregate ODA spending continued to 
increase,  but  eventually  succumbed  to  the  pressure  in  2011  and  2012,  resulting  in  a 
reversal in the slow trajectory of scaling up to meet 2015 targets. 
The 2012 decline in ODA by EUR 2.2 billion was the result of an overall negative performance by 
most Member States. In nominal terms, fifteen Member States reduced their ODA by a total of EUR 
3.2 billion, while twelve Member States increased theirs by a total of EUR 1.0 billion, although 
most  of  these  increases  were  due  to  fluctuations  in  the  exchange  rate  between  their  national  
60 
currencies and the Euro
145. ODA budget cuts in Spain (EUR 1.5 billion), Italy (EUR 1.1 billion), the 
Netherlands (EUR 0.3 billion), and Belgium ( EUR 0.2 billion) accounted for 94% of the total 
reduction in EU ODA spending. Only Austria, Luxembourg, Latvia and Poland increased their 
ODA/GNI ratios between 2011 and 2012, as shown in Figure 4.2.3b. 
Looking at overall developments since 2004, six Member States now have lower ODA/GNI ratios 
than at the beginning of the period under consideration. Four Member States (i.e. Greece, Italy, 
Portugal  and  Spain)  reduced  their  ratios  from  an  initially  low  level,  while  the  remaining  two 
(Denmark and the Netherlands) had ratios above the 2015 collective target of 0.7% both at the 
beginning and the end of the period. Only Greece, Portugal and Spain had also ODA volumes at 
current prices that were lower in 2012 than in 2004. 
  Figure 4.2.3b – Gap between 2015 targets and 2012 results 
146 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development) 
There is limited information available on the predictability EU ODA. In both the 2011 and 2012 
EU Accountability Reports, one-year EU ODA/GNI ratio projections were relatively accurate but 
slightly optimistic: 3% higher than the actual ratio in 2011, and 6% higher in 2012. The two-year 
projection included in the 2011 Accountability Report was 11% higher than the actual EU ODA 
ratio of 2012. 
An OECD/DAC Survey
147 – carried out in July 2012 – revealed that ten Member States
148 and the 
Commission provide 3-5 year plans for country programmable aid, but only the Commission, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom do so for all partner countries. 
                                                           
145  For example, ODA spending by the United Kingdom marginally declined from £8,629 million in 2011 to £8,620 million in 
2012,  but,  when  converted  into  Euro,  increased  from  EUR  9,948  million  in  2011  to  EUR  10,627  million  in  2012, 
accounting for 70 % of the above mentioned collective increase of EUR 1 billion. 
146  The direction of the arrows was determined based on changes of at least 0.01 % after rounding both the 2012 and 2011 
ratios to the second decimal.  
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4.2.3.3.  Achievement of the 0.7% ODA/GNI Target by 2015 
Based on the projections provided by Member States and/or estimates prepared using their 2006-
2012 compound annual growth rate
149, the EU28 ODA is expected to increase to 0.43% of GNI by 
2015, below the level reached  in 2010 and almost 40% below the 0.7% target. Considering the 
expected GNI growth rate until 2015, reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI target would require the EU and 
its Member States to almost double their current ODA in nominal terms from EUR 50.6 billion 
today to EUR 97.1 billion by 2015. Figure 4.2.3c below shows the long-term trends in ODA 
volumes for the EU28. ODA growth has stalled, and the path to 0.7% is unclear, even if EU ODA is 
projected to stabilise between its 2010 and 2011 levels by 2015. There is also a significant risk that 
the current decline might continue until 2015 and beyond. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
147  OECD/DAC, ‘DAC Report on Aid Predictability: Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans, 2012-2015 and efforts 
since HLF-4’, 2012. 
148  BE, DK, FI, DE, IR, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK. 
149  Annex 2 outlines the methodology used to analyse ODA indicators and forecasts provided by MS.  
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Table 4.2.3b: Estimates and gaps to be bridged for reaching the 2015 ODA targets, based on Member States’ forecast information and Commission simulation  
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
 EUR 
Million 
% of GNI
Austria 799               0.27           865                0.28           1,362            0.43           1,359         0.42           1,347         0.40           2,361             0.70              1,014        0.30                 
Belgium 2,019            0.54           1,792            0.47           1,998            0.51           2,065         0.51           2,920         0.70           2,920             0.70              -             -                   
Bulgaria 35                  0.09           30                  0.08           45                  0.11           50               0.12           56               0.13           146                0.33              90              0.20                 
Croatia 15                  0.03           15                  0.03           41                  0.09           65               0.14           69               0.15           217                0.33              148            0.18                 
Cyprus 28                  0.16           20                  0.12           28                  0.17           29               0.18           29               0.17           55                   0.33              26              0.16                 
Czech Republic 180               0.12           171                0.12           178               0.13           189             0.13           188             0.12           501                0.33              313            0.21                 
Denmark 2,108            0.85           2,115            0.84           2,151            0.85           2,204         0.84           2,258         0.84           2,685             1.00              427            0.16                 
Estonia 18                  0.11           18                  0.11           19                  0.11           23               0.12           25               0.13           63                   0.33              38              0.20                 
Finland 1,011            0.53           1,027            0.53           1,118            0.56           1,123         0.55           1,090         0.51           1,485             0.70              395            0.19                 
France 9,348            0.46           9,419            0.46           9,826            0.47           10,531       0.49           10,916       0.49           15,587          0.70              4,671        0.21                 
Germany 10,136         0.39           10,198          0.38           10,461         0.38           10,731       0.38           11,008       0.38           20,418          0.70              9,409        0.32                 
Greece 305               0.15           252                0.13           234               0.13           217             0.12           202             0.11           1,308             0.70              1,106        0.59                 
Hungary 100               0.11           93                  0.10           94                  0.10           98               0.10           102             0.10           335                0.33              233            0.23                 
Ireland 657               0.51           629                0.48           623               0.48           623             0.46           623             0.44           982                0.70              359            0.26                 
Italy 3,111            0.20           2,053            0.13           2,581            0.16           2,435         0.15           2,978         0.18           11,521          0.70              8,543        0.52                 
Latvia 14                  0.07           16                  0.08           16                  0.07           17               0.07           19               0.07           84                   0.33              66              0.26                 
Lithuania 38                  0.13           40                  0.13           41                  0.13           43               0.12           44               0.12           119                0.33              76              0.21                 
Luxembourg 294               0.97           336                1.00           323               0.98           323             0.95           337             0.96           352                1.00              15              0.04                 
Malta 14                  0.25           14                  0.23           15                  0.22           19               0.28           23               0.33           23                   0.33              -             -                   
The Netherlands 4,563            0.75           4,298            0.71           4,240            0.69           3,816         0.60           3,990         0.61           4,581             0.70              591            0.09                 
Poland 300               0.08           341                0.09           387               0.10           407             0.10           428             0.10           1,347             0.33              919            0.23                 
Portugal 509               0.31           441                0.27           464               0.30           488             0.31           513             0.31           1,153             0.70              640            0.39                 
Romania 118               0.09           113                0.08           126               0.09           134             0.09           142             0.09           515                0.33              373            0.24                 
Slovak Republic 62                  0.09           61                  0.09           63                  0.09           66               0.09           69               0.09           265                0.33              196            0.24                 
Slovenia 45                  0.13           45                  0.13           45                  0.13           46               0.13           47               0.13           122                0.33              75              0.20                 
Spain 3,001            0.29           1,516            0.15           1,955            0.19           1,630         0.15           1,360         0.12           7,630             0.70              6,270        0.58                 
Sweden 4,030            1.02           4,078            0.99           4,411            1.01           4,599         1.00           4,748         1.00           4,748             1.00              -             -                   
UK 9,948            0.56           10,627          0.56           13,067         0.70           13,612       0.70           14,117       0.70           14,117          0.70              -             -                   
EU15 Total 51,840         0.44           49,647          0.42           54,814         0.46           55,756       0.45           58,406       0.46           91,847          0.72              33,441      0.26                 
EU13 Total 966               0.10           977                0.10           1,099            0.10           1,186         0.10           1,241         0.10           3,793             0.33              2,552        0.23                 
EU28 Total 52,806         0.42           50,623          0.39           55,913         0.43           56,942       0.42           59,647       0.43           95,640          0.69              35,993      0.26                 
EU Institutions ODA 12,507         13,669         
of which:
Imputed to Member States 9,054           9,125           Gap to collective 2015 target 0.7%
Not imputed to Member States 3,453           0.03          4,544           0.04          5,071           0.04          5,736         0.04          6,487         0.05          Target in EUR Million 97,936             
Collective EU ODA 
 (1) 56,259         0.45           55,167          0.43           60,984         0.47           62,677       0.46           66,134       0.47           Gap in EUR Million 47,313             
(1) Including EU Institutions ODA not imputed to Member States
Member State
2015 commitment 2015 financial gap 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 
Shaded cells are Commission estimates  
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Figure 4.2.3c - EU 15/25/27 ODA/GNI Ratios (1995-2012) and EU 28 Projections (2013-2015)  
 
Source: OECD/DAC and European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development)  
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The EU scaling-up process has been uneven, with asymmetric efforts among Member States. Those 
Member States not contributing their fair share to the burden-sharing effort have kept the collective 
EU performance below the targets, and are also those that would need to make the greatest efforts to 
reach the 2015 targets. 
Table 4.2.3b above shows that a significant amount of EU Institutions’ ODA (worth EUR 4.5 
billion, equivalent to 0.04% of EU GNI) is not imputed as ODA to EU Member States by the DAC 
Secretariat.  In  contrast,  the  EU  ODA  projections  shown  in  Figure  4.2.3c  only  refer  to  ODA 
imputed to EU Member States, and are therefore conservative. In addition, Table 4.2.3b shows the 
projections  and  the  sometimes  drastic  increases  needed  by  individual  Member  States  in  their 
budgets of 2013-2015 if they are to meet their targets. For example, to reach the 2015 target Italy 
would need to sextuple their current ODA volumes over three years; Bulgaria, Croatia
150, Greece, 
Latvia, Romania, and Spain would need to quintuple theirs; Estonia, Hungary, Poland, an d the 
Slovak Republic would need to quadruple; while Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Portugal and Slovenia would need to triple their aid allocations. 
The projections provided by Member States suggest that many of them do not plan to make 
such increases under the current tight budget conditions. 23 Member States provided some 
projections  for  their  ODA  in  the  coming  years  and  16  have  provided  projections  up  to  2015. 
Excluding the four Member States that are already above 0.7% ODA/GNI, as indicated earlier, only 
Belgium,  Malta  and  the  United  Kingdom  foresee  reaching  their  2015  targets.  Based  on  these 
indications and the Commission’s own projections, it is foreseen that thirteen Member States will at 
least marginally increase their ODA/GNI ratio by 2015, however remaining far from reaching their 
individual targets. 
For 2013, the projections (based on Member Sates’ replies or budget data available online) point to 
a substantial increase in ODA budgets (EUR 5.2 billion), larger than the cumulative cuts of 2011 
and 2012. This is due in great part to significant ODA budget increases in the United Kingdom to 
reach the 0.7% target in 2013 (45% of total net increase), with another third generated by increases 
by Austria, France, Italy and Spain (ranging between EUR 400 and 500 million each). 
The ODA graphs in Annex 3 show the prospect for each EU Member State to meet its individual 
ODA targets (of 0.7% and 0.33% of GNI for EU15 and EU12 respectively) in 2015, as well as the 
size of the gap and how much of it is likely to be filled by 2015. 
Based  on  past  ODA  performance  and  future  plans,  six  categories  of  Member  States  can  be 
identified: 
  Member States that are leaders in ODA performance (3): Sweden, Luxembourg, and 
Denmark,  have  shown  consistent  performance  over  the  entire  period  always  remaining 
above the 2015 targets. 
  Member States that are above the 0.7% target but are planning to decrease (1). The 
Dutch government expects its ODA ratio to fall below 0.7%, from 0.71% in 2012, to 0.60% 
in 2015. 
  Member States on track to achieve their 0.7 or 0.33 target in or before 2015 (3). The 
United Kingdom has stated its intention to meet the 0.7 target this year, after growing from 
0.36% in 2004 to 0.56% in 2012. Belgium also intends to reach its target by 2015. It had 
reached a peak of 0.64% in 2010, before reducing it to 0.47% in 2012. The Government still 
plans to achieve the 0.7 target by 2015, after stabilising at 0.51% in 2013 and 2014. Malta 
showed a consistent growth of its ODA/GNI ratio from 0.18% in 2004 to 0.25% in 2011, 
                                                           
150  For Croatia, the 2013 projection was used as it includes imputed ODA through the European Commission.  
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before  declining  to  0.23%  in  2012.  The  Government  still  expects  to  reach  its  0.33% 
individual target by 2015. 
  Member States that have shown a consistent, visible growth of their aid, but do not 
expect to achieve their individual targets by 2015 (3). Between 2004 and 2009, Finland 
has increased its ODA ratio from 0.37% to 0.54% and has now essentially stabilised at this 
level, which it expects to maintain through to 2015, thus achieving less than 75% of its 2015 
target. Austria has increased its ODA/GNI ratio (net of debt relief) at a slow but steady pace 
from 2004 (0.23%) to 2010 (0.32%), when it started slowly declining, reaching 0.28% by 
2012. Austria expects to be able to raise its ODA/GNI ratio to 0.42% by 2015, 40% short of 
its target. France increased its ODA steadily from 0.41% in 2004 to 0.50% in 2010, and has 
since reduced it to 0.46% in 2012. France expects to regain the lost ground by 2015 (0.49%), 
but still 30% short of its target. 
  Member States that have gone off track due the economic crisis and are unlikely to 
catch  up  any  time  soon  (3).  The  significant  budget  cuts  of  2011  and  2012  affected 
particularly  Spain  that  had  shown  a  remarkable  upward  trend  before  the  crisis,  almost 
doubling its ODA/GNI ratio from 0.24% to 0.46% between 2004 and 2009. Since then, its 
ratio has fallen to 0.15% in 2012, less than one third of its 2009 level, and the country does 
not expect to regain any of the lost ground before 2015. Ireland had consistently increased 
its ODA ratios from 0.39% in 2004 to 0.59% in 2008, but has since then started a decline 
that led to a ratio of 0.48% in 2012 and a forecast of 0.44% by 2015, a little over two thirds 
of  the  peak  reached  in  2008,  and  almost  40%  short  of  its  target.  Cyprus  increased  its 
ODA/GNI ratio from 0.03% in 2004 to 0.23% in 2010, before declining by almost 50% in 
2011-2012 to 0.12%. The country expects to raise its ODA slightly over the next three years, 
remaining well below its 2010 level and almost 50% short of its target. 
  Member States that have never shown a sustained increase in their ODA, and are in 
some  cases  cutting  their  low  levels  of  ODA  even  further  (14).  Greece,  Italy  and 
Portugal are among the six Member States
151 whose ODA/GNI ratios were lower in 2012 
than in 2004.  Germany has kept its ODA levels practically steady (between 0.35% and 
0.39% of GNI) for the entire period between 2005 and 2012. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia 
have shown steady ODA ratios over the last four years with fluctuations within a 0.02-0.03 
band, and do not project any significant increase towards their ODA target by 2015. Croatia 
expects to stabilise at a ratio of 0.15% of GNI, following a similar path to the ones of several 
Member States after their accession. 
 
                                                           
151  The others are Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands, the last two from initial values already above 0.7%.  
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Table 4.2.3c - Gap between 2012 ODA levels and 0.7% and 0.33% ODA/ GNI individual targets,  
by Member State 
Projected 
increase in 
ODA by 2015
EUR Million % of GNI EUR Million EUR Million % of gap EUR Million % of GNI
Austria 865              0.28         482                    1,014                   2.6           2,361             0.70        
Belgium 1,792           0.47         1,127                 -                       -           2,920             0.70        
Bulgaria 30                0.08         26                      90                        0.2           146                0.33        
Croatia 15                0.03         54                      148                      0.4           217                0.33        
Cyprus 20                0.12         9                        26                        0.1           55                 0.33        
Czech Republic 171              0.12         17                      313                      0.8           501                0.33        
Denmark 2,115           0.84         144                    427                      1.1           2,685             1.00        
Estonia 18                0.11         7                        38                        0.1           63                 0.33        
Finland 1,027           0.53         63                      395                      1.0           1,485             0.70        
France 9,419           0.46         1,497                 4,671                   12.2         15,587           0.70        
Germany 10,198         0.38         810                    9,409                   24.6         20,418           0.70        
Greece 252              0.13         (51)                     1,106                   2.9           1,308             0.70        
Hungary 93                0.10         10                      233                      0.6           335                0.33        
Ireland 629              0.48         (6)                       359                      0.9           982                0.70        
Italy 2,053           0.13         925                    8,543                   22.3         11,521           0.70        
Latvia 16                0.08         2                        66                        0.2           84                 0.33        
Lithuania 40                0.13         4                        76                        0.2           119                0.33        
Luxembourg 336              1.00         0                        15                        0.0           352                1.00        
Malta 14                0.23         9                        -                       -           23                 0.33        
The Netherlands 4,298           0.71         (308)                   591                      1.5           4,581             0.70        
Poland 341              0.09         87                      919                      2.4           1,347             0.33        
Portugal 441              0.27         71                      640                      1.7           1,153             0.70        
Romania 113              0.08         29                      373                      1.0           515                0.33        
Slovak Republic 61                0.09         8                        196                      0.5           265                0.33        
Slovenia 45                0.13         2                        75                        0.2           122                0.33        
Spain 1,516           0.15         (156)                   6,270                   16.4         7,630             0.70        
Sweden 4,078           0.99         670                    -                       -           4,748             1.00        
UK 10,627         0.56         3,490                 -                       -           14,117           0.70        
Total EU MS 50,623         0.39         9,024                 35,993                 94.0         95,640           0.69        
Unassigned gap 
to collective 
target 2,296                   6.0           2,296             0.02        
EU28 50,623         0.39         9,024                 38,289                 100.0       97,936           0.70        
Member State
ODA 2012
Remaining gap to national 
targets
Total ODA in 2015 to 
meet national targets
 
Source: OECD/DAC and European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development) 
Several  factors  that  explain  why,  under  the  status  quo,  targets  will  be  missed  by  a  wide 
margin: 
First, the reduced ambition of some national plans has had a real impact on collective progress on 
ODA. Some of the more ambitious Member States have reduced their targets compared to the ones 
that formed the basis for the 2005 Council Conclusions. Most of the Member States do not plan to 
reach their individual targets. 
Second, the current fiscal crunch has led some countries to revise downwards their commitments 
and targets. 
Third, back-loading the increase in ODA expenditure is often unrealistic. Experience shows that 
missing intermediate targets in a significant way leads to missing subsequent targets too. A good 
example is provided by the Member States that significantly missed the 2006 target of 0.33% GNI: 
Greece, Italy and Portugal. Once the target was missed, statements were made that the 2006 target 
would be achieved by 2007 or 2008. In reality, the 2006 target has not been met by any of them 
even by 2012 and these three Member States ended up missing both the 2006 and the 2010 targets.  
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Fourth, reaching the EU ODA targets is contingent not only on the medium-sized donors, but 
also on EU countries with large economies such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK boosting 
average aid levels. These countries account for almost 70% of the gap to be filled between 2010 and 
2015.  If the  EU as  a whole is  to  meet  the  collective target  of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2015, it is 
imperative that all the big players play their full part, whereas only the United Kingdom has so far 
committed to do so. 
Table 4.2.3c above shows the funding gap between the current level of ODA from EU Member 
States and the 0.7% target. It appears clearly that unless decisive action is taken, the 2015 target will 
be missed by a large margin. 
4.2.3.4.  Falling Short of EU’s Promise on ODA to Africa
152 
Between 2005, when the commitment was made to direct 50% of EU aid increases to Africa (based 
on 2004 aid levels), and 2012, the combined EU aid to Africa has risen by about EUR 0.8 billion at 
constant prices. This means that 7% of total EU ODA growth between 2004 and 2012 went to 
Africa, as shown in Figure 4.2.3c. The smaller increase than last year is due to the fact that EU 
bilateral ODA to Africa declined from EUR 12 billion in 2011 to EUR 10 billion in 2012. 
No reference is made in Member States’ replies to specific actions towards the target of allocating 
50% of the ODA increase to Africa. On the other hand, Member States often cite the share of 
Africa in their overall ODA or geographically programmable ODA for measuring their effort in this 
respect. Most EU Member States are taking actions to increase ODA targeted to Africa. For some, 
aid to Africa already accounts for over half of their bilateral ODA (e.g. Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, and Portugal). A few Member States declare that they will not contribute to that target through 
their bilateral ODA as they state that their comparative advantage lies in other regions of the world. 
An important dimension is the imputed multilateral share of EU aid to Africa, which amounted to 
an estimated EUR 8.3 billion in 2012 and represented the entire EU increase from 2004 to 2012, as 
purely bilateral ODA declined over the period. Overall, 45% or EUR 21.1 billion of EU ODA was 
targeted to Africa in 2011. 
4.2.3.5.  How Did EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa Increase since 2005? 
EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa grew by around EUR 1.2 billion in real terms over the period 
2004-2012, thus meeting the less demanding target of increasing EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Over 90% of this growth was due to aid through multilateral channels. Only the Netherlands and 
Portugal significantly decreased their ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa over this period (-32% and -64%, 
respectively), with Spain showing only a very small decline of two percentage points. Preliminary 
data for 2012 show a 9% decline in bilateral EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa compared to 2011. 
4.2.3.6.  Honouring the EU Commitment on ODA to Least Developed Countries 
In  November  2008,  the  EU  Member  States  promised,  as  part  of  the  EU’s  overall  ODA 
commitments, to provide collectively 0.15% to 0.20% of their GNI to LDCs by 2010, while fully 
meeting the differentiated commitments set out in the ‘Brussels Programme of Action for the LDCs 
for the decade 2001-2010’. 
 
 
                                                           
152  For  the  first  time,  DAC  statistics  include  information  on  all  EU  Member  States.  Unlike  previous  editions  of  the 
Accountability Report, the analysis in this chapter concerns all EU Member States and not just the EU15, and this change 
explains most differences in values.  
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Figure 4.2.3d – EU ODA to Africa in EUR million and as a% of GNI (including imputed multilateral flows)  
 
Source: OECD/DAC data for 2004 – 2011 and Commission simulation on DAC Advance Questionnaire data for 2012 
Figure 4.2.3e - EU ODA to LDCs in EUR million and as a% of GNI including imputed multilateral flows 
 
Source: OECD/DAC data for 2004 – 2011 and Commission simulation on DAC Advance Questionnaire data for 2012  
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The LDCs’ share of EU ODA has increased both in absolute and relative terms since 2004. Last 
year’s report provided estimates, based on preliminary data, which seemed to indicate a volume of 
EU ODA to LDCs corresponding to 0.15% of EU GNI, thus meeting the target. Final statistics 
showed that the estimate was too optimistic, and that EU ODA to LDCs actually amounted to EUR 
16.1 billion in 2011, representing only 0.13% of EU GNI. EU ODA to LDCs, now estimated using 
a new methodology (described in Annex 2), declined further in 2012 to less than EUR 14 billion, or 
0.12% of EU GNI. The target has therefore been missed both in 2011 and in 2012. 
Figure 4.2.3e summarises the evolution of ODA/GNI ratios to LDCs for EU Member States over 
the  period  2004-2012.  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  remained  above  the  ODA  to  LDC  target  in  2012.  Eleven 
Member States
153 do not expect to be able to reach the 0.15% target any time soon . For several 
EU12 Member States, even allocating all of their ODA to LDCs would not suffice to meet the 
target, given their actual and projected ODA/GNI targets below 0.15%. 
4.2.4.  EU Policy 
The  European  Union  and  its  Member  States  have  repeatedly  reiterated  their  commitments  to 
achieve the 0.7% ODA to GNI ratio by 2015, as a concrete time-bound goal. The rationale for a 
time-bound target was to provide adequate funding to achieve the MDGs. Although EU Heads of 
State and Government confirmed that ODA remains an important element of the EU support to 
developing countries, the Council has not agreed any concrete measures to ensure the national steps 
necessary for fulfilling this commitment. 
The Commission has, in the last five annual reports, proposed three ways to step up efforts: (a) 
drawing up realistic and verifiable national ODA action plans outlining how Member States aim to 
scale up and strive to achieve the 2015 ODA targets; (b) introducing a peer review mechanism 
whereby the European Council would assess the progress of each Member State and give guidance 
for  further  joint  EU  progress  for  attaining  the  agreed  ODA  targets;  and  (c)  enacting  national 
legislation ring-fencing ODA. Under current trajectories, the EU as a whole is set to miss its 2015 
collective  target  by  a  wide  margin,  and  a  lack  of  readiness  to  act  would  therefore  affect  its 
credibility. 
The discussion on new FfD aggregates to monitor after 2015 should in no way affect the efforts 
towards meeting longstanding commitments that have been reiterated on numerous occasions. 
                                                           
153  CY,CZ, EL, ES, HR, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, and SK.  
70 
4.3.  Funding for Tackling Climate Change  
EU Commitments 
 
  Under the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries made important pledges 
for  fast  start  as  well  as  for  long-term  climate  financing.  The  collective  commitment  by 
developed countries was to provide new and additional resources approaching US$ 30 billion 
for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding 
for adaptation would be prioritised for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the 
Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States. In the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries committed to a 
goal of mobilising jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing 
countries. This funding should come from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. 
  The EU has frequently confirmed the importance of supporting developing countries moving 
towards sustainable economic growth and adapting to climate change (e.g. European Council 
Conclusions of 19-20 June 2008, §28). It has also underlined that climate financing should not 
undermine  or  jeopardise  the  fight  against  poverty  and  continued  progress  towards  the 
Millennium Development Goals (§23 European Council Presidency Conclusions 30 October 
2009). 
  European  Council  meeting  of  10-11  December  2009.  In  the  run-up  to  the  Copenhagen 
Conference, the EU and its Member States committed to contributing EUR 2.4 billion annually 
over the period 2010-2012 to the fast start climate funding (§37).  
 
The Council Conclusions of 15 May 2012, 13 November 2012 and 14 May 2013: 
  reaffirmed the EU and its Member States’ commitment to provide EUR 7.2 billion cumulatively 
over the period 2010 – 2012 to fast start finance; 
  reaffirmed the importance of continuing to provide support by developed countries beyond 2012 
for policies, programmes and initiatives that will deliver substantial results and value for money 
in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency in implementation, and in 
helping to increase climate resilience; and 
  reiterated  that,  in  this  respect,  the  EU  and  other  developed  countries  should  work  in  a 
constructive manner towards the identification of pathways for scaling up climate finance from 
2013 to 2020 from a wide variety of sources, public finance and private sector finance, bilateral 
and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance, as needed to reach the international 
long term committed goal of mobilising jointly US$100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. 
4.3.1.  Introduction 
Development and climate change are closely interconnected. If not contained, climate change risks 
undermining years of progress in reducing poverty in the context of sustainable development and 
meeting the MDGs. Conversely, development and the associated increased use of fossil fuels and 
other resources is the main driver of climate change. 
Investing in a low-carbon growth path in the context of an inclusive green economy early in the 
development process is likely to be cheaper and more efficient that polluting first and cleaning up 
afterwards.  The  integration  of  climate  change  concerns  in  development  offers  real  win-win 
opportunities. 
Climate  change  will,  however,  also  be  a  significant  additional  burden  and  challenge  for  many 
developing countries that will add costs and complexity to poverty reduction efforts.  
71 
The world has agreed to limit the global annual average temperature increase to 2º C above pre-
industrial levels by 2050. Reaching this target would require substantially increased global efforts. 
As a matter of fact, even if all countries lived up to their most ambitious current commitments and 
pledges, some estimates are now closer to a global average increase of 4°C. A recent World Bank 
report
154 has tried to illustrate what consequences such a 4°C increase would have on the world. The 
latter would be devastating: inundated coastal cities, food and water shortages, heat waves and 
droughts. All countries would be affected, but for the most vul nerable populations living in the 
poorest countries - consequences would be disastrous. The report thus acts as a wake -up call to 
significantly step up efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in all countries, and to support the 
most vulnerable in adapt ing to its consequences. Least Developed Countries and Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) need special consideration due to their extreme vulnerability. 
Economic  development  is  the  best  hope  for  adaptation  to  climate  change,  but  it  cannot  be 
development  as usual. Activities needed to adapt to climate change are in practice difficult to 
distinguish  from  ‘normal’  development  activities.  Most  often  ‘adaptation’  is  a  question  of 
integrating  and  mainstreaming  climate  change  concerns  into  the  general  development  planning 
process, and to support ‘climate-smart’ projects and programmes. 
In 2010, the World Bank
155 had estimated that the cost of adapting to a 2
oC warmer world by 2050 
will be in the range of EUR 54 billion to EUR 78 billion a year, or EUR 2.2 to EUR 3.1 trillion for 
the entire period. There is however no guarantee that adaptation to a 4°C world would even be 
possible, and this is why it is paramount that early, cooperative, international actions are taken to 
avoid such a scenario. 
A major difficulty in this endeavour is that there is no precise internationally agreed definition of 
climate  finance  at  present.  The  term  broadly  refers  to  resources  that  catalyse  low-carbon  and 
climate-resilient development. It covers actions required to mitigate climate change by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as actions to adapt to climate change by addressing the impacts. It 
includes support to an enabling environment, capacity for adaptation and mitigation, R&D and the 
deployment of new technologies. Climate finance will have to be mobilised through a range of 
instruments  from  a  wide  variety  of  sources,  international  and  domestic,  public  and  private, 
multilateral and bilateral, and including new and innovative sources of financing. To date, most of 
the public climate financing from developed to developing countries reported to UNFCCC has been 
ODA that originated from development assistance budgets. 
                                                           
154  World Bank, ‘Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided’, 2012. 
155  World Bank, ‘The Cost to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change: New Methods and Estimates’, 2010.  
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4.3.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises  progress  made in  2012 in  implementing the EU commitments  on 
climate finance. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
156  Comment 
Contribute EUR 2.4 billion 
annually in 2010-12 to ‘fast 
start’ climate funding 
End 2012 
 
The EU and MS contributed 
EUR7.3 billion in 2010-12 to 
‘fast start’ climate funding. 
Work towards pathways for 
scaling up climate finance 
from 2013 to 2020 from a 
wide variety of sources to 
reach the international long-
term joint goal of mobilising 
US$ 100 billion a year by 
2020 
2013-20 
 
Not applicable yet. Work has 
started. 
4.3.3.  Recent Trends 
Monitoring ODA which is related to climate change and other environmental issues has long been a 
difficult  task  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  issues  and  their  multidimensional  character.  The 
OECD/DAC  CRS  reporting  system  has  included  policy  markers  for  environment  and  climate 
change mitigation for a number of years. Since 2010, reporting also includes a climate change 
adaptation marker. Data prepared using both climate markers were released for the first time in 
January 2012, and now cover ODA disbursed during 2010 and 2011. 
These data are the best available proxy on climate-related ODA, but have not been set-up to track 
financial  flows,  and  should  thus  be  analysed  carefully  to  avoid  double  counting.  At  present, 
different approaches are used by different donor countries to convert the Rio-marked OECD/DAC 
from  quality  to  quantified  climate  finance  flows.  The  method  followed  by  the  European 
Commission is to report the budget of programmes marked with Rio marker 2 (principal objective) 
as 100% climate relevant while only 40% of the budget of programmes and projects marked with 
Rio marker 1 (significant objective) is reported. Some EU MS follow the same approach, while 
others have been using slightly different systems. There are no guidelines on the application of such 
conversion factor internationally or at EU level - a gap that should be filled. There is currently on-
going work within OECD/DAC to develop a common methodology for improving the tracking of 
climate-related development financing. 
In November 2012, the EU presented a joint consolidated report
157 to UNFCCC tracking on the Fast 
Start Finance pledge for 2010 – 2012. Fast Start Financing is a sub-set of the overall climate finance 
flows from the EU and the Member States to developing countries. The 2012 FSF Report shows 
that the EU and its Member States committed EUR 7.3 billion for fast-start finance for tackling 
climate change over the period 2010-2012, thus exceeding the goal of EUR 7.2 billion, despite a 
difficult economic situation and budgetary constraints. 
Several Member States
158 have been channelling their fast start finance through the GEF managed 
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) or the Adaptation Fund, whil e others are channelling it 
directly to SIDS and LDCs. Three quarters of the pledges received by the LDCF, and almost 95% 
                                                           
156  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track. 
157  Council of the EU, ‘EU Fast Start Finance Report’, 15541/12, 6 November 2012.   
158  Among them, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have provided the most significant 
contributions.  
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of the donor contributions received by the Adaptation Fund were made by EU Member States. The 
2011 Accountability Report suggested a methodology for assessing ‘additionality’ of Fast Start 
Financing based on a baseline average ODA level in 2007-2009. According to the figures available 
for 2012, this criterion seems to have been met in 2010 and 2011, but may not have been met for 
2012
159. 
Table 4.3.3 below presents the overall ODA committed by EU donors in 2010 and 2011 for climate 
change adaptation and mitigation relevant activities. It combines two sources: (a) the CRS data that 
determines how much ODA was spent on adaptation and mitigation in 2010 and 2011; and (b) data 
from the 2011 and 2012 EU annual questionnaires on Financing for Development to determine the 
share of fast start climate finance (often provided only as commitments). Unfortunately, detailed 
ODA data are released over a year after the close of the calendar year they refer to, and 2012 data 
will only be available in January 2014, too late to be included in this report. 
Table 4.3.3 – EU ODA for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in 2010-2011 
(Commitments, EUR million at constant 2011 prices)
160 
Type  2010  2011 
Adaptation   2,343  1,912 
of which: 
Principal 
 
373 
 
336 
Significant  1,969  1,577 
Mitigation  5,214  3,277 
of which: 
Principal 
 
3,527 
 
1,811 
Significant  1,687  1,466 
Adaptation and Mitigation  1,928  1,736 
of which: 
Both Principal 
 
923 
 
235 
Both Significant  1,005  1,501 
Total Climate Change  9,484  6,925 
of which:   
2,307 
 
2,340  Fast-start finance 
Non Fast-start finance  7,177  4,585 
Sources: DAC CRS  
The EU has been by far the largest contributor to both mitigation-related and adaptation-
related ODA in 2010 and 2011, with a share of 50.3% over the period, even though there was 
a significant reduction in real terms between 2010 and 2011. This decline seems to have been 
partially reversed in 2012 based on preliminary data provided by some Member States through the 
2013 questionnaire. 
It is difficult to get an overview of total climate related financial flows from EU to developing 
countries as there is neither an agreed methodology nor a comprehensive system put in place to 
track  private  flows.  According  to  OECD
161, in the 2009 -2010, the global aggregate flows for 
                                                           
159  See the 2011 Accountability Report for a description of the methodology. 
160  The  table  avoids  double  counting  using  the  following  method.  Principal  (2)  always  prevails  over  substantial  (1).  If 
mitigation is set as principal and adaptation substantial for the same activity, the higher mark prevails and the activity is 
classified  as  mitigation.  When  the  ratings  are  equal,  the  ODA  is  classified  under  ‘Adaptation  and  Mitigation’.  The 
combinations  are  as  follows.  Mitigation  or  Adaptation:  Principal  (2-0  and  2-1);  Substantial  (1-0).  Mitigation  and 
Adaptation: Principal (2-2); Substantial (1-1). 
161  OECD, ‘Financing Climate Change Action’, 2012.   
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mitigation and adaptation were in the range of EUR 53 to 90 billion annually. Public bilateral 
sources  are  estimated  between  EUR  11-17  billion,  mostly  for  mitigation,  while  multilateral 
development finance (including concessional and non-concessional sources) is estimated to provide 
another  EUR  11-13  billion,  97%  of  which  for  mitigation  purposes.  Private  climate  finance  far 
outweighs public sources, as FDI and other private finance flows are estimated to have ranged 
between EUR 28 and 54 billion annually over the same period. Carbon market flows represent only 
a small fraction of total private flows (about EUR 1.5 billion), while less than EUR 0.8 billion of 
export credits were considered to be supporting low-carbon projects. 
4.3.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
Discussions on the appropriate funding to enable and support developing countries to implement 
their mitigation commitments and address adaptation challenges will remain a central element of 
the climate change negotiations under UNFCCC, and will be an important element of the new 2015 
International Climate Change Agreement. 
 
While no specific intermediary targets have been established for the midterm period 2013-2020, the 
Doha  climate  change  conference  ‘encouraged’  developed  countries  to  provide  at  least  US$  10 
billion  per  year  between  2013-2015  (similar  to  the  amount  provided  as  ‘fast-start’  financing). 
Further, there is no agreed key for determining the specific commitment of the individual developed 
countries towards the US$100 billion per year target. A Commission Staff Working Document
162 in 
2011 advised that the EU’s share should represent one third of this amount (if equal consideration 
were given to greenhouse gas emission and ability to pay). The EU made a submission to UNFCCC 
in 2013 on envisaged strategies to contribute to mobilising additional climate financing of US$ 100 
billion  per  year  by  2020.  A  mix  of  public  finance,  carbon  market  finance  and  private  finance 
(including  sources  leveraged  by  development  banks)  will  be  required  to  deliver  on  this 
commitment. 
 
There  are  many  common  challenges  between  the  need  to  scale  up  climate  finance  and  the 
discussion in the broader Financing for Development debate. The similarities include both the range 
of potential sources for mobilising international financing (domestic and international, public and 
private, bilateral and multilateral, new and innovative sources) and the principles that should guide 
their use (focus on results, impact, transparency, mutual accountability, etc.). It therefore seems 
important that the EU defines a coherent approach to these issues across the different international 
processes and negotiation tracks where financing and means of implementation are being discussed. 
Improving the system to measure, report and verify (MRV) financial support is a priority. In this 
context, the current work within the OECD aimed at improving the tracking of climate finance, 
including by devising methodologies for tracking private flows, is very important. 
In  November  2011,  the  Commission  issued  a  Regulation  on  a  mechanism  for  monitoring  and 
reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union 
level relevant to climate change
163. The latter entered into force in mid-2013 and requests Member 
States to report annually to the Commission information of financial and technological support to 
developing  countries,  in  accordance  with  the  UNFCCC  provisions.  The  new  mechanism  for 
monitoring and reporting will eventually replace the data gathering exercise on climate finance 
which had been carried out so far by the present annual EU Accountability Report. While the 
proposed  regulation  provides  common  definitions  for  climate  change  adaptation-related  and 
mitigation-related aid, a few Member States feel that there may still be a need to agree on one single 
EU methodology to measure international public climate finance, thus improving the transparency 
and comparability of EU actions. 
                                                           
162  SEC(2011) 487, ‘Scaling up international climate finance after 2012’. 
163  COM(2011) 789 final.  
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The climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC have also added new elements to the global 
financing architecture, and will continue to do so in the coming years. A number of funds and 
instruments have been established under the convention, such as the Adaptation Fund, the Least 
Developed Country Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund. The Green Climate Fund is in the 
process of being made fully operational, and is expected to play an important role in mobilising and 
channelling climate finance in the future. Likewise, climate funds have been established under other 
UN agencies and within the multilateral and regional development banks, for example the Climate 
Investment Funds implemented by a group of MDB with more than USD seven billion in pledges. 
 
Within the EU, a number of new instruments or initiatives were launched or further developed in 
2012. They include: 
 
-  The  Global  Climate  Change  Alliance  (GCCA)  was  launched  in  2007  by  the  European 
Commission to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on climate change between the EU and 
developing countries most vulnerable to climate change, in particular LDCs and SIDS. From 
2008 to 2012, the GCCA committed EUR 285 million from the EU budget and through 
contributions from several EU Member States (e.g. Ireland, Sweden, Estonia, Cyprus and 
the Czech Republic). To date, the GCCA has been supporting programmes that address 
climate change in 35 countries and four regions – and work is under way to formulate an 
additional nine programmes. 
 
-  The  Global  Energy  Efficiency  and  Renewable  Energy  Fund  (GEEREF)  and  the  EU 
Regional Investment Facilities, discussed in Chapter 5, support investments in sustainable 
energy in developing countries. 
 
-  In  2011,  the  UK  Government  established  the  International  Climate  Fund  (ICF)  to  help 
reduce poverty and tackle climate change in developing countries. The ICF aims to help the 
poorest people adapt to the effects of climate change on their lives and livelihoods and to 
support developing countries to reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions. The ICF provides 
EUR 3.6 billion for international climate finance as part of the rising UK aid commitment 
for the period 2011–12 to 2014–15. The ICF scales up UK climate finance for two years 
beyond the Fast Start period. 
Policy coherence between policies in  both  developed and developing  countries  is  an important 
element. For example, a crucial but politically difficult task is to reduce fossil fuel consumption 
subsidies. According to OECD and IEA statistics, these subsidies amounted to a yearly average of 
EUR 34-57 billion in OECD countries in 2005-10
164, and to an estimated EUR 309 billion in 37 
developing and emerging economies in 2010. EU policies pertaining to the various Means of 
Implementation will be assessed in the forthcoming biennial EU Report on Policy Cohe rence for 
Development to be published in 2013. 
 
                                                           
164  International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook 2011’, 2011.  
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4.4.  Funding for Addressing Biodiversity Challenges 
EU Commitments 
  In the Council Conclusions of 14 October 2010 ‘Preparation of the tenth meeting of the Conference of 
the  Parties  (COP  10)  to  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD)’,  the  Council  asked  the 
Commission to ‘continue reporting on the amount of funds related to biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable use’. Previously, such monitoring was done via reporting on the Biodiversity Action Plan 
which ended in 2010. 
  At  the  10th  meeting  of  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  on Biological  Diversity  in 
Nagoya, Parties, including the EU, made a commitment to mobilise financial resources for effectively 
implementing the Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and to substantially increase resources from all sources, 
including innovative financial mechanisms, against an established baseline. 
  Within the EU, Council Conclusions of 21 June 2011 endorsed the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020
165. 
Action 18 of the Strategy: ‘Mobilise additional resources for global biodiversity conservation’ requests 
the Commission and Member States to ‘contribute their fair share to international efforts to significantly 
increase  resources  for  global  biodiversity  as  part  of  the  international  process  aimed  at  estimating 
biodiversity funding needs and adopting resource mobilisation targets for biodiversity at CBD CoP11 in 
2012. The Strategy also stresses that ‘discussions on funding targets during CoP11 should recognise the 
need for increases in public funding, but also the potential of innovative financing mechanisms’.  
  The Council Conclusions of 11 June 2012 on the preparation of 11
th meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP 11) recognised the need to further improve 
the effectiveness of existing funding and mobilise new types of funding sources, including the private 
sector and other stakeholders, whilst emphasising the importance of innovative financing mechanisms as 
an essential and necessary funding source, in addition to traditional financing mechanisms, and as a 
tool for mainstreaming. 
  At  CBD  COP11  in  Hyderabad,  the  Parties  decided  on  an  overall  substantial  increase  of  total 
biodiversity-related funding, from a variety of sources, and resolved to achieve a number of preliminary 
targets  including  to  ‘double  total  biodiversity-related  international  financial  resource  flows  to 
developing countries, in particular Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, as 
well as countries with economies in transition, by 2015 and at least maintain this level until 2020, in 
accordance  with  Article  20  of  the  Convention,  to  contribute  to  achieving  the  Convention’s  three 
objectives, including through a country-driven prioritisation of biodiversity within development plans in 
recipient countries’, using the preliminary baseline of annual biodiversity funding for the years 2006-
2010. Parties also agreed complementary targets on making appropriate domestic financial provisions, 
reporting, and developing national financial plans. They also decided to use a preliminary reporting 
framework
166 as a flexible and preliminary framework to report on and monitor the resources mobilised 
for biodiversity at a national and global level. Progress will be r eviewed at COP12 with the aim of 
adopting the final target for resource mobilisation. 
4.4.1.  Introduction 
As noted in the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020
167, biodiversity — defined as the extraordinary 
variety  of  ecosystems,  species  and  genes  that  surround  us  —  is  humanity’s  natural  capital, 
delivering  ecosystem  services  that  underpin  the  world’s  economy.  Its  deterioration  and  loss 
jeopardises  the  provision  of  these  services.  In  addition,  biodiversity  and  climate  change  are 
inextricably  linked  as  the  former  contributes  positively  to  climate  change  mitigation  and 
adaptation
168, while achieving the ‘two degrees’ target coupled with adequate adaptation measures 
to reduce the impact of unavoidable effects of climate change are also essential to avert biodiversity 
loss. Both are essential in the efforts to move towards sustainable development. 
                                                           
165  COM(2011) 244 final.  
166  UNEP/CBD/COP/11/14/Add.1. 
167  Council Conclusions on the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, 11978/11, 23 June 2011.  
168  See for example the Report from the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Connecting Biodiversity and 
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation’, 2009.  
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4.4.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises  progress  made in  2012 in  implementing the EU commitments  on 
biodiversity-related finance. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
169  Comment 
Hyderabad commitment to 
double total biodiversity-
related international 
financial resource flows to 
developing countries (in 
particular LDCs, SIDs and 
countries with economies in 
transition), as compared 
with 2006-10, by 2015 and 
at least maintain this level 
until 2020 
2015 and 2020 
 
Not applicable yet.  
4.4.3.  Recent Trends 
In previous editions of the EU Accountability Report on FFD, EU support to biodiversity was 
measured using the specific Biodiversity Rio Marker of the OECD/DAC CRS. However, in July 
2012, the CBD invited the EU and its Member States to report biodiversity-related financial flows, 
including but not limited to ODA, through the Common Reporting Framework (CRF). Thus, for the 
first time, data on biodiversity-related finance included in the present Report have been collected in 
CRF format. 
As  part  of  this  process,  the  EU  and  Member  States  have  developed  specific  methodologies  to 
capture  biodiversity  related  ODA,  applying  specific  coefficients  to  better  capture  the  real 
biodiversity  component  of  projects.  Such  methodologies  are  not  uniform.  The  European 
Commission, for example, reported only 40% of the allocated budget of projects with a Biodiversity 
Rio Marker of significant (1) and 100% of projects marked as principal (2); Germany reported 
100% of the specific components marked as significant rather than the budget of the entire project, 
and 100% of those marked as principal; Finland determined a ‘biodiversity relevance percentage for 
each biodiversity related project’ that was then applied to all projects  marked as significant or 
principal. 
                                                           
169  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
78 
Table 4.4.3 Official and Private Financial Flows Directly or Indirectly Related to Biodiversity 
(Commitments, EUR million at current prices) 
 
Country or Institution 
2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total  Direct   Indirect  Total 
Austria  10  -  10  10  -  10  14  -  14  16  -  16  20  -  20  16  -  16  -  -     -  
Belgium  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Bulgaria  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -     0  
Croatia  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Cyprus  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Czech Republic  1  3  4  1  3  4  1  4  5  1  3  4  0  3  4  1  2  4  1  5     6  
Denmark  3  90  93  3  90  94  3  90  94  3  90  94  3  90  94  3  90  94  3  90  94 
EU Institutions  120  25  145  73  62  135  97  66  163  64  201  265  98  163  261  45  129  174  -  -     -  
Estonia  -  -  -  0  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Finland  1  10  11  1  8  9  1  11  12  1  10  11  2  10  12  5  16  20  2  17    20  
France  59  45  103  23  29  51  27  105  132  24  74  99  24  79  103  56  87  143  81  45    126  
Germany  75  -  75  125  -  125  219  -  219  250  -  250  300  -  300  499  -  499  549  -    549  
Greece  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Hungary  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -     0  
Ireland  -  -  -  20  -  20  14  -  14  75  -  75  25  -  25  25  -  25  22  -    22  
Italy  -  -  -  11  77  88  17  42  59  5  41  46  1  3  4  2  3  5  4  2     6  
Latvia  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -     0  
Lithuania  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Luxembourg  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  3  0  -  0  -  -     -  
Malta  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Netherlands  159  -  159  97  -  97  93  -  93  95  -  95  87  -  87  82  -  82  76  -    76  
Poland  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Portugal  1  0  1  1  3  4  1  3  4  1  4  5  0  3  3  0  3  3  0  0     1  
Romania  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  0  0  1  0     1  
Slovak Republic  -  -  -  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -  0     0  
Slovenia  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  -  0  0  -  0  0  -     0  
Spain  6  -  6  10  -  10  19  -  19  15  -  15  11  -  11  7  -  7  -  -     -  
Sweden  9  26  35  15  39  54  18  54  72  17  92  109  21  108  129  20  131  151  55  156    211  
United Kingdom  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -     -  
Total  443  199  643  390  311  701  524  377  900  567  516  1,084  596  460  1,057  763  462  1,225  795  316  1,111 
 
Source: 2013 EU Financing for Development Questionnaire   
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Because  of  the  adjustments  applied  by  each  Member  State,  the  amounts  calculated  under  the 
Common Reporting Framework may be lower than those reported previously to OECD/DAC. They 
are also  incomplete, as  some Member States  are still working on their processes  for  reporting 
biodiversity-related financial flows. Finally, no Member State provided information on support for 
biodiversity from private sources, while no alternative data source is available at this stage. As 
mentioned in previous CBD decisions, further work is needed to improve methodological guidance 
on reporting biodiversity-related finance. 
Data summarised in Table 4.4.3 should therefore be considered as work in progress and likely to be 
updated in future editions of the EU Accountability Report. Based on such data, biodiversity-related 
finance almost doubled in nominal terms between 2006 and 2012. In 2012, the EU and Member 
States who reported data committed EUR 1,111 million
170per year in biodiversity-related finance, 
including ODA. 
4.4.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
In June 2011 and December 2011, the Council adopted Conclusions on the implementation of the 
Europe 2020 Biodiversity Strategy. The new strategy has six main targets, with twenty actions to 
help the EU address biodiversity challenges. Internationally, the EU contribution to averting global 
biodiversity loss is to be stepped up, through a reduction of indirect drivers of biodiversity loss (e.g. 
changing consumption patterns, reducing harmful subsidies, and including biodiversity issues in 
trade negotiations) and mobilisation of additional resources for global biodiversity conservation. 
Council Conclusions were also adopted in preparation for CBD COP meetings. 
Delivering  on  the  Hyderabad  targets,  as  explained  above,  will  require  the  mainstreaming  of 
biodiversity in the main development sectors. This is in line with the 2011 EU ‘Agenda for Change’ 
and more generally, with the 2011 Communication on ‘A budget for Europe’ which indicated that 
in the area of development cooperation, climate and environment, notably biodiversity, would be 
mainstreamed in all relevant programmes. 
It is also clear that biodiversity financing will need to come from a variety of sources, both public 
and  private,  including  from  innovative  financing  mechanisms.  Adequate  reporting  on  progress 
towards meeting these commitments will also require improved mechanisms for tracking financing 
flows at both EU and national level. 
                                                           
170  At current prices.  
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4.5.  Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), including Technology Development and 
Transfer 
EU Commitments 
  Council  Conclusions  of  9  March  2012  on  Rio+20,  §33:  Underlines  the  important  role  played  by 
cooperation  on  technology,  research  and  innovation,  education  and  training  programmes  and 
emphasises  the  need  to  improve  mechanisms  for  international  research  cooperation  and  for  the 
development  of  information  and  communications  technology  on  major  sustainable  development 
challenges. 
  Council Conclusions of 25 October 2012 on follow-up to Rio+20,§36: Reaffirms its commitment to the 
promotion of clean and environmentally sound technologies as a means to facilitate a transition to green 
economy for all countries regardless of their development status as well as its commitment to support 
cooperation and capacity building for developing countries, and recalls that the EU research framework 
programmes  are  open  to  third  countries  and  that  the  EU  will  further  cooperate  with  developing 
countries  through  its  new  programme  for  research  and  innovation  ‘Horizon  2020’  to  promote 
sustainable development. 
  Council Conclusions of May 30 2013 on EU international cooperation in research and innovation: 
Recognises the added value of deepening the cooperation with developing countries (§10); recommends 
further  exploring  how  to  strengthen  the  innovation  dimension  in  the  cooperation  with  developing 
countries (§9). 
4.5.1.  Introduction 
The role of STI in support of sustainable development has been recognised since the Rio Summit in 
1992.  Subsequently,  through  the  Johannesburg  Plan  of  Implementation  on  Sustainable 
Development
171, the international community committed to actions in this area, notably in relation 
to the development and transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs)
172. At the Rio+20 
Conference  of  2012,  Heads  of  State  and  Government  further  emphasised  the  role  of  these 
technologies in support of sustainable development. 
The debate around STI in developing countries has shifted over the past decades. While the focus 
has mostly been put in the past on building local R&D capabilities, often in pre -competitive stage, 
increased attention is now being paid to strengthening capabilities in innovation and technology 
closer to market deployment. This is partly due to the lessons learnt from the success of emerging 
economies in deploying their own innovation and technology capabilities thanks to government 
policies  and  incentives,  often  aimed  at  supporting  specific  sectors.  At  th e  Rio+20  Summit, 
agreement was reached on the need to foster the development and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies  aimed  at  allowing  developing  countries  to  meet  their  objectives  related  to 
environment, climate change, energy and other environmentally sensitive sectors. 
Currently, there is no internationally -agreed  definition  of  the  term  ‘technology  transfer’.  The 
concept is subject to varying interpretations, which ultimately depend on the policy objectives of 
the different stakeholders. The debate is still open as to what type of actions in the R&D and 
innovation area constitutes ‘technology transfer’. For instance, Germany considers that almost all its 
investments related to Climate Change constitute ‘technology transfer’. Belgium indicates that at 
least  25  per  cent  of  its  programmes  aimed  at  research  institutions  are  dedicated  to  technology 
transfer and building capabilities. 
EU  Member  States  have  called  for  broadening  the  definition  of  technology  transfer  and, 
accordingly, the policy objectives in this area. The UK considers that it would be appropriate to 
speak  about  ‘technology  cooperation’  or  ‘technology  support’,  which  would  better  reflect  the 
                                                           
171  http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm.  
172  The definition of Environmentally Sound Technologies can be retraced in the Agenda 21, which refers to them as those 
technologies that have the potential for significantly improved environmental performance relative to other technologies.  
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cooperation amongst and between countries in sharing knowledge and experience, and would also 
cover the participation of the private sector. Finland maintains that the terms ‘technology transfer’ 
gives  the  idea  that  technology  is  developed  in  advanced  economies  and  then  transferred  to 
developing countries, an approach which would not be sustainable. It would be more effective to 
foster local technological development while at the same time aim at increasing the capacities of 
developing  countries  to  adapt  and  use  new  and  existing  technologies,  as  a  prerequisite  for  a 
sustainable innovation process that responds to local needs and culture. 
4.5.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises  progress  made in  2012 in  implementing the EU commitments  on 
Science, Technology and Innovation. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
173  Comment 
Improve mechanisms for 
international STI 
cooperation and for the 
development of ICT on 
major sustainable 
development challenges 
No date specified 
   
The  EU  Research  Framework 
Programme  and  EU  ODA 
increasingly support cooperation 
with partner countries in a range 
of  sectors.  Several  EU-funded 
research  projects  have 
specifically  targeted  the  use  of 
ICT  to  share  experience  and 
knowledge across countries
174.  
Promote clean and 
environmentally sound 
technologies as a means to 
facilitate a transition to a 
green economy for all 
countries, regardless of their 
development status 
2014-20 
   
The EU and 15 MS support STI 
and technology transfer activities 
relating to the green economy. 
Support STI research 
cooperation and capacity 
building to enhance 
sustainable development in 
developing countries, 
including through the new 
Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme’’ 
2014-20 
   
’Horizon 2020 will put increased 
emphasis on STI partnerships 
with developing countries, in 
particular through bi-regional 
partnerships. Several MS 
implement programmes in this 
field. 
4.5.3.  EU Policies and Programmes 
The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  longstanding  supporters  of  research  and  development  in 
developing  countries,  including  in  the  area  of  clean  technologies,  with  a  focus  on  exchange 
programmes,  twinning  arrangements  and  direct  support  to  research  institutions  in  developing 
countries. 
Several Member States have developed specific strategies, or included technology as part of their 
overall development  cooperation strategy.  In 2008, the United Kingdom  redefined its  Research 
Strategy for the period 2008–2013, with an overall budget of EUR 1.2 billion, in which health and 
agriculture were identified as the focal sectors
175. 
                                                           
173  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track. 
174  Examples  include  the  development  of  e-infrastructures  and  collaboration  on  ICTs  between  Europe  and  developing 
countries for research in different areas, e.g. the EU-Med GRID project, the EU-China GRID project and the EU-India 
GRID project, aimed at supporting the interoperability of grid infrastructures in the EU and third countries to strengthen e-
Science and promote new scientific collaboration. 
175  DFID, Research Strategy 2008-2013.  
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The  EU  and  17  Member  States
176  have been actively supporting technology development and 
transfer for developing countries. In the case of the EU, most of the support is funded through its 
aid budget as well as through t he international cooperation activities of its Research Framework 
Programme. The initiatives that are related to development aid are mostly aimed at strengthening 
local or regional STI capabilities in particular in health, energy, agriculture and environme nt. The 
EU is also fostering South-South STI cooperation, for example through a EUR 45 million funding 
line for research mobility aiming at fostering cooperation on topics such as energy, agriculture, 
engineering and health, among universities and research centres of ACP countries. Also, the EU is 
supporting the African Union in managing R&D and Innovation actions with the aim of developing 
collaboration capabilities closer to the beneficiary countries. 
As regards the Seventh Research Framework Programme (FP7, 2007-13), international cooperation 
activities were open to the participation of all third countries. They included a specific budget line 
dedicated ‘to addressing specific problems that third countries face or that have a global character’
 
177.  The  FP7  also  targets  specific  regions  and  countries  addressing  certain  needs  and  issues 
primarily related to global challenges such as health, agriculture, energy and environment – as well 
as strengthening the research capacity of developing countries. So far, FP7 has contributed over 
EUR  450  million  to  common  research  projects  with  partners  from  emerging  economies  and 
developing countries. 
The Strategic Forum for International Science and Technology Cooperation (SFIC) aims to further 
develop, implement and monitor the international dimension of the European Research Area. A key 
issue is to coordinate international research activities of Member States and the EU with and vis-à-
vis key strategic partner countries outside Europe. An example of this type of joint cooperation is 
the building up of the Indo-European Research and Innovation Partnership. 
Europe  is  also  one  of  the  world’s  leading  players  in  the  advancement  of  Earth  Observation 
technologies and related environmental applications. European Earth Observation covers remote-
sensing satellite,  ground-based, air-based  and ocean-based monitoring  devices.  They enable the 
collection of high quality observation data for different purposes such as urban planning, adaptation 
to climate change, disaster reduction, disease control and humanitarian relief. 
A  number  of  FP  projects  contributed  directly  to  building  capacity  in  developing  countries  in 
environmental  and  environmentally  related  monitoring,  assessment  and  information,  based  on 
modern  technology  in  a  number  of  fields  such  as  earth  and  ocean  observation  systems  and 
monitoring methods for sustainable development and a contribution to international observation 
systems. 
The implementation of the next FP, ‘Horizon 2020’, will start in 2014, maintaining its openness to 
partnerships  with  developing  countries,  in  particular  bi-regional  partnerships
178.  It  will  also 
contribute to addressing global challenges and specific areas of technology development, including 
green economy, climate action, health and agriculture
179. 
                                                           
176  AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK. 
177  Commission Staff Working Document, ‘A new approach to international scientific and technological co-operation in the 
7th  Research  Framework  Programme  (2007-2013)  and  7th  Framework  Programme  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community (Euratom) (2007-2011)’, Brussels, 12.1.2007. 
178  COM 2012(497). 
179  European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, recently stated that Horizon 2020 
recognises that ‘international cooperation in research and innovation is a key aspect of the Union’s global commitments 
and has an important role to play in the Union’s partnership with developing countries, which are often disproportionately 
affected by global challenges. This cooperation will promote inclusive growth and progressing towards the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals and other goals agreed in the framework of international sustainable development’. 
‘EU Science: Global Challenges & Global Collaboration’, March 5, 2013.  
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Examples of other noteworthy initiatives by the EU and its Member States include projects that 
promote STI cooperation and/or enhance ICT implementation to address global challenges: 
  The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS): GEOSS is an international 
initiative. The Commission is one of the five co-chairs of the Group on Earth of Observation 
(GEO)  and  supported  the  first  implementation  phase  of  the  Global  Earth  Observation 
System of Systems (GEOSS). GEOSS is a unique example of how research cooperation has 
already substantially progressed towards meeting the needs for long-term global information 
as a basis for decision making. The first implementation phase (2005-2015) focuses on nine 
societal  benefit  areas:  disasters,  health,  energy,  climate,  water,  weather,  ecosystems, 
agriculture, and biodiversity. A second phase is currently under preparation. 
  The African Network for Drugs and Diagnostics Innovation (ANDI) was established to 
promote and sustain African-led health research and development (R&D) and innovation by 
building capacity, developing infrastructure, promoting collaborative efforts and delivering 
affordable new tools including natural products and traditional medicines. The Commission 
provided funding of EUR 5 million for the 2009-2013 period. ANDI has the overarching 
goal  of  linking  health  innovation  to  development  by  sustaining  local  R&D  and  market 
access  to  diagnostics,  drugs,  vaccines  and  other  health  products  in  Africa.  ANDI  has  a 
memorandum of understanding with WIPO on the management of intellectual property and 
technology transfer activities. 
  In the context of establishing the patent landscape, the  European Patent Organisation 
(EPO) developed and launched a new classification scheme for patents in climate change 
mitigation technologies, starting with CETs, which is now available on the EPO’s public 
patent information service esp@cenet. The new scheme will provide continuous, accurate 
and user-friendly patent information and thus help to improve the transparency of the patent 
system in this critical technology sector. 
  The  European  and  Developing  Countries  Clinical  Trials  Partnership  (EDCTP)  was 
established in 2003 in response to the global health crisis caused by the three main poverty-
related diseases (PRD) - HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis - and as a means to achieve 
the health-related MDGs. The EDCTP’s core objective is to accelerate the development of 
new clinical interventions (drugs, vaccines, and micro biocides) to fight the three major 
PRD in  sub-Saharan Africa, and to  improve the quality of research in relation  to  these 
diseases, including the ethical review capacities and regulatory environment. Secondly, the 
EDCTP aims to step up cooperation and the networking of European national programmes 
for  clinical  trials  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  thereby  achieving  a  most  cost-efficient  and 
coordinated  European  effort  in  this  area.  Currently,  there  are  14  Member  States,  two 
Associated Countries and 29 sub-Saharan countries engaged in the EDCTP programme. The 
renewal of the EU’s mandate and funding for an EDCTP 2 programme is envisaged under 
the auspices of Horizon 2020 (2014-2020). 
There are also examples of projects supported by the EU Member States that specifically promote 
the green economy: 
  The Renewable Energy and Adapting to Climate Technologies (REACT). The REACT 
programme is a window of the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund which aims to stimulate 
private sector investment in developing and delivering low cost clean energy and climate 
adaptation  technologies,  such  as  solar  power,  biogas,  irrigation,  and  water  efficiency 
measures.  Provisional  estimates  (currently  under  review)  are  that  by  2015,  the  REACT 
programme will have helped to deliver access to cheaper, cleaner energy technologies to 
200,000 households and 50,000 SMEs. The United Kingdom is contributing EUR 14 million 
to the REACT programme between 2010 and 2016.  
84 
  Between 2009 and 2013  Austria  granted EUR 1.8 million  in  support of the  ECOWAS 
Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) which was 
established to lead and coordinate regional projects and programmes that seek to establish 
and operationalize markets for renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies and 
services in ECOWAS. 
Reporting on Technology Development and Transfer should be enhanced: in particular, work needs 
to be done in improving the quality and coordination of the various reports. There are currently 
three reporting mechanisms on technology transfer activities: report to the WTO under Article 66.2 
of the TRIPS Agreement, the EU Accountability Report on FFD and, starting from 2014, the EU 
biennial  report  for  the  UNFCCC
180. The European Commission plans to initiate a stocktaking 
exercise on its own funding for R&D. 
4.6.  Future of Development Finance Reporting 
An international consensus is emerging around the need for better measures of progress and 
development efficiency to tackle global challenges. The proposals for defining new aggregates 
that would enhance accountability fall into three broad categories, described in a recent ECDPM 
study
181: (a) changing how we measure ODA efforts (notably by revising the ODA concept)
182; (b) 
changing what we measure (including by complementing/replacing ODA with a broader aggregate 
such as ‘total net resource flows for development’
183); or (c) changing where we measure ODA/GNI 
ratios (at the recipient level rather than at the donor’s level)
184. 
The  on-going  international  processes  leading  to  the  formulation  of  a  post-2015  overarching 
framework and Sustainable Development Goals, as described in Chapter 1, are likely to lead to 
several  exercises  aimed  at  estimating  the  financial  needs  linked  to  the  new  goals,  and  a  more 
comprehensive monitoring of development finance. 
In  that  context,  the  OECD  Working  Party  on  Development  Finance  Statistics  (WP-STAT)  has 
started work in view of extending the coverage and categorisation of non-ODA flows in DAC 
statistics. The current cash-based flow measurement system used by DAC may need to be revised to 
better  reflect  development-related  expenditures  in  donor  countries  which  indeed  represent  a 
budgetary effort but do not generate cross-border flows, or place greater emphasis on gross instead 
of net transfers
185. 
OECD/DAC members have agreed not to revise the ODA definition before 2015, in order to avoid 
moving goalposts before a full analysis is made of whether donors delivered on their commitments. 
However, the DAC has also been tasked to elaborate a proposal for a new measure of total official 
                                                           
180  §40. Decides, building on existing reporting and review guidelines, processes and experiences, to enhance reporting in the 
national communications of Parties included Annex I to the Convention on mitigation targets and on the provision of 
financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing country Parties as follows: (a) Developed countries 
should submit annual greenhouse gas inventories and inventory reports and biennial reports on their progress in achieving 
emission reductions, including information on mitigation actions to achieve their quantified economy-wide emission targets 
and emission reductions achieved, projected emissions and the provision of financial, technology and capacity-building 
support to developing country Parties. 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1). 
See also Decision 19/CP.18 Common tabular format for ‘UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country 
Parties’ (FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.3). 
181  ECDPM, ‘Reporting on Development: ODA and Financing for Development’, 2012. 
182  See for example, Brzoska, Michaela, ‘Analysis of and recommendations for covering security relevant expenditures within 
and outside of official development assistance’, Paper 53, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2010. 
183  See  for  example,  OECD/DAC,  ‘Identifying  New  Measures  for  Non-ODA  Development  Contributions’, 
DCD/DAC(2011)43, 2011; or Severino, Jean-Michel and Ray, Olivier, ‘The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global 
Public Policy’, CGD - Center for Global Development - Working Paper Number 167, 2009. 
184  See for example ODI, ‘From high to low aid: a proposal to classify countries by aid receipt’, Background Note, 2012. 
185  See OECD/DAC, ‘New directions in DAC measurement and monitoring of external development finance’, Paper prepared 
for the DAC High Level Meeting of December 2012.  
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support  for  development,  and  to  investigate  whether  any  resulting  new  measures  of  external 
development finance (including any new approaches to measurement of donor effort) suggest the 
need to modernise the ODA concept. A first report on this topic is expected in 2013. 
In addition, a loan qualifies as ODA depending on its concessional character, a concept not defined 
in quantitative terms and on which countries’ views diverge. DAC members agreed in 2012 to 
establish,  as  soon  as  possible,  and  at  the  latest  by  2015,  a  clear,  quantitative  definition  of 
‘concessional in character’.   
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5.  COMBINING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
EU Commitments 
  The Council Conclusions of 15 June 2010 committed to seriously consider ‘proposals for innovative 
financing mechanisms with significant revenue generation potential, with a view to ensuring predictable 
financing for sustainable development, especially towards the poorest and most vulnerable countries’ 
(§31). The EU also committed to use these resources in line with the international Aid Effectiveness 
principles (§32).  
  The Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012 (on Agenda for Change), §17: In order to leverage further 
resources and increase the EU’s impact on poverty reduction, new financial tools will be promoted, 
including blending grants and loans and other risk-sharing instruments. 
  The Council Conclusions of 15 October 2012 made a distinction, as in this year’s report, between the 
funding side (innovative financing sources) and the expenditure side (innovative financial instruments), 
§1: The Council stresses the importance of increasing use of innovative financial instruments to promote 
stronger private sector engagement in inclusive and sustainable development, especially at the local 
level. The EU agrees to use grants more strategically and effectively for leveraging public and private 
sector resources, including in the context of blending grants and loans and innovative risk-sharing and 
joint  financing  mechanisms.  The  Council  supports  the  setting  up  of  the  ‘EU  Platform  for  External 
Cooperation  and  Development’ to  provide  guidance  to  existing  blending  mechanisms.  The  EU  also 
stresses the central role of enabling domestic business environments and promoting corporate social 
responsibility principles, at local and global level. Use of innovative financing mechanisms will take 
account  of  debt  sustainability  and  accountability  and  will  avoid  market  disturbances  as  well  as 
budgetary risks. 
5.1.  Introduction 
There is no universally accepted definition of Innovative Financing Mechanisms (IFM)
186. While 
the  term  initially  referred  to  new  sources  of  development  financing  that  could  complement 
traditional ODA
187 in a stable and predictable way
188, it has progressively been expanded to include 
innovative financial instruments aiming at enhancing the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of 
development finance. 
The main characteristic of these mechanisms is not intrinsic financial novelty, but the fact that they 
differ  from  traditional  approaches  to  mobilising  and/or  delivering  development  finance
189. 
Traditional sources of funding ODA typically include budget outlays from established s overeign 
donors,  or  bonds  issued  by  multilateral  and  national  development  banks,  while  traditional 
approaches to delivering development finance include grants and loans to beneficiaries, directly or 
through a variety of implementing agencies. Innovative fi nancing sources and mechanisms are 
essentially a way to fill the financing gap between what is needed to address developmental 
challenges and what donors can provide, often addressing a specific externality or market failure. 
                                                           
186  According  to  the  Leading  Group  on  Innovative  Financing  for  Development,  Innovative  Financing  Mechanisms  are 
‘mechanisms for raising funds for development [which] are complementary to official development assistance. They are 
also predictable and stable. They are closely linked to the idea of global public goods and aimed at correcting the negative 
effects of globalisation.’ 
187  The question of whether or not innovative financing can be counted as ODA in the understanding of the OECD/DAC 
remains in the remit of each donor country. A thorough discussion on the perimeter of ODA is currently on-going in view 
of  better  identifying  and  measuring  the  various  financial  flows,  in  the  broad  sense,  benefitting  developing  countries 
(‘ODA+’). Initiated within the OECD/DAC, this discussion could inspire a general debate on the modernisation and the 
diversification of the measuring instruments of the financing effort for development. 
188  See Declaration of Doha UN Conference on Financing for Development: §51 - "…these funds should supplement and not 
be a substitute for traditional sources of finance, and should be disbursed in accordance with the priorities of developing 
countries and not unduly burden them." 
189  For  an  in-depth  analysis  see  World  Bank,  ‘Innovating  Development  Finance:  From  Financing  Sources  to  Financial 
Solutions’, CFP Working Paper Series No. 1, 2009.  
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IFM  are  thus  mechanisms  that  (i)  support  fund-raising  by  tapping  new  sources  and  engaging 
investors  beyond  the  financial  dimension  of  transactions,  as  partners  and  stakeholders  in 
development;  and/or  (ii)  deliver  development  finance  in  new  ways,  enhancing  its  impact  on 
development problems on the ground. They can therefore be considered ‘innovative’ either because 
of the nature of sources or the way they are collected, implemented and used to catalyse additional 
financing. 
Broadly speaking, IFM can be divided into innovations in fund-raising and innovative financial 
instruments for development: 
(1)  Mechanisms that generate additional Financing for Development by tapping into new and 
innovative  finance  (or  funding)  sources  (non-traditional  or  non-conventional  ODA 
resources, emerging donors and the private sector). For example, global solidarity levies 
(such as the airline ticket tax or the Adaptation Fund) or national lotteries, or front loading 
mechanisms  like  the  International  Finance  Facility  for  Immunisation  (IFFIm),  or  co-
payment schemes such as the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) mechanism. 
(2)  Mechanisms that offer innovative financial instruments in the way existing aid resources 
are  pooled,  blended  and  delivered.  For  example,  the  EU  regional  blending  facilities, 
structured investment funds like GEEREF, Special Purpose Funds like TCX, or Guarantee 
Mechanisms like GIIF. 
This chapter tries to quantify innovative financing sources (Section 5.3) and instruments (Section 
5.4), and shows where the EU stands on its commitment to support the use of innovative ways to 
finance development. 
5.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises  progress  made in  2012 in  implementing the EU commitments  on 
innovative financing sources and instruments. Further details are discussed in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
190  Comment 
Consider proposals for 
innovative financing 
mechanisms with significant 
revenue generation potential, 
with a view to ensuring 
predictable financing for 
sustainable development, 
especially for the poorest and 
most vulnerable countries 
No date specified 
 
 
Several MS are using innovative 
sources of development funding, 
although they accounted for only 
2% of ODA in 2010-12. It is unclear 
whether revenue generation for 
development from existing and new 
taxes (e.g. FTT) will be significant. 
Promote new financial tools, 
including blending grants and 
loans and other risk-sharing 
instruments 
No date specified 
 
 
Several blending instruments have 
been introduced and further 
developed over 2012, now covering 
all regions of EU external 
cooperation. The EU Platform for 
Blending in External Cooperation 
was established in December 2012. 
Use innovative financing 
mechanisms taking into account 
debt sustainability and 
accountability and avoiding 
market disturbances and 
budgetary risks. 
No date specified 
 
 
MS and Commission funds for 
innovative financial instruments 
increased from EUR 600 million a 
year in 2010-11 to over EUR 2 
billion in 2012. 
                                                           
190  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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5.3.  Recent Trends 
5.3.1.  Innovative Financing Sources 
Innovative financing sources accounted for about 2% of EU ODA over the period 2010-2012, as 
shown  in  Table  5.3.1  below,  with  an  average  of  EUR  1.2  billion  per  year.  Only  one  third  of 
innovative financing sources were reported as ODA by EU Member States in 2011. The revenues 
generated by such sources were highly concentrated in five countries accounting for 98% of the 
total: Germany (43%), France (37%), Belgium (7%), United Kingdom (6%), and Italy (5%). 
 
Figure 5.3.1 - Distribution of Innovative Sources of Financing for Development (%, 2010-2012) 
 
Source – 2013 EU Financing for Development Questionnaire 
   
As shown in Figure 5.3.1, a relative majority of innovative finance for development was raised 
through auctioning of emission permits. Government guarantees are used by IFFIm to raise funds 
on international markets. The solidarity tax on air travel is currently implemented only by France 
and represents a sizeable share of the total. Lottery proceeds are directed to aid activities in Belgium 
and the United Kingdom, although the contributions from the latter have not been quantified.  
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Table 5.3.1 - Revenues Generated by Innovative Financing Sources as reported by Member States (2010-2012, EUR million)  
Member 
State 
Innovative Financing 
Sources 
Total revenues  Reported 
as ODA in 
2011 
Mechanism to ensure that this financing is used in accordance with the aid effectiveness 
principles  2010  2011  2012 
Belgium 
Contribution Belgian 
Lottery 
88.0  88.0  88.0  88.0 
The  budget  provided  through  the  National  lottery  is  not  used  through  a  parallel 
mechanism,  but  is  integrated  in  the  normal  programming  of  Belgium’s  bilateral 
cooperation. Alignment of the projects and programmes with local policies 
Cyprus  UNITAID  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Existing initiative in the field of health which has shown its ability to provide stable and 
predictable resources in a coordinated manner. 
France 
International 
Solidarity Levy (tax on 
airline tickets) 
163.7  175.1  185.3  172.5 
These resources are used to fund IFFIm, GAVI and UNITAID. France contributed US$1.1 
billion to UNITAID between 2006 and 2012. This contribution helped developing medicines 
adapted  to  HIV/  AIDS  infected  children  (less  than  10,000  children  were  under  anti-
retroviral treatment in 2010 but today they are more than 560,000); to drastically reduce 
the prices of second-line anti-retroviral medicines and of multi-drugs resistant tuberculosis 
treatments; or to generalise the use of more adapted anti-malaria treatments. 
France 
International 
Financing Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm) 
230.2  147.1  99.3  27.7 
IFFIm  is  based  on  the  ‘front  loading ’principle.  IFFIm/GAVI  estimated  that  IFFIm  had  a 
leverage of 1.98 in 2012. France ensures that the funds are used in line with development 
effectiveness principles through its participation in the Board of Directors of GAVI. 
France 
Debt Reduction-
Development 
Contracts (C2Ds) 
137.0  135.5  143.1   
Debt Reduction-Development Contracts (C2Ds) are a mechanism within the French foreign 
aid  tool-set.  The  mechanism  aims  to  alleviate  debt  that  has  been  contracted  by  a 
developing country within the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA), e.g. 
French foreign aid. C2Ds allow French ODA debts to be refinanced through grants. With 
the C2D mechanism, a country continues to honour its debt to France; when a repayment 
is made, France makes a grant to the country in an equivalent amount. The grant money is 
then  allocated  to  poverty  reduction  programmes  that  have  been  selected  by  joint 
agreement between France and the receiving country 
Germany 
Special Energy and 
Climate Fund 
(previously: emission 
allowances sales 
591.0  562.0  482.7  27.0 
All  programmes  are  aligned  with  country  priorities.  The  Federal  Ministry  for  the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) coordinates its activities with 
BMZ.  BMZ’s  programmes  are  fully  integrated  with  existing  German  development 
cooperation and as such adhere to the principles of aid effectiveness.  
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Member 
State 
Innovative Financing 
Sources 
Total revenues  Reported 
as ODA in 
2011 
Mechanism to ensure that this financing is used in accordance with the aid effectiveness 
principles  2010  2011  2012 
revenues) 
Germany  Debt2Health  20.0  3.3     
Implementing Agency: KfW Entwicklungsbank; type of grant support: debt swap; health 
focus. 
Hungary 
European Emission 
Trading Scheme 
    5.0     
Italy 
International 
Financing Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm) 
25.0  26.7  26.7  26.7   
Italy 
Advance Market 
Commitments (AMCs) 
38.0  38.0  38.0  38.0    
Luxembourg 
Contribution to 
Unitaid 
0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Unitaid is committed to improving aid effectiveness and respecting the principles of the 
Paris Declaration. 
Luxembourg 
Fonds de lutte contre 
certaines formes de 
criminalité  
3.8  0.6    0.8 
Funds are channelled through existing mechanisms (UNODC, NGOs, and Lux Dev), how aid 
effectiveness principles are respected is indicated in the project documentation. 
Netherlands 
International 
Financing Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm) 
         
Spain  IFFIm   9.5  9.5  8.7      
Spain  UNITAID   8.0  5.0        
United 
Kingdom 
International 
Financing Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm) 
40.2  50.7  66.0     
United 
Kingdom 
Advance  Market 
Commitments (AMCs) 
  17.5     40.3     14.8     
The  AMC  is  an  innovative  ‘pull  mechanism’  which  is  being  piloted  to  encourage 
manufacturers  to  invest  in  and  scale-up  the  production  of  pneumococcal  vaccine  for 
developing countries.  
Total     1,372.9  1,282.7  1,092.5  381.5     
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Member 
State 
Innovative Financing 
Sources 
Total revenues  Reported 
as ODA in 
2011 
Mechanism to ensure that this financing is used in accordance with the aid effectiveness 
principles  2010  2011  2012 
% of EU 
ODA    
2.6%  2.4%     
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On  the  basis  of  the  definitions  of  Innovative  Financing  for  Development  (IFD)  used  by 
OECD/DAC
191,  64%  of  EU  IFD  concerned  new  public  revenue  streams  (i.e.  emission 
allowances, taxes and lotteries), 31% debt-based instruments and frontloading, and 5% public 
private incentives like the Advance Market Commitments (AMCs). Debt -based instruments 
are usually reported as ODA as they fall due, and it is therefore not surprising they are not 
fully included in ODA reporting by Member States. 
5.3.2.  Innovative Financing Instruments 
Seven Member States are currently using, or are planning to use, one or more of the existing 
innovative financing mechanisms to raise funds for development
192. Overall, funds allocated 
for  innovative  financial  instruments  by  EU  Member  States  and  the  Comm ission  have 
increased from EUR 600 million per year in 2010-2011 to over EUR 2 billion in 2012. 
 
Figure 5.3.2 - Distribution of EU Innovative Financing Instruments for Development (%, 2010-2012) 
 
Source – 2013 EU Financing for Development Questionnaire 
 
As  shown  in  Figure  5.3.2,  over  two  thirds  of  innovative  financial  instruments  involve 
blending, while structured investment funds account for one quarter. 
5.4.  EU Policies and Programmes 
5.4.1.  Innovative Financing Sources 
Innovative tax sources earmark revenues for development cooperation. As a general principle, 
revenues from specific taxes should not be earmarked to specific public expenditure but used 
to finance general government spending. Governments usually follow this principle and use 
earmarking only in special cases. In some countries, earmarking is even forbidden by the 
budget  law  since  it  can  lead  to  budgetary  inflexibility  by  restricting  the  decision-making 
powers  of  the  current  and  future  governments.  Moreover,  the  revenue  generated  from  a 
particular source or sources may be greater than – or less than – the desired or appropriate 
level of spending on a particular development goal. Nor can earmarking ensure that revenues 
from a new source are additional spending, as the new revenues may simply replace spending 
previously financed from other public revenues. 
                                                           
191  OECD/DAC,  ‘Mapping  of  some  important  innovative  finance  for  development  mechanisms’, 
DCD/DAC/STAT/RD(2011)1/RD1, 2011.  
192  For a short review of existing innovative financing mechanisms, refer to last year’s Accountability Report.  
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At the EU level, two innovative sources of financing are worth underlining. 
First, the Financial Transaction Tax which eleven Member States (France, Germany, Spain, 
Italy,  Belgium,  Estonia,  Greece,  Austria,  Portugal,  Slovenia  and  Slovak  Republic)  have 
already decided to apply under ‘enhanced co-operation’ rules, as approved by the EU Council 
of Ministers in January 2013. These countries will impose a 0.1% tax on trades in stocks and 
bonds, and a 0.01% tax on derivative transactions. The tax is expected to generate about EUR 
30-35 billion per year when applied by the eleven Member States. A few EU Member States 
use FTT to finance UNITAID. France has committed to use at least 10% of the tax’s revenues 
for development. If a similar commitment were made by the other ten Member States, the tax 
could  raise  an  additional  EUR  3-3.5  billion  in  IFD,  in  effect  quadrupling  the  current 
innovative funding level. 
Second, the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) – used to fund 
development co-operation in Germany - to aviation transport, the scheme for greenhouse 
gas  emission  allowance  trading  within  the  Community.  As  foreseen  in  the  Directive 
2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council decision of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC, aviation activities are, since January 2012, included in the 
emissions from all domestic and international flights that arrive at or depart from an EU 
airport
193. 
5.4.2.  Innovative Financing Instruments 
Innovative financial instruments usually tackle two inter-related issues of cost and access. The 
type of funding and the repayment terms are both key determinants on the cost side. Blending 
of grants with market-based financing is thus a way to reduce costs, especially for investment 
with  long  gestation  period  and  with  economic  and  social  rates  of  return  well  above  the 
financial rate of return. While other measures such as guarantees help address both issues, 
other mechanisms discussed below help improving access. 
A few recent initiatives that have not yet generated substantial flows are described in Box 
5.4.2. Each instrument reports substantial leveraging of private funds, from 1:1 to 1:30. 
The European Commission is strengthening its blending mechanisms; combining grants 
with  additional  flows  (such  as  loans  and  risk  capital)  to  gain  financial  and  qualitative 
leverage, and increase the impact of EU development policy. The strategic use of a grant 
element  can  make  projects  and  initiatives  by  public  or  commercial  investors  financially 
viable, thereby exerting a leveraged policy impact. The grant element may take various forms 
such as: direct investment grants (41% of the grant element provided so far by the seven EU 
regional blending facilities managed by DEVCO); interest  rate subsidies (19%); technical 
assistance (32%), risk capital (4%), and risk sharing mechanisms such as guarantees (3%). 
Beyond unlocking additional project financing, the EU grant element also reduces the price of 
the project for the beneficiary and contributes to complying with debt sustainability criteria. 
Since 2007, the EU, together with several Member States, has set up eight regional blending 
facilities
194, now covering all regions of EU external cooperation, after the launch of t hree 
new facilities for Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific in 2012. EUR 1.5 billion grants from the 
EU budget, the European Development Fund (EDF) and Member States have financed more 
                                                           
193 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=CJE/11/139&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en.  
194  The EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the Latin America 
Investment Facility (LAIF), the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), the Asian Investment Facility (AIF), 
the Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF) and the Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP), and the Western Balkans 
Investment Facility (WBIF). The first seven are managed by DG DEVCO and the latter one by DG ELARG.  
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than 320 operations of EU blending mechanisms. The EU grant contributions to individual 
projects have leveraged more than EUR 20 billion of loans by eligible finance institutions, 
unlocking project financing of at least EUR 45 billion, in line with EU policy objectives. To 
date, the seven EU regional blending facilities managed by DEVCO have covered similar 
broadly defined sectors: transport (26% of the grant element provided by the eight regional 
blending facilities so far), energy (35%), social (5%), water/wastewater (20%), ICT (3%), and 
access to finance for MSMEs (11%). 
 
Box 5.4.2 - Examples of Innovative Financial Mechanisms Supported by Member States 
 
Germany - Support for social entrepreneurs and foundations in development   
The objective is to mobilise additional private resources for developmental activities in developing countries. 
This initiative is in technical preparation and will be piloted in 2013. 
     
Netherlands - Private Sector Revolving Fund 
The Netherlands is currently setting up a EUR 750 million revolving fund to bridge the gap between commercial 
challenges in developing countries and the strengths of the business community. 
 
Sweden - Business for Development (B4D) Programme 
B4D is an innovative programme, where Sweden engages in new ways with the private sector in order to achieve 
more development impact. An important feature of the programme is that it is open to private sector actors from 
all over the world and it is the development results that are in focus. Cost-sharing, risk-sharing, additionality, 
catalytic support and leverage effect are other guiding principles. The main instruments for collaboration are: 
Public-Private Development Partnerships, Challenge Funds, Drivers of Change, Innovative Finance (please see 
below) and Dialogue. Innovations Against Poverty is one example of a tool (a challenge fund) which is used for 
collaborating with the business sector to stimulate companies to come up with new innovative solutions for 
addressing poverty and contributing to sustainable development. Through this challenge facility successful 
bidders are able to receive support; from planning grants through guarantees, to develop and expand their 
business, as needed. A similar setup is in place for companies working with the African Enterprise Challenge 
Fund, with a particular focus on post-conflict countries.  
 
United Kingdom - Impact Programme for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
The programme, launched in December 2012, will provide up to EUR 138 million over 13 years to foster the 
development of the market for impact investment into Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia by: 
  Demonstrating the development impact and financial viability of this emerging class of investment through 
a new DFID Impact Fund (up to EUR 92 million) that will be managed by CDC. The Fund will provide 
capital and specialist advice on a competitive basis to enable impact investment managers to raise more 
capital and invest it more effectively into high impact enterprises 
  Partnering with USAID, Omidyar Network, Rockefeller Foundation to provide support (EUR 13 million) to 
the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) to improve the way that social impact is measured and 
information about it is shared  
Expected results of the Programme are:  
  Over five million poor women and men using or benefiting from access to affordable goods and services 
such as health, agricultural services, energy, housing, education, and safe water or accessing new 
opportunities as employees or producers. 
  Investments in over 100 enterprises in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia  
  Additional private capital catalysed by the DFID-CDC Impact Fund.  
  Over 300 locally based Fund Management staff trained in impact measurement and investment skills. 
 
In addition to achieving more with less by leveraging ODA grants, blending facilities provide 
funding with a financial discipline that can be more effective in boosting ‘ownership’ that 
traditional ODA. Moreover, they bring together a variety of partners, improving coordination 
among donors, international financial institutions and investors both in terms of funding and 
policy  dialogue.  These  facilities  have  also  built  a  wealth  of  expertise  in  environmental 
assessments,  engineering,  and  project  management,  and  this  expertise  is  used  the  overall 
quality of the projects they support.  
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Some civil society organisations have however raised concerns regarding the increased use of 
blending for five reasons: (1) insufficient access to information about blending operations; (2) 
unclear  monitoring  and  evaluation  methods;  (3)  opportunity  costs;  (4)  risk  of  financial 
incentives outweighing development principles; and (5) debt risks for developing countries. 
 
To address these concerns amongst other things, the European Commission launched a new 
‘EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation’ at the end of 2012, a major forum to 
build on the successful experience so far in this area and look at how to improve the quality 
and efficiency of blending mechanisms. Representatives from Member States, the European 
Parliament, the European External Action Service and the European Commission agreed on a 
work  plan  for  2013  that  includes  a  review  of  the  existing  blending  mechanisms  and  the 
development of a common results based framework to measure impact. Technical groups 
have started their work with the participation of all relevant finance institutions active in EU 
regional blending. In connection with the work of the technical groups, consultations are held 
with civil society organisations. 
 
The EU regional blending facilities currently mainly support public investments. Only 10% of 
the grant  contributions  made so  far went  to  projects  that involve the private sector. This 
support  predominantly  took  the  form  of  support  to  MSMEs.  However,  the  European 
Commission is looking into ways of increasing the role of blending as a catalyser of private 
investment for development. The main idea is not to provide grants to the private sector, but 
rather  to  use  the  grant  to  enable  additional  private  Financing  for  Development.  The 
motivation  for  increasing  the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  development  is  to  make  a 
contribution to poverty eradication and the achievement of sustainable development; not to 
help private firms make a profit. The grant shall serve to crowd-in foreign and local financing, 
assuring the additionally of the EU grant contribution, that seems strong given the average 
34:1 leverage between ODA grants and project financing achieved so far through blending. 
The leverage varies by sector from 50:1 for urban transport projects to 4:1 for projects in the 
social sectors. 
 
Debt sustainability is another important consideration when assessing projects in the blending 
facilities. In fact, the grant contribution can be used precisely to reduce the borrowing cost for 
the  beneficiary  with  a  view  to  easing  its  exposure  to  external  debt.  To  ensure  that  debt 
sustainability is taken into account, the approval process of the facilities has a built-in check 
for concessionality requirements, based on IMF regulations. This aspect is already flagged in 
the identification phase of the project by the lead finance institution. The Commission, in 
close  collaboration  with  the  EU  Delegations,  verifies  the  social,  environmental  and  debt 
sustainability  of  projects  supported  through  the  blending  facilities.  This  also  means  that 
blending cannot be used in each and every country, sector or project. 
 
Blending  mechanisms  are  also  used  bilaterally.  Over  the  period  2010-2012,  over  half  of 
blending was bilateral, and Germany accounted for 92% of the total, with the balance coming 
from  Sweden.  Implemented  by  KfW  Entwicklungsbank,  German  blending  mechanisms 
involve  a  combination  of  interest  rate  subsidies  and  Federal  guarantees.  They  are  used 
globally  and  focus  on  more  profitable  sectors  and  partner  countries  with  adequate  debt 
sustainability.  Sweden  uses  blending  in  specific  countries  (e.g.  Kenya,  Sri  Lanka, 
Mozambique) in water and sanitation and hydro power generation, or through international 
development banks (e.g. EBRD, IFC).  
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Structured  Investment  Funds  provide  risk  capital  to  private  initiatives  in  developing 
countries. Denmark supports the Arab Investment Fund (AIF), and the Climate Investment 
Fund  (DCIF).  DCIF  invests  in  commercially  viable  private  sector  projects  within  energy 
production and energy efficiency with a positive climate impact. Germany is financing several 
structured investment funds with a geographical focus. The Netherlands is a shareholder of 
the Health Insurance Fund (HIF), Investment Fund for Health in Africa (IFHA), and Medical 
Credit Fund. These are funding mechanisms for developing health insurance for people with 
low income or in the informal sector, and improving and expanding healthcare capacity. Their 
objective is to use public funds to leverage private sector investments. The first round of 
IFHA  raised  EUR  50  million  from  Goldman  Sachs,  Pfizer,  FMO,  IFC,  Shell,  Unilever, 
Aegon, Achmea, SNS Reaal, Heineken and other companies. The Global Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) is an innovative Fund-of-Funds, providing global 
risk capital through private investment for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in 
developing  countries  and  economies  in  transition.  Launched  in  2004,  GEEREF  aims  to 
accelerate  the  transfer,  development,  use  and  enforcement  of  environmentally  sound 
technologies for the world’s poorer regions, helping to bring secure, clean and affordable 
energy to local people. GEEREF is sponsored by the European Union, Germany and Norway. 
A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a partnership between the public and the private 
sector for the purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by the public 
sector.  The  Private  Infrastructure  Development  Group  (PIDG)  is  a  multi-donor 
organisation
195, including Austria, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. It was 
established in 2002 to promote private participation in infrastructure in devel oping countries 
with a strong focus on Africa. It provides long-term capital and local currency guarantees, and 
TA.  The  Public-Private  Infrastructure  Advisory  Facility  (PPIAF)
196  is a multi -donor 
technical assistance facility, set up in 1999 and financed by  17 multilateral and bilateral 
donors  including  Austria,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Sweden,  and  United 
Kingdom. It is a complementary scheme to deliver technical assistance to developing country 
governments. 
In terms of bilateral initiatives, the  Netherlands supports the PPP Facility for Food Security 
and Sustainable Development, the PPP for renewable energy, and PDP, a PPP for product 
development,  managed  by  an  independent  scientific  secretariat  that  coordinates  the 
development of new medicines, vaccines and diagnostic kits. 
Special  purpose  funds  leverage  public  long  term  capital  to  provide  solutions  to  market 
failures. The Netherlands is supporting, though a convertible subordinated loan that is not 
ODAble, the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX). TCX is a special purpose fund that hedges 
the currency and interest rate mismatch that is created in cross-border investments between 
international  investors  and  local  market  participants  in  frontier  and  less  liquid  emerging 
markets. In some blending operations (e.g. the NIF with EBRD), the EBRD is making use of 
TCX in order to make finance available to SMEs in their own currencies in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. This is an important innovation for borrowers whose revenues are in local 
currency  –  the  foreign  exchange  risk  to  borrowers  might  have  otherwise  offset  any 
concessionality  or  grant  component,  The  Netherlands  also  supports  enterprise  challenge 
funds for renewable energy (e.g. the Daey Ouwens Fund, the Sustainable Biomass Fund). The 
United Kingdom supports the GAVI Matching Fund designed to raise EUR 196 million for 
immunisation by the end of 2015. Under the initiative, the UK Department for International 
                                                           
195  Current members are: the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss State Secretariat for 
Economic  Affairs  (SECO),  the  Netherlands  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (DGIS),  the  Swedish  International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the World Bank Group (currently represented by IFC), the Austrian 
Development  Agency,  Irish  Aid,  KfW  of  Germany  and  the  Australian  Agency  for  International  Development 
(AusAID). Source: http://www.pidg.org/sitePages.asp?step=4&navID=2&contentID=10. 
196  http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/.   
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Development (DFID) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have pledged about EUR 98 
million  combined  to  match  contributions  from  corporations,  foundations  and  other 
organisations, as well as from their customers, members, employees and business partners. 
Guarantee mechanisms can reduce risk and enhance access to finance. Sweden has launched 
a EUR 76 million guarantee programme to support micro-finance. The European Commission 
with EUR 24.5 million and the Netherlands with EUR 0.4 million are providing 90% of the 
funding for IFC’s Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF). The GIIF addresses the scarcity of 
affordable insurance protection against weather and natural disasters in developing countries 
and  is  currently  supporting  28  developing  countries  with  capacity  building  and  premium 
subsidies.  Since  its  establishment  in  2009,  GIIF  partners  have  issued  more  than  125,000 
contracts. The total number to be reached by the end of 2013 exceeds 200,000, benefiting 
around one million households. 
Issues affecting the use of IFMs. As noted by some Member States, a number of issues need 
to be taken into account when using innovative financial instruments: 1) instruments should 
not impede the proper functioning of market mechanisms, 2) conditionality and earmarking of 
instruments  can  reduce  ownership  of  developing  countries,  3)  instruments  can  have  pro-
cyclical effects which can make the availability of means unpredictable, 4) ownership and 
coordination of instruments are crucial to reduce transaction costs, 5) the creation of new 
instruments implies higher financial-economic risks which need to be taken into account from 
the beginning of the design process and 6) a good ex-ante assessment framework for the 
instruments is crucial. 
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6.  USING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE EFFECTIVELY 
EU Commitments 
  The Council Conclusions of 17 November 2009
197on an Operational Framework on 
Aid  Effectiveness,  with  additions  made  in  June  2010  (cross  country  division  of 
labour) and December 2010 (accountability and transparency)
198 contains measures 
in three areas: (1) Division of Labour (selected measures to further implement the EU 
Code of Conduct on the C omplementarity and Division of Labour in Development 
Policy); (2) Use of Country Systems, and (3) Technical Cooperation for Enhanced 
Capacity Development. EU Member States and the Commission were asked to start 
implementing them immediately (both individually and jointly). 
  Council Conclusions of 14 November 2011 on the EU Common Position for the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness specified the importance of joint 
programming,  cross-country  division  of  labour,  use  of  country  systems,  mutual 
accountability,  results,  and  transparency.  It  also  endorsed  application  of  the  aid 
effectiveness principles to climate change finance. 
  Council Conclusions of 15 October 2012 (on Financing for Development): The EU 
will implement the European Transparency Guarantee and the commitments related 
to  the  common  open  standard  for  publication  of  information  on  development 
resources including publishing the respective implementation schedules by December 
2012, with the aim of full implementation by December 2015, as set out in the Busan 
Outcome Document. The EU is also committed to reducing aid fragmentation in line 
with the Busan Outcome Document, notably through promoting joint programming, 
as defined in the Council Conclusions on the EU Common Position for the Fourth 
High  Level  Forum  on  Aid  Effectiveness,  and  increasing  coordination  in  order  to 
develop a common EU joint analysis of and response to partner country’s national 
development strategy. 
6.1.  Introduction 
Quality of development expenditure is at least as important as its funding. Such quality has 
several dimensions. Development effectiveness of the financial flows analysed in the previous 
chapters, both public and private, is of paramount importance, and has been subject to a series 
of agreements initially on aid effectiveness at the OECD/DAC High Level Forums (HLF) of 
Rome, Paris and Accra, and then on development effectiveness at the Busan HLF. The latter 
resulted in the launch of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, a 
new inclusive forum bringing together a wide range of countries and organisations that are 
committed  to  ensuring  that  development  cooperation  is  effective  and  supports  the 
achievement of results. 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, the debates on Financing for Development (FFD) and on the 
Means of Implementation (MOI) for the Rio+20 Conference are converging. The principles 
for Effective Development Cooperation, agreed in Busan in December 2011, discussed in this 
chapter,  refer  clearly  to  both  FFD  and  MOI,  from  both  public  and  private  sources.  The 
Declaration itself stated that ‘as we partner to increase and reinforce development results, we 
will take action to facilitate, leverage and strengthen the impact of diverse sources of finance 
to support sustainable and inclusive development, including taxation and domestic resource 
                                                           
197  Council Conclusions on An Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, 15912/09, 18 November 2009. 
198  Council  Conclusions  on  an  Operational  Framework  on  Aid  Effectiveness  –  Consolidated  text,  18239/10,  11 
January 2011.  
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mobilisation, private investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding 
and climate change finance. At the same time, new financial instruments, investment options, 
technology  and  knowledge  sharing,  and  public-private  partnerships  are  called  for’.  More 
specifically,  ‘global  climate  change  finance  is  expected  to  increase  substantially  in  the 
medium  term.  Recognising  that  this  resource  flow  brings  with  it  new  opportunities  and 
challenges, we will endeavour to promote coherence, transparency and predictability across 
our  approaches  for  effective  climate  finance  and  broader  development  co-‐operation’. 
Effective  development  funding  must  work  towards  complementarity  of  objectives,  for 
example by ensuring that funding always supports the objectives of protecting biodiversity, 
valuing  ecosystem  services  as  well  as  climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation.  In  this 
respect, the impact of private investments must be particularly monitored. 
 
The Busan principles for Effective Development Cooperation therefore apply to all Financing 
for Development discussed in this report, including Means of Implementation into financing 
of Global Public Goals/ sustainable development goals, as well as all actors involved as both 
civil society organisations and the private sector are part of the post-Busan Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation. 
The EU and its Member States played an active and constructive role in the Busan Fourth 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness as well as during its preparation. The Busan outcome 
document was in line with the priorities of the EU and Member States: it is inclusive, it 
focuses  and  deepens  aid  effectiveness  commitments  while  expanding  to  development 
effectiveness and, finally, it emphasises country level implementation while scaling down 
global governance structures. 
As stated in the EU Common Position for Busan, the priority after Busan is to focus on the 
country level implementation of aid and development effectiveness commitments. The 
main EU deliverables are on joint programming and transparency. There is also an EU 
commitment to support country-level results and accountability frameworks and division of 
labour arrangements. 
A first progress report on progress made after Busan will be presented in the second 
half of 2013, and could therefore not be considered for the preparation of this report. Final 
decisions on the mandate and the governance structure of the Global Partnership as well as 
monitoring framework set in the Busan outcome document were made by the Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness in June 2012. The main function of the Global Partnership is to ensure 
continued accountability at the political level based on the evidence arising from country level 
implementation.  Global  monitoring  arrangements,  in  turn,  will  build  on  country  level 
monitoring processes based on a global set of core indicators on Busan priority themes. The 
decisions of the Working Party were based on the proposals negotiated by the Post-Busan 
Interim  Group.  The  European  Commission  (representing  the  EU),  the  United  Kingdom, 
Germany and Sweden were all members of the group and played an active role in it. 
The Global Partnership Steering Committee has met twice so far, in December 2012 and 
March  2013.  Regional  and  constituency  consultations  are  currently  on-going  and  a  first 
progress review of progress on the ten indicators agreed in Busan will be prepared after mid-
2013. The Global Partnership is also seeking linkages with the UN post-2015 process and 
with the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, to  ensure consistency 
between these parallel  efforts.  The process  is  ambitious  and potentially far reaching with 
simultaneous attempts at redefining the overall targets of development cooperation, its scope 
and financing tools, the types of actors involved from the official sector and civil society, and 
the focus of effectiveness from aid to development.  
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6.2.  Implementation Table 
The table below summarises progress made in 2012 in implementing the EU commitments on 
aid transparency, joint programming, and mutual accountability. Further details are discussed 
in the main text. 
EU Commitment  Target Date  Status
199  Comment 
Implement the European 
Transparency Guarantee and 
commitments relating to the 
common open standard for 
the publication of 
information on development 
resources, e.g. by publishing 
implementation schedules 
by December 2012, with the 
aim of full implementation 
by December 2015 
December 2012 
(schedules) and 
December 2015 
(implementation) 
 
By December 2012, the 
Commission and 20 MS, 
including all nine that are 
signatories to IATI, had 
published schedules to 
implement the common 
standard. 
In their schedules, the 
Commission and 13 MS set out 
plans for implementation by 
2015. 
A majority of the schedules (11 
out of 21) were rated 
‘unambitious’ by Publish What 
You Fund (PWYF). 19 MS had a 
rating of ‘poor’ in PWYF’s 2012 
Transparency Index, four MS 
and the Commission were rated 
as ‘fair’ and four MS as 
‘moderate’.  
Promote joint programming 
and increase coordination in 
order to develop a EU joint 
analysis of, and response to, 
partner countries’ national 
development strategies 
No date specified 
 
  Joint programming was taken 
forward in six partner countries 
in 2012 and is expected to be in 
place at the start of the next 
programming period (2014) in at 
least eight. The opportunities for 
joint programming were 
assessed on the ground in a total 
of 55 countries and preparations 
for joint programming will go 
ahead in almost all of these. 
Nine MS have issued guidelines 
on joint multi-annual 
programming.  
Implement the results and 
mutual accountability 
agenda 
No date specified 
 
  Currently, the EU and 24 MS 
participate in mutual 
accountability arrangements in 
over 10% of their priority 
countries, and 13 MS and the EU 
do so in 50% or more. 
The EU and 21 MS participate in 
country-level results frameworks 
and platforms in over 10% of 
their priority countries, and 12 
MS and the EU do so in 50% or 
more. 
                                                           
199  Green: achieved or on-track; amber: limited achievement, partly off-track; red: off-track.  
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6.3.  EU Policies and Programmes 
6.3.1.  Joint Programming 
The EU has achieved substantial progress on joint programming. EU Joint Programming 
occurs  when  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  agree  to  adopt  a  common  multiannual 
programming document for their support to a partner country or region, or when they take 
steps in this direction. In accordance with the Council Conclusions of November 2011
200, 
Joint  Programming  calls  for  a  joint  analysis  of  and  a  joint  response  to  the  partner 
country’s/region’s development plan. It should also include the identification of the sectors of 
intervention, in-country division of labour and indicative financial allocations. 
 
In January 2012, the EU and its Member States jointly asked that the feasibility of Joint 
Programming  be  assessed  by  their  delegations  and  embassies  in  eleven  candidate  partner 
countries. Joint Programming was taken forward in six of these countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Laos, Mali and Rwanda), while it had already begun in Haiti and South Sudan. 
Following the experiences in these first eight countries (discussed in Box 6.3.1 below), the 
feasibility of Joint Programming in an  additional forty-two countries  was  canvassed. The 
overwhelming majority of responses received so far have been positive, with most expecting 
to  undertake  Joint  Programming  by  2016.  The  EU  and  nine  Member  States  have  issued 
guidelines on joint multi-annual programming, while four Member States will issue them in 
2013
201. The European Commission and the EEAS have issued programming instructions for 
the period 2014-20 noting the priority given to Joint Programming where it is relevant to the 
country situation, and setting out guidance on how to deal with it in the programming 
exercise. Further guidance on joint programming is available from dedicated units within the 
EEAS and EuropeAid. 
 
Member States that have issued or are planning to issue Joint Programmin g guidelines cover 
almost equally all elements of joint programming: joint analysis, joint response, in -country 
division of labour, indicative sector allocation, and synchronisation with planning cycles of 
partner countries. 
Box 6.3.1 – On-going Joint Programming Exercises and Lessons Learnt 
 
In Guatemala and Laos, draft Joint Programming documents were received in December 2012, 
including a joint analysis of and response to national development plans, steps towards division of 
labour and indicative financial allocations. Further discussions are taking place with Member States 
with a view to fine tuning these documents. 
 
In Ghana, the Joint Programming process is built on the Busan-inspired Compact already agreed by 
the government and most donors. It includes an analysis of the strategic direction of the development 
of the country and ways to implement the aid relationship. In addition, the EU and Member States will 
discuss a Joint Framework Document which encompasses the wider EU-Ghana relationship. 
 
In Ethiopia, an EU Joint Cooperation Strategy was signed in January 2012 by 21 EU donors as well 
as Norway. For Rwanda, an advanced Joint Programming document, which will be fully synchronised 
with the new national development cycle of the government, is expected by June 2013. It will build on 
the existing and quite well advanced division of labour process led by the Rwandan government itself. 
                                                           
200  Doc. 16773/11: Council Conclusions of 14 November 2011 on the EU Common Position for the 4th High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, South Korea, 29/11 -1/12/2011). 
201  BE, DK, EE, ES, FI, LU, NL, PL, and SK. AT, DE, FR, and RO will issue guidelines in 2013.  
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In Mali, Joint Programming will be reviewed in order to take account of the current political situation. 
In Haiti, the prospects are good for Joint Programming to start in the short term, building on the 
experience of 2010. Further identification is taking place on the ground with regard to the scope and 
timelines. In South Sudan, the Joint Programming agreed in 2011 is currently being implemented and 
a revised Joint Programming document is foreseen for 2014. 
 
Some of the main lessons learnt from the first Joint Programming countries are: 1) Joint Programming 
processes are most effective when driven at partner country level, having led to local solutions adapted 
to the specific circumstances; 2) Ownership by partner countries, and where possible their leadership 
as in Rwanda, is important; 3) In some countries, non-EU actors are taking part as well, and it is 
important to remain open to other committed non EU actors; 4) Above all, experience confirms that 
synchronisation with partner countries’ planning cycles is crucial. Programming instructions for all 
EU cooperation for the period 2014-20 provide for flexibility to synchronise with partner countries’ 
planning cycles, and to use their development plans as the basis for all EU programming. 
6.3.2.  Transparency of Development Finance 
Making  Development  Finance  more  transparent  is  also  essential.  All  EU  non-DAC 
donors now also report their ODA to the OECD/DAC. The Commission continues to provide 
support to the EU’s non-DAC donors to enhance their statistical reporting capacity. The EU15 
countries have all adhered to the new DAC CRS++ reporting formats. 
The  International  Aid  Transparency  Initiative  (IATI)  was  launched  in  2008  to  develop 
consistent and coherent international standards so that donors report more timely information 
on past and future aid spending. The European Commission and nine Member States
202 are 
signatories to IATI, and are implementing or are preparing to implement its standards. The 
Czech Republic is designing a new ODA internal reporting system in full compliance with 
IATI  standards,  and  Estonia  is  exploring  the  possibility  of  making  its  ODA  statistics 
compatible with IATI standards. 
Nineteen Member States have developed and use national aid transparency tools, usually 
through their development cooperation’s websites, and annual reports. Denmark is preparing a 
new law on International Development Assistance that will require increased transparency 
both  at  partner  country  level,  and  domestically.  The  EU  adopted  the  EU  Transparency 
Guarantee in November 2011, while both Sweden and the United Kingdom launched national 
Aid Transparency Guarantees in 2010 (see Box 6.3.2). 
Important dimensions of aid transparency include: 1) the way funds are provided (within or 
outside national budget and public finance management systems), 2) how predictable their 
disbursement is (a key element in enabling proper planning and resource management), and 3) 
the extent to which information on the use of such funds is made public. 
Aid predictability is essential in that regard. For example, while overall international public 
finance  has  been  stable,  the  picture  is  different  for  individual  developing  countries.  The 
analysis on the basis of DAC’s Forward Spending Surveys shows that volatility of bilateral 
donors’ Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is on average close to 10% (slightly higher with 
multilateral institutions). Studies have found aid to be pro-cyclical and more volatile than 
exports for example, and put a cost of this volatility at about EUR 12bn
203. 
At  the  Busan  HLF  for  Effective  Development  Cooperation  in  December  2011,  donors 
committed to providing indicative 3-5-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans 
                                                           
202  BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, IE, NL, SE, UK. 
203  Kharas, ‘Measuring the cost of aid volatility’, Wolfensohn Center for Development Working Paper 3, 2008.   
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to  all  of  their  partner  countries.  The  implementation  of  annual  predictability  as  well  as 
medium-term (three years) aid predictability will be monitored through the Busan indicators. 
Forward spending data is also part of the agreed IATI standard, so should improve with the 
progressive implementation of IATI in the near future. 
Table 6.3.2 – EU Member States that are signatories to IATI and/or have published their IATI 
Implementation Schedule
204 
Signatory  Month/Year signed up to IATI  Date of most recent schedule  
Austria    December 2012 
Belgium  November 2012  December 2012 
Czech Republic    December 2012 
Denmark  September 2008  December 2012 
EC  September 2008  December 2012 
Finland  September 2008  December 2012 
France    December 2012 
Germany  September 2008  December 2012 
Greece    December 2012 
Ireland  September 2008  December 2012 
Italy    December 2012 
Latvia    December 2012 
Luxembourg    December 2012 
Netherlands  September 2008  December 2012 
Poland    December 2012 
Portugal    December 2012 
Slovak Republic    December 2012 
Slovenia    December 2012 
Spain  November 2008  December 2012 
Sweden  September 2008  December 2012 
United Kingdom  September 2008  December 2012 
The EU performance on aid transparency is mixed. Nineteen Member States had a rating of 
‘poor’ in the 2012 Transparency Index prepared by Publish What You Fund (PWYF), the 
global campaign for aid transparency. Four Member States
205 and the Commission were rated 
as  ‘fair’  and  four  Member  States
206  as  ‘moderate’.  By  December  2012,  the  European 
Commission and twenty Member States, including all nine that are signatories to IATI, have 
published schedules to implement the common standard for transparency for development 
cooperation  resources  as  required  in  the  Busan  Partnership  for  Effective  Development 
Cooperation, as shown in Table 6.3.2 above. 
In particular, all EU IATI signatories have committed to start publishing in the IATI Registry 
by end of 2013. The Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland and the Slovak Republic have 
committed to begin by 2015. A majority of published scheduled (11 out of 21) were rated as 
unambitious by PWYF. 
                                                           
204  See http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/acommonstandard.htm. 
205  DK, NL, SE, UK (DfID). 
206  BE, CZ, EE, FI.   
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Publish  What  You  Fund  rated  the  implementation  plans  along  three  dimensions
207:  (a) 
intention to publish (current, comparable data) by 2015; b) publication approach (frequency 
and open data licence); and (c) proportion of data fields to be delivered by end of 2015. The 
implementation plans of Belgium, Den mark, the European Commission, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (DfID) were rated as ambitious, while the plans of the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland and Spain were considered as moderately ambitious. The 
remaining plans were either incomplete or rated as unambitious. 
Civil society organisations have also committed to make their aid more transparent as part of 
the Busan process. Private grants are presently difficult to monitor and lack a common 
reporting standard. Given the relative importance of private charity in low income countries, it 
is essential that CSO become at least as transparent as official donors on their funding and 
ensure  proper  reporting  of  their  support  to  developing  countries,  even  though  some 
confidentiality may still be needed in sensitive areas like human rights. 
Box 6.3.2 – Aid Transparency Guarantees 
  In November 2011, EU Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed on the EU Transparency Guarantee, 
ensuring that EU Member states will publicly disclose all information on aid programmes so that it 
can be more easily accessed, shared and published. It will also make available to all stakeholders 
indicative forward-looking information on development expenditure at country level on an annual 
basis. It will finally make information available on all aid to partner countries, to enable them to 
report  them  in  their  national  budget  documents  and  help  increase  transparency  towards 
parliaments, civil society and citizens.  
  In  2010  Sweden  introduced  a  transparency  guarantee  into  its  development  cooperation.  The 
guarantee means that all public documents and public information will be made available online. 
The information shall explain when, to whom and why money has been made available, and what 
results have been achieved. Sweden’s flagship website - www.openaid.se - was launched in 2011. 
Openaid.se is a democratic initiative, facilitating accountability towards Swedish tax payers as 
well as towards people in Sweden’s partner countries, by opening up development cooperation to 
the public. It is a data-hub providing Swedish aid information on disbursements in an open format. 
This means that the format allows for citizens, CSOs and entrepreneurs to use, refine, and develop 
the data provided. The aid information is provided on a global scale, at country level, per sector or 
by implementing agency. It covers a time period of four decades. The Swedish Government is 
committed to continuing its implementation of the transparency guarantee and supports initiatives 
such as the Open Government Partnership, the Open Aid Partnership, and the EU Transparency 
Guarantee (see below). 
  The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee was launched in June 2010. It commits the United Kingdom 
to  publishing  detailed  information  about  new  DfID  projects  and  policies  in  a  way  that  is 
comprehensive, accessible, comparable, accurate and timely. In November 2012, DfID launched 
the Open Aid Information Platform, to improve access to its aid data and open up the chain of aid 
delivery, from DfID right through to the end beneficiary. 
The European Commission, in cooperation with the Joint Research Centre, is developing an 
EU aid transparency tool called TR AID (Transparent Aid) to support the sharing of aid 
information within the EU and across major international donors, with the aim of using aid 
funds more effectively. Sharing of aid data with the public and among donors has always been 
a challenge, due to a large number of data formats in use, and because data is available in 
different repositories. 
                                                           
207  See http://tracker.publishwhatyoufund.org/.  
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6.3.3.  Mutual Accountability Frameworks 
Mutual  accountability  is  a  fundamental  principle  for  EU  development  policies  and 
strategies.  It  refers  to  the  process  through  which  two  or  more  partners  hold  each  other 
accountable for their performance against the commitments they have voluntarily made to 
each other. 
Although managing for development results and mutual accountability lie at the heart of the 
Paris  principles,  they  figure  among  the  least  advanced  of  the  five  Paris  Declaration 
principles
208. The UN DCF surveys in 2010/2011 on mutual accountability in de velopment 
cooperation  in  105  countries  showed  limited  progress  in  this  area
209.  The  results  and 
accountability agenda was thus strongly reaffirmed in the  Busan Global Partnership focusing 
on key principles of transparent, country-led and country level results frameworks. The so-
called ‘Results and mutual accountability Building Block’ is formed by a coalition of donors 
and  developing  countries  who  on  a  voluntary  basis  are  promoting  action  on  the  Busan 
Partnership in this area. 
One  of  the  key  objectives  of  the  building  block  is  to  promote  Country  Results  and 
Accountability  Agreements.  Such  Agreements  should  be  defined  and  led  by  developing 
countries, based on a two pillars approach: a developing country pillar (definition of a results 
framework  based  on  national  development  strategies  with  a  limited  number  of  results 
indicators) and a development cooperation provider pillar (accountability framework based on 
aid  policies  and  other  strategies  for  aid  effectiveness  agreed  at  country  level).  These 
agreements can also be used as an umbrella for other related initiatives aimed at delivering 
sustainable development results. 
In 2012, a number of initiatives have been taken in order to promote the Results and Mutual 
accountability agenda and to identify ways in which it can be implemented. 
In September and November 2012, two regional workshops were organised in Africa (Lusaka, 
in September 2012, and Cotonou in November 2012 for Francophone Africa) with the support 
and  participation  of  the  EU  and  several  Member  States
210. The main purpose of these 
workshops was to share lessons learnt from country experiences on results and accountability 
frameworks,  including  on  how  to  build  on  existing  mechanisms/initiatives  and  further 
strengthen them. The objective was to identify concret e successes and challenges in setting 
satisfactory results and mutual accountability systems and ways of making further progress. 
The  EU is currently working with partner countries and other donors on comprehensive 
approaches to domestic and mutual accountability and transparency. At this stage, the EU 
and 24 Member States participate in mutual accountability arrangements in more than 10% 
of their priority countries, and thirteen Member States and the Commission do so in 50% or 
more of their priority countries. These mutual accountability arrangements can have different 
forms:  joint  performance  assessment  frameworks,  policy  dialogue  groups,  consultative 
groups, or joint review panels. 
In 2011, the ‘Agenda for Change’ underlined the need for an EU common framework for 
Results; and an EU experts group on Results was set up in order to share experiences and 
approaches to measuring results and to reflect on how best to harmonise project results among 
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different donors, both at sector and country level. The EU and 21 Member States participate 
in  country-level  results  frameworks  and  platforms  in  more  than  10%  of  their  priority 
countries, and twelve Member States and the Commission do so in 50% or more of their 
priority countries. 
The  Commission  is  working  towards  the  adoption  of  a  harmonised  way  to  monitor 
performance at the country level for its own operations. To this end, EuropeAid has started 
working towards the design of an overall results framework that will allow for increased 
accountability for the projects and programmes portfolio it manages. It also initiated a review 
of  its  ex-ante  evaluation  process  as  well  as  of  its  projects  and  programmes  monitoring, 
reporting and evaluation system.  In parallel,  it stepped up its  work on developing a new 
operational information management system allowing the Commission to have appropriate 
information on the performance of individual projects and programmes, as well as on the 
results they achieve. 
The  EU  and  seventeen  Member  States  support  partner  countries’  statistical  capacities  for 
monitoring progress and evaluating impact. Several Member States have indicated that this 
kind of support is often integrated in programme design, and hence difficult to tabulate. Most 
activities focus on technical assistance and capacity building for national statistics institutes 
(data collection, harmonisation and compliance criteria, decentralisation, etc.), including in 
the form of trainings, scholarships and transfer of knowledge. 
6.3.4.  Domestic Accountability and Good Public Financial Management 
As a critical element for domestic accountability systems and development policies, effective 
Public Financial Management (PFM) lies at the heart of countries’ governance systems. PFM 
not only includes technical systems and processes, also but wider issues of institutions and 
incentives.  The  ultimate  objective  of  PFM  reforms  is  to  achieve  more  transparent,  more 
effective and more efficient management of government revenues, expenditure, assets and 
liabilities.  Well-functioning  PFM  systems  are  vital  to  implement  policies  effectively  and 
efficiently. 
The EU strongly supports PFM, mainly through its Budget Support operations. Strengthening 
public  finance  management  systems  and  capacities  continues  to  be  a  key  area  of  EU 
cooperation. More than 80 new projects were implemented in 2012 in that area, in close 
cooperation with other key partners.  
The new Guidelines on Budget Support notably reinforce the importance of PFM through two 
new features. The first is the highlight of the existence and structured monitoring of a relevant 
and credible government PFM reform programme. The second is the reinforcement of budget 
transparency and oversight of the budget that has become an eligibility criterion on its own. 
The Commission uses the PEFA-PFM Performance Measurement Framework as the preferred 
tool to assess the quality of the PFM system in a country. The promotion of its use has 
continued in 2012 as the Commission conducted 22 assessments. The European Commission, 
France and the United Kingdom are working very closely with the other four PEFA partners 
on the revision of the framework to continuously enhance the PEFA tool. 
In  early  2013,  following  a  request  from  the  OECD/DAC,  the  IMF  and  the  Commission 
published a Good Practice Note to assist donors when sequencing PFM reforms
211. This note 
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reviews  lessons  learnt  on  the  sequencing  of  PFM  reforms  and  offers  guidance  to  assist 
reforms in countries with different PFM backgrounds.  
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Annex 2 – Methodology 
All figures not expressed in Euro have been converted into Euro using OECD/DAC average 
exchange rates for the relevant year. Data in Table 1.2.2 were calculated from a variety of 
sources as shown below, and refer to the year 2010. 
 
 
Flow  Methodology and Source 
Public Domestic Finance    
Tax revenue  Tax revenues were calculated by applying IMF tax to GDP ratios by income group
212 to 
GDP data by income group (source WB WDI)
213 
Public or Publicly Guaranteed 
(PPG) External Debt 
WB International Debt Statistics 2013
214, PPG external debt from non-official creditors. 
Short term debt not included. Official creditors covered under ‘Public international Finance’. 
Total Reserves  WB International Debt Statistics 2013, pages 56-59 
Public International Finance    
ODA Grants  OECD DAC Geo Book
215 -Net Disbursement 
(of which EU)  OECD DAC Geo Book - Net Disbursement. EU data do not include imputed multilateral aid 
and therefore underestimate the real contribution of the EU and its Member States. 
Concessional Loans  OECD DAC Geo Book -Net Disbursement 
(of which EU)  OECD DAC Geo Book -Net Disbursement 
Other official finance  OECD DAC Geo Book -Net Disbursement 
(of which EU)  OECD DAC Geo Book -Net Disbursement 
International security  operations  United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
216 
(of which EU)  United Nations Peace Keeping Operations 
Private Finance – domestic and 
international   
Domestic Private Investment  (Private) Gross Capital Formation (Domestic Private Investment) is calculated on the basis 
of private and total Gross Fixed Capital Formation (source WB WDI). First, the ratio 
between Private Fixed Capital Formation and Public Fixed Capital Formation is applied 
Gross Capital Formation to find a proxy for Private Gross Capital Formation. Second, FDI 
and Private non-guaranteed external debt (source: World Bank IDS) are deducted from the 
private GCF, which gives the estimate for Domestic Private Gross Capital Formation. 
External private finance (debt, FDI, 
portfolio investment, remittances)   
Private non-guaranteed External 
Debt  WB International Debt Statistics 2013, Short term debt not included.  
FDI  WB WDI. 
Foreign Portfolio Investment  WB WDI. 
Remittances  Year 2011. WB Database on Remittances
217. In 2010, remittances accounted to 462bn 
(of which EU)  Year 2011. WB Database on Remittances, and Balance of Payment data, using the EU share 
of total remittances to calculate EU remittances to developing countries.  
Private charity  Hudson Institute
218 
Total volume of developing 
countries’ exports of goods and 
services  WB WDI. 
 
                                                           
212  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12108.pdf.  
213  http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators.  
214  http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ids-2013.pdf.  
215  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DACGEO.  
216  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/.  
217
  http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pa
gePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.  
218  http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/2012IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittancesWeb.pdf.   
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Figures on Official Development Assistance (ODA) are in current prices and taken from: 
–  The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for those Member States for which 
DAC reports.  
–  Member  States’  replies  for  those  Member  States  whose  ODA  data  are  not  available 
through DAC.  
–  From 2013 onwards, ODA figures are taken, as far as available, from Member States’ 
replies.  
–  Where  a Member State presents  only the ODA/GNI ratio, ODA will be calculated by 
multiplying it with the Commission’s GNI figure. Where a Member State gives both the 
ODA figure and the ODA/GNI ratio, we will give preference to using the ODA figure as 
this gives a better indication of where the achievement of ODA/GNI targets is sensitive to 
differing assumptions on GNI.  
–  When information on both ODA and ODA/GNI ratio for 2013 and/or beyond is missing, 
the trend for the missing years is established on the basis of Compound Annual Growth 
Rate of 2007-2012, except if indicated differently.  
–  Imputed multilateral aid for LDCs and Africa in 2012 was calculated differently this year. 
For  the  previous  editions,  we  used  the  bilateral  ODA  for  each  income  group/region 
reported to DAC by Member States and assumed that the proportion between bilateral and 
imputed multilateral aid would remain the same as in the previous year. This assumption 
did not allow accurate projections. This year, we used the actual amounts disbursed by EU 
Institutions to Africa and LDCs and imputed them to Member States based on their share 
of total contributions, used the actual disbursements of the Wold Bank Group in FY12 
(which  does  not  correspond  to  the  calendar  year  but  is  the  best  proxy  available)  and 
imputed them based on funding shares derived from table DAC1a for 2012, and did the 
same for other multilaterals assuming zero nominal growth compared to 2011. 
–  Data  on  ODA  to  LDCs  are  not  provided  by  Germany.  As  for  previous  editions,  we 
assumed zero nominal growth compared to 2011. 
Exchange rates used for conversion into EUR are: 
–  the annual DAC exchange rate in the case of the OECD/DAC data,  
–  for Members States national currencies, the Commission’s annual average exchange rates 
from Ameco database (extracted on 19 February 2013) up to 2015.  
Figures for Gross National Income (GNI) are taken in current prices from: 
–  the OECD/DAC statistics when available to ensure consistency of the ODA/GNI data.  
–  the AMECO database as of 19 February 2013, for other Member States and for the years 
not covered by the DAC, as well as for projections up to 2014. Projections for 2015 are not 
available and we assumed a nominal growth rate identical to the one used for the 2012 EU 
Accountability Report.  
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There is often reference to OECD, and DAC membership of EU Member States. All EU 
OECD members report to DAC, while only EU DAC Members report to DAC in great detail. 
The  list  of  non  DAC  Members  reporting  to  DAC  is  available  online  at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_2649_34447_41513218_1_1_1_1,00.html .  
The table below summarises the OECD and DAC membership of EU Member States. 
EU MEMBER STATES  OECD MEMBERS  DAC MEMBERS 
REPORTING TO 
DAC 
AT  Y  Y  Y 
BE  Y  Y  Y 
BG      Y 
CY      Y 
CZ  Y    Y 
DK  Y  Y  Y 
EE  Y    Y 
FI  Y  Y  Y 
FR  Y  Y  Y 
DE  Y  Y  Y 
EL  Y  Y  Y 
HR      Y 
HU  Y    Y 
IE  Y  Y  Y 
IT  Y  Y  Y 
LV      Y 
LT      Y 
LU  Y  Y  Y 
MT      Y 
NL  Y  Y  Y 
PL  Y    Y 
PT  Y  Y  Y 
RO      Y 
SK  Y    Y 
SI  Y    Y 
ES  Y  Y  Y 
SE  Y  Y  Y 
UK  Y  Y  Y 
  21  15  28  
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There is often reference to EU 28, EU 27, EU 15 and EU 12. The table below gives the list 
of Member States in each category: 
EU MEMBER STATES  EU 28  EU 27  EU 15  EU 12 
AT  Y  Y  Y   
BE  Y  Y  Y   
BG  Y  Y    Y 
CY  Y  Y    Y 
CZ  Y  Y    Y 
DK  Y  Y  Y   
EE  Y  Y    Y 
FI  Y  Y  Y   
FR  Y  Y  Y   
DE  Y  Y  Y   
EL  Y  Y  Y   
HR  Y       
HU  Y  Y    Y 
IE  Y  Y  Y   
IT  Y  Y  Y   
LV  Y  Y    Y 
LT  Y  Y    Y 
LU  Y  Y  Y   
MT  Y  Y    Y 
NL  Y  Y  Y   
PL  Y  Y    Y 
PT  Y  Y  Y   
RO  Y  Y    Y 
SK  Y  Y    Y 
SI  Y  Y    Y 
ES  Y  Y  Y   
SE  Y  Y  Y   
UK  Y  Y  Y   
 